While
all of this was occurring, a whole new group of Iraqis entered
the anti-occupation fray; resistance started to emanate from
Shi'ite leader Moqtada Al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army. Al-Sadr, who
Washington was intent on keeping out of the decision making
process, increased his anti-occupation rhetoric to such a degree
that the Bush administration finally decided to silence him,
choosing to shut down his newspaper Al-Hawza. Al-Sadr
refused to give in, and continued his incendiary speeches, this
time provoking the United States into arresting one of his top
deputies. He decided that it was time to prove to Washington
that he would not be sidelined; he responded by calling his
Mahdi Army into open confrontation with US-led troops.
It
was this decision that has cast doubt over the future of US
plans in Iraq, since Al-Sadr’s rebellion has had such extreme
ramifications. His rebellion, coupled with the US retaliation
into Fallujah, hastened the US troop death rate to its highest
levels since the start of the Iraq invasion in March of 2003.
Since the beginning of April, some 70 US troops have been killed
throughout the country. Furthermore, the US military has killed
some 600 Iraqi civilians, and has wounded thousands more.
The
heightened level of death on both sides - American and Iraqi -
bodes ill for the success of the occupation. Generally, the
success of occupation hinges on the amount of negative influence
the occupation force has on the lives of civilians in the
occupied country. The goal of an occupation is for the positive
effects to far outweigh the negative. Up until April, the United
States had managed to largely balance the two out. The recent
surge in violence, however, is quickly causing the negative
effects of the US occupation to far outweigh the positive ones.
This lack of balance must be corrected if the United States
hopes to foster peace in the country and install a government
that pursues policies at least somewhat in line with US
interests in the region.
The
heavy-handed reaction by Washington to the Fallujah attacks and
the Shi’ite uprising is seriously threatening America’s
current position in Iraq. The US must avoid creating huge levels
of civilian casualties if it wants to defeat, or at least
marginalize, anti-occupation guerrillas. By causing a high rate
of civilian casualties, the US is quickly turning itself into an
occupying force despised by the Iraqi populace. This, in turn,
will lead many neutral Iraqis to sympathize, or even side with,
anti-occupation guerrillas.
The
pendulum has already started swinging, which is evident by the
quick collapse of the US-trained Iraqi security forces in the
face of the various guerrilla groups. In Fallujah, Baghdad and
Iraq’s southern Shi’ite cities, guerrillas quickly swept
into checkpoints and police stations, meeting little or no
resistance from the US-trained security forces. Indeed, in some
instances, the US-trained Iraqi security forces switched sides.
If
this pattern continues, and more of the Iraqi population begins
to side with anti-occupation guerrillas, the United States will
be forced to make compromises in its Iraq strategy. For one, it
will have to negotiate with guerrilla groups and political
figures that it currently labels as “outlaws.” Leaders such
as Moqtada Al-Sadr will need to be invited to the political
decision-making table since Washington will not have enough
military leverage to deal with so many different threats at one
time. Such compromises will mean that the United States will not
achieve all of its original objectives in Iraq; on the contrary,
it may have to be happy with achieving a minor influence in the
new Iraqi government since otherwise, if the current resistance
movement continues, it may be left with none.