After Saddam Hussein’s Ba’thist infrastructure collapsed in Iraq, and US troops rode into Baghdad, an important goal of the Pentagon was to establish law and order in the city. The power vacuum created after the fall of Saddam needed to be filled by a new entity, and that entity became the United States. While unprepared for the task ahead, the Pentagon and policymakers in Washington aimed to stabilize Baghdad and the rest of Iraq in order to allow Iraqis to continue on with their lives. The end goal of the Bush administration was to replace the leadership in Baghdad with a US-friendly one, while having as little effect on the Iraqi people as possible.

Yet by undertaking such a mission, the United States marched into an interesting paradox that often occurs when a state occupies another: occupation often sparks guerrilla resistance. As guerrilla resistance intensifies, the occupying power finds itself justifying its continued involvement in order to contain the resistance; yet the more involved the occupier becomes, the more determined is the resistance.

Many of the groups and individuals behind the insurgency in Iraq have stated that their purpose of fighting is to end the US occupation. While some groups are made up of disenfranchised members of Saddam’s banned Ba’th Party, other groups have claimed that they have no allegiance to it and are only interested in removing US troops from Iraqi soil.

These different militant organizations have been plaguing US soldiers in the country, especially around the Baghdad area. Using roadside and vehicle bombs, hit and run attacks, and other methods of guerrilla warfare, insurgents in Iraq have prevented the United States from accomplishing its mission of replacing the leadership in Baghdad while at the same time preventing the country from falling into violence and instability.

The main reason why the Bush administration is trying to stabilize Iraq and reduce the strain on the Iraqi population is because a major national interest of the administration is for Iraq to become an important US foothold in the Middle East, a country that can provide Washington power and influence in the region. For this to work effectively, Iraq needs to be stabilized and the people generally have to support a new government in Baghdad that acquiesces to US interests.

And this is where the problem lies. The administration sees the only solution of stabilizing Iraq in the ability of the US military to deal a death blow to the insurgency. But since this is Washington’s only real strategy, it means that the occupation will have to remain until the insurgency is destroyed.

Yet, the reason that the insurgency exists is to prevent the US from occupying Iraq, and the longer the occupation remains, the stronger the insurgency will probably become. Furthermore, as is usually the case in guerrilla conflicts, the Iraqi people will blame the United States for the carnage and instability created during warfare between the insurgents and US troops. Similar to what happened during US involvement in the Vietnam struggle or in present day Israel, the longer the war rages, the more support the insurgents and militant organizations receive.

In a country like Iraq, increasing support for the insurgency will wreak havoc on the ability of the Bush administration to justify to the US population its involvement there. If the Iraqi people show less and less support for the US-led coalition authorities, an already skeptical American population will intensify their questioning of the Bush administration. With a presidential election less than a year away, the Bush administration is struggling to keep the picture rosy in Iraq in order to prevent the American people from becoming disenchanted over US foreign policy.

Therefore, if the insurgency is not destroyed, the occupation will continue until it becomes so unpopular domestically that Washington will be forced to pull out, similar to the political failure that occurred during US involvement in Vietnam. One effort that the Bush administration is undertaking to prevent the US population from becoming disenchanted with the occupation has been to redeploy US troops out of the most hostile parts of the Baghdad area and to form a perimeter around the city.

The number of US military bases in Baghdad has already been dramatically reduced, now down to 26 from a high of 60. The Pentagon plans to reduce this number to eight by the middle of April. Hoping that Iraq’s security forces will be able to keep a general atmosphere of stability in Baghdad, the administration would like to bring Iraq off the political radar for the time being.

In theory, this strategy could work. In practice, however, if US troops pull out of Baghdad, yet remain in Iraq, it will provide time and freedom for insurgents to better organize their infrastructure and prepare for bolder and more efficient attacks. The belief that Iraq’s security forces will be able to crack down effectively on the guerrillas is unrealistic; one only needs to look at the many high-profile insurgent attacks on the security forces to realize that the guerrillas look at them in the same way they look at US soldiers, who are far better trained and equipped.

Therefore, the paradox of occupation could prove to be Washington’s death knell in Iraq. With no firm strategy to end the insurgency, and with an eroding political base at home, the Bush administration has already been forced to sacrifice military strategy in exchange for domestic support, a decision that could quickly unravel Washington’s efforts to bring stability to post-Saddam Iraq.

Erich Marquardt is an analyst with the Power and Interest News Report (PINR). He can be contacted at content@pinr.com.