Iraqis and the Occupation

Women and Social Change in Iraq

By Dr. Nadje Al-Ali
University of Exeter, UK

11/11/2003 

Anyone who has been watching the media in recent months is aware of the fact that there are different ethnic groups in Iraq, most notably Arabs, Kurds and Turkmen. The Iraqi population is also differentiated with respect to religious affiliation: 53% of the Iraqi population are Shiite Muslim and 42% are Sunni Muslim, according to Encyclopedia Britannica. Some people might even have heard that one can find Catholics, Orthodox and Assyrians amongst the Christian populations in Iraq, or that Iraq used to be home to the oldest and biggest Jewish community in the region. But what is lost and ignored in the media accounts of Iraq is the actual majority of its population – women. According to various estimates, women constitute between 55 to 60 percent of the Iraqi population. The demographic discrepancy is due to three wars (the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, the 1991 Gulf war, and the 2003 US invasion), out-migration, and political repression and executions by the regime. Nevertheless, in most media accounts, women are totally absent from the picture. They are neither seen on the streets of Iraq’s cities nor are they part of any of the political structures, whether pro- or anti-American.

This situation might be perceived as ‘natural’ for a western audience that is used to seeing oppressed, passive Muslim and Arab women (Wasn’t this the case in Afghanistan?). Conversely, in reality, Iraqi women have been very much part of the ‘public sphere’ until a few years ago. Despite general political repression by the Baath regime of Saddam Hussein, Iraqi women were among the most educated in the whole region. They were part of the labour force and visibly active on almost all levels of state institutions and bureaucracy. These days, however, women are prevented from leaving their houses due to fear and a great sense of insecurity. Looting, violent burglaries, mafia-like gangs that roam the cities at night and increased sexual violence, including rape, have pushed women into the background. The demise of women’s gains of the 1970s and early 80s was already evident prior to the 2003 war. Aside from most obvious effects related to the atrocious humanitarian situation, there have been changes in gender relations and ideologies in the context of wider social changes associated with war, sanctions and changing state policies.

Even before this last war, due to sanctions, there was a massive deterioration in basic infrastructure (water, sanitation, sewage, electricity etc.) that severely reduced the quality of life of Iraqi families, who often have to get through the day without water and electricity. A high child mortality rate (about 4000-5000 cases per month), rampant malnutrition, and increased rates of leukaemia, other forms of cancer, epidemic diseases and birth defects were among the most obvious ‘side effects’ of the sanctions regime. However, everyday life has changed, not only with respect to a drastic deterioration of economic conditions and basic infrastructure; the social and cultural fabric of the Iraqi society has also been affected.

Iraqi women have experienced a number of profound social and cultural changes linked to gender relations and ideologies. These changes are not easily quantifiable and visible to an outside observer. But when war and economic hardship are brought to a civilian population, women suffer in various ways. Data on war and conflict-ridden countries such as Iraq tend to conceal gender-specific forms of hardship.

In this article, I focus on a number of social and cultural changes that have had an impact on women and gender relations. It is too early to address with certainty the impact of this last war and the ongoing conflict in Iraq, although some trends are already evident. More long-term and quantitative research would be needed to provide statistical information and evidence, so I can only provide a broad sketch of certain trends and transformations.

My findings are based on observations that I had during my own visits to Iraq (last two were in 1991 and 1997), interviews with Iraqi refugee women in the UK and Germany who have recently left Iraq, discussions with my parents and friends who have been visiting Iraq more regularly, phone contact with relatives, and discussions with my PhD student who has been doing fieldwork in Iraq.

• Historical Background: Iraqi Women Before the Sanctions Regime

• Years of Sanctions and War

• Collapsed Education

• Strained Family Relationships

• Husband-Wife Relationships

• Marriage

• A New ‘Cultural’ Environment

• Conclusion

Historical Background: Iraqi Women Before the Sanctions Regime

An analysis of the impact of economic sanctions and war on women in Iraq must be prefaced by a brief historical background addressing the general situation of Iraqi women before the sanctions regime came into place in 1990.

Despite indisputable political repression in the 1970s and early 1980s, the majority of the Iraqi population enjoyed high living standards thanks to an economic boom and rapid development, which resulted from the rise of oil prices and the government’s developmental policies. These were the years of a flourishing economy and the emergence and expansion of a broad middle class. State-induced policies worked to eradicate illiteracy and educate women and incorporate them into the labour force. The initial period after the nationalization of the Iraqi oil industry in 1972 was characterized by economic hardship and difficulties, but the 1973 oil embargo by OPEC countries, known as the “oil crisis,” was followed by a period of boom and expansion. Oil prices shot up and oil-producing countries started to become aware of their bargaining power vis-à-vis western countries’ dependence on oil.

With this rapid economic expansion, the Iraqi government actively sought out women to incorporate them into the labour force. In 1974, a government decree stipulated that all university graduates – men and women – would be employed automatically. In certain professions, such as those related to health care and teaching, education itself entailed a contract with the government, which obliged the students to take up a job in their respective professions.

Policies of encouraging women to enter waged work cannot be explained in terms of egalitarian or even feminist principles; however, several women I interviewed did comment positively on the early Baathists’ policies of the social inclusion of women. The initial ideology of the Baath party, the former ruling party of Iraq, was based on Arab nationalism and socialism. It is beyond the scope of this article to explore in detail the specific motivations and ideology of the Baathist regime regarding women’s roles and positions. What can be said is that human power was scarce, and that, as the Gulf countries started to look for workers outside their national boundaries, the Iraqi government also tapped into the country’s own human resources. Subsequently, working outside the home became for women not only acceptable, but also prestigious and the norm. Another factor to be taken into account was the state’s attempt to indoctrinate its citizens – whether males or females. A great number of party members were recruited through their work places. Obviously, it was much easier to reach out to and recruit women when they were part of the so-called public sphere and visible outside the confines of their homes.

Whatever the government’s motivations were, Iraqi women became among the most educated and professional in the whole region. How far this access to education and the labour market resulted in an improved status for women is a more complex question. As in many other places, conservative and patriarchal values did not automatically change because women started working. Furthermore, there were great differences between rural and urban women as well as between women from different class backgrounds.

Years of Sanctions and War

Although signs of deterioration in living standards and changing gender relations began to be evident during the years of the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88), there seemed to be a prevailing belief that the situation would revert to the better once the war stopped. And while many families lost sons, brothers, fathers, friends and neighbours during that time, life in the cities appeared relatively ‘normal,’ with women playing a very significant role in public life.

Only two ‘peaceful’ years were followed by the invasion of Kuwait (August 1990) and the Gulf War (January-March 1991). The latter was particularly traumatizing, as night after night of heavy bombing not only disrupted sleep and family lives, but left many in deep shock and fear. Iraqis invariably have vivid memories of the Gulf War; and even prior to the latest war, many Iraqis spoke about ongoing nightmares, a sense of anxiety and a great sensitivity to certain noises that could only remotely be mistaken for bombs. Unlike other war-torn countries, like Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, post-traumatic stress syndrome has not been a recognized medical condition in Iraq. And even if it were acknowledged, lack of resources and expertise makes systematic treatment impossible.

Despite common, generalized depictions of Iraqis as either culprits or victims, a closer look at the Iraqi society reveals the obvious fact that Iraqi women, as well as men, are not a homogeneous group and have been affected by sanctions and war in different ways. Among the numerous differentiating factors are place of residence (urban or rural), ethnic (Arab or Kurd) and religious (Shiite, Sunni or Christian) backgrounds, and, perhaps most important, social class.

The previously existing class system itself has been inverted, basically through the impoverishment of a previously broad and stable educated middle class and the rise of a class of sanctions-and-war profiteers. The latter group tends to be closely related to the former Iraqi regime and to constitute political and economic networks of privilege.

Another extremely significant factor affecting the ways sanctions and war have impacted Iraqis’ daily lives is the existence of relatives or close friends in western countries. Remittances sent by relatives from all over the world, most notably from northern Europe and the United States, have often made the difference between misery and coping.

For women of low-income classes in urban areas or poor women living in the countryside, sheer survival has become the main aim of their lives. There is no doubt about the fact that it is particularly the poor mothers whose children are more likely to become yet another statistic in the incredibly high child mortality rates, or who suffer from disease and malnutrition. Yet, even for educated women who were part of the broad and well-off middle class of Iraq, feeding their children has become the major worry and focus. Hana’, who recently left Iraq and now lives in London, recalls:

I would feed my children and my husband before eating anything myself. Often I would stay hungry. I would also feed my children before visiting anyone. Before the sanctions people were very generous. You would always serve tea and biscuits if not a meal when a visitor came. Now people stopped visiting each other so that they do not embarrass each other.

During the time of sanctions, about 60% of the population were dependent on the monthly food rations given out by the government and paid for by the oil-for-food program. Now, according to recent UNICEF figures, 100% of the Iraqi population are not dependent on food aid, which currently needs to be distributed by the occupying forces.

Sanctions and war have led to massive impoverishment and insecurity, which have subjected women of various social backgrounds to material strain. Household management in the presence of electricity cuts and water shortages is time-consuming, exhausting and frustrating.

Widespread unemployment, high inflation and the virtual collapse of the economy have affected most women in their daily lives. For a population that was used to plenty and abundance (one example being well-stocked home freezers), scarcity has come as a shock. Many women have had to revert to or learn homemaking skills practiced by their grandmothers. For example, bread has been too expensive to buy on the market and many Iraqi women have had no choice but to bake their own bread on a daily basis. Furthermore, for many women, especially those living in the countryside or in the south of Iraq, food storage has been largely impossible because of the frequent electricity cuts.

Collapsed Education

Aside from the more obvious effects related to basic survival strategies and difficulties, sanctions and war have also left their mark on the social and cultural fabric of the Iraqi society. Without doubt, Iraqi women have lost some of the achievements gained in the previous decades. They can no longer assert themselves through education or waged employment, as both sectors have deteriorated rapidly.

Higher education has in effect collapsed and degrees are worthless in view of widespread corruption and continuous exodus of university professors. Monthly salaries in the public sector, which has paradoxically become increasingly staffed by women, have dropped dramatically; and they do not correspond to high inflation rates and the cost of living.

There are reports of absolute chaos at universities and looting of libraries – professors are forced to step down and some are threatened to be killed by students, as they are perceived to be Baathist.

The deterioration of education was already evident in the early 90s. Wadat, an educated middle-class woman in her late forties, had worked as a teacher in a high school until 1995. She told me:

We hadn’t felt it so much during the first years of the sanctions, but it really hit us by 1994. Social conditions deteriorated; the currency was devalued while salaries were fixed. Many women started to quit work. Some of my friends could not even afford transportation to the school. Before the sanctions, the school had used to make sure that we were picked up by a bus, but all this was cut. For me, the most important reason was my children. I did not want them to come home and be alone in the house. It became too unsafe. And then, I knew from my own work that schools became so bad, because teachers quit and there was no money for anything. So I felt that I had to teach them at home.

Because of the bad conditions in schools due to the lack of resources and teachers, many parents feel that they have to contribute to their children’s education.

Working women like Wadat suffered from the collapse of their support systems. One previous support system, funded by the state, consisted of numerous nurseries and kindergartens, along with free public transportation to and from school and to the women’s work places. The other major support system was based on extended family ties and neighbourly relations, which helped in childcare. These days women are reluctant to leave their children with neighbours or other relatives because of the general sense of insecurity.

Strained Family Relationships

Crime rates have been on the increase since the Gulf war. Many women have reported that prior to the imposition of sanctions they used to keep all their doors open and felt totally secure. During the sanctions regime, there were numerous accounts of burglaries – often violent ones. And in the current situation, looting, burglaries, killings and rape are widespread. Aside from mafia-like gangs that roam the cities at night, most Iraqis do not want to hand in the weapons they have, because they feel they have to protect themselves and their families. Given the failure of US and UK troops to protect hospitals, museums, libraries etc., the only people organizing security in a systematic way are imams at mosques.

Although Iraqi families used to be very close-knit and supportive of each other, family relationships have been strained by envy and competition in the struggle for survival. In the past, children grew up in the midst of their extended families, often spending time and sleeping over at the houses of their grandparents, uncles and aunts. These days, nuclear families have become much more significant; people now think about themselves and those closest to them first.

Some women have reported that they have stopped visiting their relatives, as they don’t want them to feel embarrassed for not being able to provide them with a meal. Hospitality, especially where food is concerned, is a very important aspect of the Iraqi culture. These days, most Iraqi families cannot provide their guests with full meals because of widespread unemployment and low salaries during the time of sanctions, and, now, the absence of any form of salary during and in the aftermath of this last war. This fact has had a damaging impact on family and social life in contemporary Iraq.

The loss of loved ones has become a common aspect of the pool of experiences that Iraqi women have. Three wars, ongoing political repression, widespread disease, malnutrition and a collapsed health system account for the great number of deaths that have occurred and still occur in present-day Iraq. According to UNICEF, 4000-5000 children have been dying on a monthly basis since 1991 due to malnutrition, water-borne diseases and various forms of cancer (The impact of depleted uranium is one of the least talked about issues related to war.).

Aside from sadness, depression and sometimes anger, Iraq women and men of all ages have become remarkably fatalistic and have built up an incredible resistance power to deal with pain and suffering.

The demographic cost of three wars and the forced economic migration of men triggered by the imposition and continuation of international sanctions account for the high number of female-headed households. It is not only war widows who find themselves without husbands, but also women whose husbands have gone abroad to escape the bleak conditions and find ways to support their families. Other men have just abandoned their wives and children, being unable to cope with their inability to live up to the social expectations of being providers and breadwinners.

Husband-Wife Relationships

The situation seems to have taken its toll on relationships between husbands and wives. There are no concrete figures, but it seems that the divorce rate has increased substantially. A caseworker working with Iraqi refugees in London reported that there is a very high divorce rate among couples who have recently come from Iraq. About 25 percent of Iraqi refugees in the UK are either separated or divorced. A few women stated that their husbands have become more violent and abusive during the past years. Widespread despair and frustration and the perceived shame of not being able to provide the family with what is needed evoke not only depression but also anger. Women are often at the receiving end of men’s frustrations.

Family planning has become a big source of tension and conflict between husbands and wives. Before the Iran-Iraq war, all kinds of contraception had been available and legal. During the war, contraception was banned as the government tried to encourage Iraqi women to ‘produce’ a great number of future citizens to make up for the loss in lives during the war. Many incentives were given, such as the extension of paid maternity leave to a year, of which six months were paid. Baby food was imported and subsidized.

After the 1991-Gulf War, contraceptives were still not available, but women’s attitudes toward children had changed because of the material circumstances and the moral climate. There had also been fear of congenital diseases and birth defects, which have been incredibly high since the Gulf war in 1991. Unlike the case in previous times, Iraqi women are reluctant to have many children.

Abortion is illegal; so many women risk their health and their lives to have illegal abortions in back alleys. The director of an orphanage in Baghdad stated in 1997 that a new phenomenon has emerged in Iraq: women abandoning newborn babies on the street. These babies may be a ‘result’ of so-called illicit relationships, but, according to the director, they are often left by married women who just can’t face not being able to feed their children.

Despite the overall strain on marital relationships, some women state that their relationships with their husbands have improved. Aliya, a housewife in her late thirties, says:

My husband never did anything in the house before the sanctions. He used to work in a factory outside of Baghdad. After he stopped working, he helps me to bake bread and to take care of the children. We get along much better than before because he has started to realize that I am working very hard in the house.

Marriage

While families and marriages are affected in multifarious ways, many Iraqi women can only dream of marriage and having their own families. One of the numerous consequences of the current demographic imbalance between men and women is the difficulty for young women to get married. Polygamy, which had become largely restricted to rural areas or uneducated people, has been on the rise in recent years. There is also a growing trend among young women to get married to Iraqi expatriates, usually much older than they are. This is largely due to economic reasons, since most Iraqi men are unable to provide for a new family. There are numerous of cases of women who are not able to cope with living abroad, and who feel totally alienated from their husbands and the new environment in which they find themselves. Others are being married off to older men within Iraq, often to settle a debt within the family.

A further common phenomenon is what one Iraqi woman called “marrying below one’s class.” Iraq is, traditionally, a very class-oriented society where one’s family name and background might open or close many doors. Now, one can detect greater social mobility and less rigid class barriers. This is partly due to the uneven demographic situation between men and women, but it also relates to the radical inversion of class structures mentioned above. The impoverishment of the previously well-off middle class goes side by side with the emergence of a nouveau riche class of sanctions-and-war profiteers.

While the majority of the Iraqi population have been impoverished and have suffered greatly from the policies of their own government as well as sanctions and war, a small percentage of people have actually managed to profit from the situation. These people are mainly working in the black market economy, engaging, for instance, in smuggling goods across the Jordanian, Syrian, Iranian or Turkish borders. These profiteers used to have close ties to the Iraqi regime. Living in luxury in the midst of widespread suffering and poverty asks for envy and contempt. But it also guarantees greater marriage prospects and access to social circles that were previously exclusive to the educated middle and upper middle classes.

A New ‘Cultural’ Environment

At the same time that marriage has become a relatively difficult undertaking, young women in particular feel pressured by a new ‘cultural’ environment that is marked by a decline in moral values like honesty, generosity and sociability, and an increased public religiosity and conservatism. Many women I interviewed concurred with one of my female relatives in Baghdad who spoke sadly about the total inversion of cultural codes and moral values. I will never forget when one of my aunts told me, “You know, bridges and houses can easily be rebuilt. It will take time, but it is possible. But what they have really destroyed is our morale, or values.” She, like many other Iraqi women I talked to, sadly stated that honesty was not paying off any more. People have become corrupt and greedy. Trust has become rare and envy now exists, even among closest kin.

Young Iraqi women frequently speak about changes related to socializing, family ties and relations between neighbours and friends. Often a parent or older relative is quoted as stating how things are different from the past, when socializing constituted a much bigger part of people’s lives. Zeinab, a fifteen-year-old young woman from Baghdad, spoke about the lack of trust between people. She suggested the following as an explanation for the change in dress code for women and the social restrictions she and her peers experience constantly:

People have changed now because of the increasing economic and various other difficulties of life in Iraq. They have become very afraid of each other. I think because so many people have lost their jobs and businesses, they are having loads of time to speak about other people’s lives, and they often interfere in each other’s affairs. I also think that, because so many families are so poor now that they cannot afford buying more than the daily basic food, it becomes so difficult for them to buy nice clothes and nice things and, therefore, it is better to wear hijab. Most people are somewhat pressured to change their lives in order to protect themselves from the gossip of other people – especially talk about family honor.

Particularly teenage girls complain about the increasing social restrictions and difficulties of movement, in addition to increased responsibilities and time restrictions related to economic circumstances. While the parents of middle-class young females who were interviewed used to mingle relatively freely when they were the age of their children, today’s young Iraqis find it increasingly difficult to meet each other. Schools are often sex-segregated; even in co-educational schools, interaction between boys and girls has become more limited. Girls are extremely worried about their reputation and often avoid situations in which they find themselves alone with a boy. These fears may have been aggravated by the not uncommon occurrence of so-called “honor killings” during the past decade. Fathers and brothers of women who are known or often only suspected of having ‘violated’ the accepted codes of behavior – especially with respect to keeping their virginity before marriage – may kill the women in order to restore the honor of the families. Although this phenomenon is mainly restricted to rural areas and uneducated Iraqis, knowledge about its existence works as a deterrent for many female teenagers.

Others may be less worried about the most dramatic consequences of ‘losing one’s reputation.’ For educated middle-class women from urban areas it is not so much death that they fear as diminished marriage prospects.

The most obvious change that has taken place over the past decade or so is the dress code of young women. Aliya (sixteen years old) is clearly unhappy about the changes:

I do think that our life was much more easy and happy in the past than it is now. My father used to be so open, and he used to believe in women’s freedom. He would let my mother go out without covering her hair when they visited our relatives in Baghdad. We only had to wear the abbayah in Najaf because it is a holy city. Some years ago, he started to change his attitude to many things. And lately he has become so conservative that he thinks covering the hair is not enough, and he demands that my mother wear abbayah everywhere outside the home. He says that I also should keep the cover on my hair when I go to Baghdad. I am now not even allowed to go out with trousers outside our home. My mother and I have to wear long skirts with long wide shirts covering the hips when we go outside our home.

As much as Aliya detests the imposed dress codes and her father’s new conservatism, she understands the underlying reasons. She explains:

I know why my father is doing this and I am not angry with him. I discussed this issue with him many times and I really do not blame him for this change in attitude. I think it is not only my father who is doing this, but that it may be all fathers in Iraq. They are doing the same in order to protect their daughters from the risks of becoming victims of bad rumors.

These days there are numerous reports of unveiled women being harassed on the streets by Islamists who demand that all women wear a headscarf or abbayah.

Increased social conservatism and the threat of gossip that would tarnish one’s reputation are common complaints among young Iraqi women. Girls especially suffer in a climate where patriarchal values have been strengthened and there is no longer a state to adopt the policies of social inclusion that were previously adopted with regard to women.

Economic hardships have pushed a number of women into prostitution – a trend that is widely known and subject to much anguish in a society where ‘a woman’s honor’ is perceived to reflect the family’s honor. In the mid-1990s, the government condemned prostitution and engaged in violent campaigns to stop it. In a widely reported incident in Iraq in 2000, a group of young men linked to Saddam Hussein’s son Uday singled out about three hundred female prostitutes and ‘pimps’ and beheaded them.

The drastic increase in female prostitution does not stop at the Iraqi border, though. Most of the female prostitutes in Jordan, for example, are Iraqi women. The imposition by the government of the ‘mahram’ escort for females leaving Iraq did not succeed in stopping this trend. This law does not allow women to leave the country without being accompanied by a male first of kin, unless they are over forty-five years old. It was enforced after the Jordanian government complained to the Iraqi government about widespread prostitution by Iraqi women in Amman.

Men often feel compelled to protect their female relatives from being the subject of gossip and from losing families’ honor. The increasing social restrictions imposed on young women have to be analyzed in the context of wider social changes, particularly with regard to the increase in prostitution, significant numbers of female-headed households, rampant unemployment, the appropriation of Islamic symbols by the Iraqi government under Saddam Hussein, the general religious revival within the Iraqi society and the rise of Islamist forces in contemporary Iraq.

Conclusion

The rather bleak picture I have sketched out only touches upon some aspects of the numerous ways sanctions and war have affected women and gender relations in contemporary Iraq. In this article, I have tried to point to the social and cultural phenomena that have emerged during the past years and have to be viewed as mainly triggered by the sanctions regime and the government of Saddam Hussein. It is too early to be able to grasp fully the complex and multifarious ways the recent war and the ongoing occupation have affected daily lives and wider gender ideologies.

What can be said about the current situation, however, is that, so far, women have been pushed back even more into the background and into their homes. They are suffering both in terms of a worsening humanitarian situation and an ongoing lack of security on the streets. Aside from the fact that basic needs (including water, electricity, medical care and food), as well security, are not addressed adequately, a more long-term issue that needs to be addressed is the lack of women’s representation in the various political parties and emerging political constituencies.

What needs to be stressed is that involving women in the reconstruction of Iraq would not simply be a matter of just ‘adding’ women. What is missing is a gender perspective in line with UN Resolution 1325 passed in October 2000, which acknowledges the importance of the inclusion of women and mainstreaming gender into all aspects of post-conflict resolution and peace operations. Research and political experiences within other conflict areas and post-war situations, such as Northern Ireland, Bosnia Herzegovina, Cyprus and Israel/Palestine, give evidence to the fact that women are often more able to bridge over ethnic, religious and political divides, and play a significant role in ‘peace-making.’ To my mind, any future peace can only be achieved by confronting and working through Iraq’s past with the help of a truth and a reconciliation committee that would be sensitive to all kinds of human rights abuses including gender violence.

The mainstreaming of gender would have to involve the appointment of women to interim governments and all ministries and committees dealing with systems of local and national governance. Women would also have to be present and active in the judiciary, policing, human rights monitoring, the allocation of funds, free media development and all economic processes. There should be encouragement to create independent women’s groups, NGOs and community-based organizations.

Unfortunately, the current situation in Iraq leaves doubt about the intentions of the US in terms of good governance and its commitment to human rights and democracy-building. Especially where women and gender relations are concerned, I personally do not expect too much from the occupying forces considering Bush’s record of conservative policies towards women in the US. The case of Afghanistan is a sad example of the US government paying lip service to women’s rights but not actually seeing it through in the aftermath of the war. In fact, Afghanistan is an example of how not to do it, as the mere appointment of a women’s minister without resources (who subsequently had to resign) was a cynical token towards a human and women’s rights agenda.

Let me finish this article on a slightly brighter note. It is very important to stress that Iraqi women are not just passive victims. And here I am not talking about those women who were implicated in the regime; I am talking about ordinary women of many social classes. Contrary to common media representations of oppressed Arab women, in many ways Iraqi women have been more resourceful and adaptable to the new situation than Iraqi men. Small informal business schemes, such as food catering, have mushroomed. Skills in crafts and the recycling of clothes and other materials give evidence to an incredible creativity. And without suggesting that there is anything natural about women being better human beings, if there is any hope for the future of Iraq, it does not lie with fragmented male opposition, but comes form those who have kept their dignity and have remained non-violent and human.

Dr. Nadje Al-Ali is a lecturer in social anthropology at the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies at the University of Exeter. She is half Iraqi and half German, and lived in Egypt for several years. Dr. Al-Ali has published widely on issues related to women and gender in the Middle East, particularly the women's movement in Egypt, women's NGOs in the Arab world, and the impact of war and sanctions on women in Iraq. She has also been working on the status of Muslim refugees and migrants in Europe, and has written several articles on Bosnian refugees.

Aside from her academic activities, Nadje Al-Ali is a political activist and co-founded the London-based group Act Together: Women's Action on Iraq. She is also a member of Women in Black, London.

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