Crossing Interests

Weaknesses Develop in the ‘War on Terror’

By Erich Marquardt

2/10/2003

The attacks of September 11 demonstrated to Washington leaders that militant Islamic organizations could cause extensive damage to American interests. Organizations such as Al-Qaeda had attacked US interests before, but never so severe as what transpired that morning. In the aftermath of the attacks, the Bush administration began to develop a strategy to forcefully deal with the Al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan, while at the same time taking the geostrategic initiative away from Iran, Russia and China in Central Asia and the Middle East.

On October 7, 2001, close to one month after the attacks in Washington and New York, the Bush administration launched an aggressive campaign against the Taliban government in Afghanistan, which it accused of harboring and hosting large numbers of Al-Qaeda, including Osama bin Laden. With this campaign, the Bush administration damaged the already weak infrastructure of Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda network. But in addition to this goal, the administration was also able to establish military bases in Afghanistan, a country located in the heart of Central Asia.

Bordering Iran and Pakistan, Afghanistan finds itself in an influential geographical and geopolitical location, being close to Central and South Asia and the Middle East. With the creation of military bases in Afghanistan, the Bush administration increased its foreign policy leverage when dealing with other states in the region considered hostile to US interests, such as Pakistan and Iran. This location gave the administration the ability to put pressure on Islamabad, causing Pakistani president General Musharraf to support the United States’ newfound ‘war on terrorism’ by ending aid to Pakistan’s former Taliban allies in Afghanistan and cracking down on its own militant Islamic organizations.

The Bush administration was also able to project its influence into the soft underbelly of Russia, establishing military bases in countries that used to be part of the Soviet Union, such as Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. This move - which the administration justified due to the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan - gave the administration influence in the governments of Central Asian states. This action worried both Russia and China, which saw the United States encroaching upon their traditional spheres of influence. Russia quickly began to establish its own military base in Kyrgyzstan to act as a counterweight to the US base further to the north.

At the same time the Bush administration gained influence in Central Asia, it was working to increase its power and influence in the Middle East. By manipulatively tying Iraq to the ‘war on terrorism,’ the administration garnered the support of the American people into standing behind a war to oust the Baathist leadership in Baghdad. But one of the main goals behind ousting Saddam Hussein’s government was to increase the US military presence in the Middle East. Through Operation Iraqi Freedom, the administration established military bases in Iraq. With military bases in Iraq, the administration was able to pull US troops from other Middle Eastern countries, most notably Saudi Arabia.

By pulling its troops from Saudi Arabia, and repositioning them in Iraq, along with smaller, more Western-orientated states such as Qatar, the Bush administration gave Washington more foreign policy leverage in dealing with the Saudi monarchy. No longer reliant on the Saudi leadership to allow US troops to attack other countries in the region, Washington is now able to use its bases in Iraq to strike anywhere in the Middle East without the approval of Baghdad.

At the same time it began to pull US troops out of Saudi Arabia, the Bush administration pressured the Saudi government - as it did with Pakistan - to clamp down on militant Islamic organizations located within its borders. Saudi Arabia - like Pakistan - responded favorably to the Bush administration’s request because it feared the costs involved with upsetting a United States that had increased its presence and influence in the Middle East.

The increased military influence by Washington in the Middle East was partly an initiative taken to force regional governments to suppress groups within their societies that were intent on attacking US interests. But another, just as powerful influence in the Bush administration’s plans for projecting US power into the Middle East was to increase the stability of the oil supply - a resource that is the lifeblood of the global economy. By increasing US military, economic and political influence in the Middle East, the Bush administration aimed to create further stability in the price of oil and to prevent Arab governments from repeating actions that caused the 1973 oil embargo. Indeed, Larry Lindsey, former top economic adviser to President Bush, stated last fall: “When there is regime change in Iraq, you could add three million to five million barrels [per day] of production to world supply. The successful prosecution of the war would be good for the economy.”

In addition to dissuading Arab governments from using oil as a political weapon, the Bush administration was also able to remove the possibility that a powerful Iraq would upset the balance of power in the Middle East. The Iran-Iraq war and the invasion of Kuwait led Washington to believe that Saddam Hussein had territorial aspirations that could create unwanted instability in the oil-rich region. Now, with Saddam Hussein no longer in power, the administration has positioned US troops on the western and eastern borders with Iran, another state that has the potential to become a strong Middle Eastern power and therefore able to limit Washington’s influence in the region. By threatening the leadership in Tehran with ‘regime change,’ the Bush administration is hoping to moderate Iran’s political stance and keep it from attempting to influence the politics in the Middle East.

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