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Laurent
Van der Stockt, a photographer working for the Gamma agency and
under contract for the New York Times Magazine, followed
the advance of the 3/4 Marines (3rd battalion, 4th regiment) for
three weeks, up to the taking of Baghdad on April 9. He was
accompanied by New York Times Magazine editor, Peter
Maas. Born in Belgium in 1964, Laurent Van der Stockt mainly
works in conflict zones: the first Gulf War, Yugoslavia,
Afghanistan, Chechnya, Africa and the Occupied Territories. This
is his eyewitness account of the Marines’ march to Baghdad:
“Everything
began at the Kuwait/Iraq border. I forced my way into the
country and arrived at Safwan. American soldiers had seized the
opportunity to tear up portraits of Saddam Hussein on the main
street. They were doing this right in front of the local
inhabitants, whose elation quickly vanished. The soldiers
obviously didn’t imagine that it was up to the Iraqis to be
doing this, or that it was humiliating for them. These were the
same soldiers who would topple down Saddam’s statue in Baghdad
three weeks later...
I
understood that the Marines’ general strategy was to not waste
any time. In the cities they crossed, the Marines had to make a
show of force. Then they would resume their advance by going as
fast as possible up by the east through the desert, and avoid
any contact with the population. It takes an effort to picture
what an army looks like as it advances through the sands. It’s
an anthill. It’s more than a city on the march. It’s a world
whose extremities are never seen. It’s a cutting edge,
mechanical version of Julius Caesar’s army.
During
the first few days, with colleagues from the New York Times
and Newsweek, I tried to follow the convoys in a SUV by
playing hide-and-seek. We were spending a lot of time then with
the 1 500 Marines of the 3/4, commanded by Colonel Bryan P.
McCoy. His troops gave us water, gas and food. In exchange for
their tolerance, we respected the rules to not pass the convoy
and to camp at such and such a place. We were just barely
tolerated. The colonel could see that the ‘few jokers were
behaving well’. He knew we had experienced more wars than his
own troops.
For
McCoy, we were obviously interesting right from the start. We
were the ones who could tell his story. Trust settled in between
us. He let us drive at the head of the convoy. The Marines are
generally less privileged than the army. They’re trained to do
the dirty work, the less honorary jobs. They have the oldest
tanks, and the least up-to-date M16 rifles. They themselves
translate ‘USMC’ (United States Marine Corps) by United
States Misgodded Children, i.e. the US’ forgotten children,
forgotten by God.
Their
motto is ‘Search and Kill’. The ‘Kilo’ unit is nicknamed
‘Killer Kilo’. The words ‘Carnivore’ or ‘Blind
Killer’ are painted on their tanks. McCoy could snap with a
‘Shame on You’ a smile flashing across his face to the
sniper who had just finished telling him: ‘I’ve got eight,
Sir, but only five’. Literally meaning: I’ve shot eight, but
only five of them are dead.
I’ve
never seen a war with so few ‘returns’. The Iraqi army was
like a ghost. It barely existed. Over the three weeks, I only
saw the adversary fire a few short-range rockets and a few
shots. I saw deserted trenches, a dead Iraqi soldier lying next
to a piece of bread and some old equipment. Nothing that really
made you feel that there was a real confrontation going on,
nothing comparable to the massiveness of the means at the
Americans’ disposal.
On
April 6, we were at the outskirts of Baghdad, facing a strategic
bridge the Americans called ‘the Baghdad Highway Bridge’.
Residential zones were now much greater in number. American
snipers got the order to kill anything coming in their
direction. That night a teenager who was crossing the bridge was
killed.
Marines
are conditioned to reach their target at any cost. |
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On
the morning of April 7, the Marines decided to cross the bridge.
A shell fell onto an armored personnel carrier. Two marines were
killed. The crossing took on a tragic aspect. The soldiers were
stressed, febrile. They were shouting. The risk didn’t appear
to be that great, so I followed their advance. They were
howling, shouting orders and positions to each other. It sounded
like something in-between a phantasm, mythology and
conditioning. The operation was transformed into crossing the
bridge over the River Kwai.
Later,
there was some open terrain. The Marines were advancing and
taking up position, hiding behind mounds of earth. They were
still really tense. A small blue van was moving towards the
convoy. Three not-very-accurate warning shots were fired. The
shots were supposed to make the van stop. The van kept on
driving, made a U-turn, took shelter and then returned slowly.
The Marines opened fire. All hell broke loose. They were firing
all over the place. You could hear ‘Stop firing’ being
shouted. The silence that set in was overwhelming. Two men and a
woman had just been riddled with bullets. So this was the enemy,
the threat.
A
second vehicle drove up. The same scenario was repeated. Its
passengers were killed on the spot. A grandfather was walking
slowly with a cane on the sidewalk. They killed him too (see
photo in Le Monde). As with the old man, the Marines fired on a
SUV driving along the river bank that was getting too close to
them. Riddled with bullets, the vehicle rolled over. Two women
and a child got out, miraculously still alive. They sought
refuge in the wreckage. A few seconds later, it flew into bits
as a tank lobbed a terse shot into it.
With
my own eyes I saw about fifteen civilians killed in two
days. |
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Marines
are conditioned to reach their target at any cost, by staying
alive and facing any type of enemy. They abusively make use of
disproportionate firepower. These hardened troops, followed by
tons of equipment, supported by extraordinary artillery power,
protected by fighter jets and cutting-edge helicopters, were
shooting on local inhabitants who understood absolutely nothing
of what was going on.
With
my own eyes I saw about fifteen civilians killed in two days.
I’ve gone through enough wars to know that it’s always
dirty, that civilians are always the first victims. But the way
it was happening here, it was insane.
At
the roughest moment, the most humane of the troops was called
Doug. He gave real warning shots. From 800 yards he could hit a
tire and, if that wasn’t enough, then the motor. He saved ten
lives in two hours by driving back civilians who were coming
towards us.
Distraught
soldiers were saying: ‘I ain’t prepared for this, I didn't
come here to shoot civilians.’ The colonel countered that the
Iraqis were using inhabitants to kill marines, that ‘soldiers
were being disguised as civilians, and that ambulances were
perpetrating terrorist attacks.’
“Why
didn’t you shoot in the air? Or at least shoot me?” |
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I
drove away a girl who had had her humerus pierced by a bullet.
Enrico was holding her in his arms. In the rear, the girl’s
father was protecting his young son, wounded in the torso and
losing consciousness. The man spoke in gestures to the doctor at
the back of the lines, pleading: “I don’t understand, I was
walking and holding my children’s hands. Why didn’t you
shoot in the air? Or at least shoot me?”
In
Baghdad, McCoy sped up the march. He stopped taking the time to
search houses one-by-one. He wanted to get to Paradise Place as
soon as possible. The Marines were not firing on the thickening
population. The course ended with Saddam’s statue being
toppled. There were more journalists at the scene than
Baghdadis. Its five million inhabitants stayed at home.”
Norman
Madarasz is a Canadian philosopher residing in Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil. With a Ph.D. from the University of Paris, he
frequently writes on international North-South relations and on
the political economy and culture of Brazil. He is also a
regular contributor to Counterpunch and has published think
pieces and philosophical research extensively. You can reach him
at nmphdiol@yahoo.ca
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