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A picture of the Mosque of Paris, which is situated behind the Institut du Monde Arab (Arab Institute).

On the whole, there have been three main models by which EU states have tried to deal with migrants[1]:

• The Guestworker model; where migrants are seen to have a temporary presence and is primarily used in Germany , but also in Austria and Switzerland in some modified form.

• Assimilation; where migrants are seen to be permanent and therefore strategies are employed for individual integration into the culture of the state and the formation of ‘communities’ of migrants is discouraged. France is the primary example of such a  country.

• Ethnic Minorities model; in which there is room for the preservation of cultural identity and some degree of pluralism is institutionalised. This model tends to be followed in the Scandinavian countries as well as in the UK .

Each of these models has its own distinct advantages and disadvantages. They are also issues of continuous debate among academics and policy makers. There does seem to be some feeling now that the Guestworker (Gastarbeiter) model is a denial of the reality of settlement and does not allow for adequate policy formation to deal with this reality. The French model has behind it the fear of “the contradictions inherent within a political system giving priority to the existence of separate communities over individual integration”. France has “based its policies on principles which categorically reject the formation of separate communities and favour their withering–away within secular society”[2]. The vision then is to incorporate minorities not as communities, but as individuals, who directly form a contract with the state. This is so that the identity of the Republic can be maintained and so that the isolation of ghettoes can be eliminated. Some French experts seem to view with displeasure the establishment of ‘ethnic minorities’ across the Channel and feel that this will be a disaster for British society. The reaction of the Muslims in the UK to the ‘Satanic Verses’ affair and recent disturbances between Asian and White youths in inner city areas are hailed as examples of the failure of the British model. The American experience is seen in much the same light. However one needs only to walk the streets of Paris , Marseilles or Lyon to realise that de facto ghettoes do exist in France . As Oliver Roy notes:

“‘Gallicization’, while continuing to observe religious practice on an individual basis, would seem to be the end result of the process of integration for groups which are socially and economically assimilated. On the other hand, a new kind of ethnic identity, a characteristically American kind, which in the place of attachment to a specific national and religious identity takes the form of shared fellowship as a sub-culture within the dominant culture, seems likely to prevail among the young Arabs (and Blacks) of the urban zones, who are casualties of the integration process”[3].

In contrast to this integration process (which in the French context is actually more an assimilationist approach as mentioned) the Ethnic Minorities or Multicultural model is described by Habermas as follows:

“In multicultural societies, the equally protected coexistence of lifeforms means ensuring for each citizen the opportunity to grow up, and have his or her children grow up, in a cultural world of his or her own origins without being insulted because of this by others; the opportunity to come to terms with this culture – as every other – to perpetuate it in its conventional form or to transform it; and also the opportunity to turn his or her back on its imperatives out of indifference or to break away from them in a self-critical manner, to live henceforth spurred on by having made a conscious break with tradition or even to live with a split identity”[4].

This model is also not without its critics both within and outside the states professing it. There are those such as Lord Tebbit in the UK who criticise the foundations of a Multicultural model and feels that it is dangerous to have different communities living side by side. Others, while accepting Multiculturalism, are more critical of the disparity between privileges that are granted to some ethnic minorities and not to others:

“The Race Relations Act, 1976, is designed to outlaw some form of this differential treatment, though by failing to explicitly recognise religious identity and religious discrimination, it itself contributes to a new form of religious inequality, namely the inequality in law between those religious groups that the courts recognise as ethnic groups and those that they do not. So that, while Sikhs and Jews are recognised as groups against whom unlawful direct racial discrimination may be proven and penalised, Muslims and Rastafarians are ruled out from such legal protection”[5].

Perhaps an important factor in how a nation treats its minorities is rooted in the 'self-image' of that nation. Germany historically had a notion of blood decent that forms the nation, perhaps due to the legacy of the Germanic tribes that were so influential in European history. It may be for this reason that Germans could not accept for so long that a foreigner (Ausländer) could be a citizen. Furthermore, German nationalism was partly formed in the defence of its realm against Napoleon, an external force, whereas French identity was forged in the struggle against its own Monarchy, ruling class and religious establishment. For France it is, therefore, the Republic and the notion of Republican Unity, the pride in the culture where all are equal that defines the self. By contrast, the UK has long been a country of ‘migration’, in which many different groups of people have settled, each of whom have left something of their traditions, culture and language. It has also had an experience of diverse Christian religious traditions and has had perhaps the broadest contact with other cultures through colonialism, factors that have forged a nation of polite, pragmatists.

The Muslim communities in the various states of Europe are at very different stages of development. It must be remembered that in European history it has taken many generations if not centuries for religious groups to adapt and find their place in society. Thus, many would argue that Muslim minorities must be given the chance to adapt and come to terms with their surroundings in a way that allows them to feel they are a part of Europe . Some, like Tariq Modood, are critical of measures that force secular identities upon religious minorities and writes against what he terms ‘radical secularism’:

“For radical secularism cannot be secured without illiberal measures; and the communalism that such a policy may provoke will be due less to the traditions of groups such as Muslims (though that won’t prevent victims from being blamed) than to the exclusionism implicit in radical secularism.”[6]

The first sentence of the French constitution states: “ France is an indivisible and laique Republic ”. Laicite is the single most significant factor when discussing the relationship between the French state and the Muslims in France . The increasing visibility of Muslims in the public sphere in France has challenged, in the minds of many, the whole nature of the strict separation between religion and public life. Islam, now the second largest faith in France , is seen as an obstacle to the cultural homogeneity of France and has brought onto the agenda the debate about Multiculturalism that French society seems only to be able to address with a degree of discomfort. As Danièl Hervieu-Léger writes:

“…one of the most decisive changes that have occurred since the beginning of the 1980s has been the transformation of a society in which cultural homogeneity seemed assured within the normative space defined by the great republican referents, to a multi-cultural society…The question of Islam, which has become the second religion in France after Catholicism – ahead of Protestantism and Judaism – constitutes the highly sensitive point of crystallization of a problem that is much more vast: the question of the relation between particularity and universality in the very definition of French identity”[7].

Some Muslims have been quick to point out that this debate did not happen in the case of Jews wearing caps, but somehow it became more provocative in the case of Muslim women wearing a headscarf. Perhaps the aspect of Islam that French society has found most difficult to deal with is the continuum between private and public life. At least in theory, Islam does not separate between private and public. Though the reality in many people’s lives and behaviour is often different, especially in the case of those who have grown up in secular states such as France or Algeria . This lack of a clean break between the public and private seems to threaten the French ideals of secularism which have developed after much struggle and angst against religious order. Additionally, for some this otherness causes a tension that questions the unity of the republic – another bastion of French political life.[8]

The history of France is embedded in the long struggle between the French Kings and the Roman Catholic Church. With the collapse of the Ancien Régime and the Revolution of 1789 society became strictly secularised. The citizen now related to the political authority directly and the religious legitimacy for the monarchy was not seen to be necessary. The constitution of 1791 granted the freedom to practice religion but this was not an issue of public concern, there would be no ‘State Religion’. The new authorities had by now seized much of the land owned by the Catholic Church and distributed the monies amongst the citizens. This led to a deep schism between the Church and the Republic, which was further exacerbated when the Constitutional Assembly repeatedly refused to acknowledge Catholicism as a state religion. As a compromise Bonaparte signed a concordat with Rome in 1801 that acknowledged Catholicism as the religion of the majority of the French. The degree of tension between Church and state can be seen in a statement of Pope Pius X in which he referred to Émile Combes, the Premier of France, as the ‘Satanic Monsieur Combes’[9]. What had effectively happened was the separation of France into two distinct groups-- the religious and secular, with these ongoing struggles being labelled ‘The War of the Two Frances’. It was perhaps in order to appease the growing tensions between clerical France and laique France that the Separation Law of 1905 was brought in (this did not apply to the three constituencies of Hant-Rhin, Bas-Rhin and Moselle in the Alsace-Loraine region). Although the clergy, with the backing of Rome , initially opposed this, the law found support among liberal Catholics in France . One result of the new law was that religious institutions, previously under state control, became an entirely private affair. The law did bring some calm to the tension between the two Frances, but it was probably the eruption of World War I, and the threat of an external enemy against whom an alliance had to be forged, that led to a final appeasement and reconciliation.

France ’s attitude to its Arab Muslim population is influenced by the French colonial experience, especially with Algeria , which was somewhat bloodier than many other colonial experiences and represents a long phase of tension and violence between Algeria and France . The French mode of colonisation was also different in that there was a strong drive to transpose French language and culture on the colonies. This can be seen in contrast to the British method in India that started with trade and was somewhat more subtle in exporting its influence--political, social and legal.

Public perception in modern day France is heavily influenced by the belief that if Muslims are allowed to form communities then they will be left in ghettos and these will be a threat to the identity and security of the nation, a sentiment that the far right party of Le Pen has played on. It is against this background that Muslim migration needs to be looked at and the consequent concerns over the re-appearance of religion in the public sphere.