|
Statist
vs. Societal Islamism
At
the heart of many of the questions which divide Algerian Islamists
are the different strategic goals each group has set for itself.
Some of the country's Islamists focus their efforts on the creation
of an Islamic state which in turn will create an Islamic society.
Others believe an Islamic order must begin at the grassroots level
and that the Islamic state will be an outgrowth of, rather than a
stepping stone to, an Islamic society. This bifurcation between
"statist" and "societal" groups is found not
only in Algeria, but across the Muslim world and throughout the
Islamist movement.
The
statist organizations in Algeria, including the FIS and the current
crop of insurgent groups, view the state apparatus as a tool to be
used in Islamizing the society from the top down. By using
legislation, the Islamists will be able to implement the changes in
society required to bring it into compliance with the shari'a. The
statists' attitudes towards democracy ranges from outright rejection
on the grounds that it is kufr to its acceptance as a way to ensure
the state's accountability to both Islam and the society. A middle
ground is the "Islamic totalitarianism" or "theo-democracy"(24)
articulated by Mawlana Abul 'Ala Mawdudi, the preeminent theorist of
statist Islamism.(25) The
governments of Iran, the Sudan, Saudi Arabia and, to an extent,
Pakistan have all used the state as a means of ordering society to
meet the specifications of their interpretation and understanding of
Islam.
The
statist model eliminates a number of problems which have plagued
Islamist movements. By controlling the state, the government's
resources, infrastructure and authoritative capacity is at the
Islamists' disposal, rather than at their throats. Statist Islamism
is easily organized because it relies on a high degree of
centralization, with the highest echelons of the movement's
leadership coalescing within and around the central state apparatus.
It is also an efficient model able to react to changing conditions
quickly and capable of rapidly initiating and enforcing policy
decisions made by the leadership.
Statist
Islamism, however, must pay a price for its increased efficiency.
The "top-down" method of change almost always engenders a
degree of resentment-the more radical the change, the greater the
degree of resentment. While the FIS says it will institute its
programs gradually, there will obviously be considerable changes
made under a FIS government. Although statist Islamism will motivate
some to join the party and the movement's ranks, it will also
alienate others; that is the nature of a vanguard party committed to
realigning and redefining society.
The
Rabita, Hamas and an-Nahdha, on the other hand, belong to the
societal camp. This model, articulated and pursued by Muhammad Abduh
and the salafiyya and (with a greater emphasis on political
activity) Hasan al-Banna and the Muslim Brotherhood, envisions a
gradual transition to a proper Islamic society. Sahnoun and the
Rabita have used education and intellectual effort to effect this
change while Hamas and an-Nahdha have also engaged in direct
political competition. While Hamas and an-Nahdha emphasize societal
change, they also believe that government has a role to play in the
implementation of an Islamic order. Societal Islamists' views of
democracy have ranged from hesitancy (Sahnoun) to scepticism (Djaballah)
to outspoken support (Nahnah). This model's emphasis on persuasion
over coercion stems from a desire to create a consensus within the
country about the Islamization of society. The societal Islamists
seek to mobilize the population at large and ensure both the success
and the permanence of their reforms by attempting to create popular
support for their platform.
What
the societal program gains in durability, however, it loses in
efficiency. Because it attempts to reach a large number of people
without the use of the state's resources, societal Islamism is much
less efficient than the statist approach. It is also unwieldy,
relying on a far-flung network of local leaders, teachers and
activists who look to the leadership for guidance but simultaneously
maintain a high degree of autonomy. The model thus requires a number
of intelligent, astute and articulate spokesmen and representatives
active around the country in order to educate and involve the
population.
Perhaps
the societal model's biggest drawback, and one of the principal
reasons why leaders like Madani have moved from this school into the
statist camp, is the slow rate of change it produces. Persuasion is
a more uncertain and slower process than coercion, and while one can
measure change under the statist system over a period of months,
societal Islamism works over the course of years or decades. Many
Islamists are simply not prepared to wait for a change that may
never come.
This
concern within the movement over the slow progress of the societal
model raises the question of sustainability. Can the decentralized
network of activists upon which the societal model relies be
preserved? It remains to be seen whether the Rabita's prestige and
importance will endure the eventual passing of Shaykh Ahmad Sahnoun,
who is currently in his early eighties. The theoretical and
educational influence of the Rabita is unquestioned, but its
organizational continuity, and with it the survival of its brand of
"purist" societal Islamism, remains in doubt.
|
