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The
Experiment Ends
The
rumored "cohabitation" government to be formed between the
FIS and Chadli, with the prospect of a reshuffle of the military
general staff, led the army to launch a preemptive strike on 11
January. The military forced Chadli to resign, cancelled the second
round of voting and annulled the first, declared a state of
emergency and, after scrambling for five days, finally announced a
new government. The new five-man High Council of State was led by
Muhammad Boudiaf, an FLN founder who had spent three decades in
political exile. The real power in the country, however, remained
the army.
Hamas
and an-Nahdha, along with a number of leftist opposition parties,
denounced the coup and the cancellation of elections. Many in the
FIS prepared to take to the streets, but Hachani and other party
leaders counseled caution and asked FIS supporters not to respond to
provocations. Hachani simultaneously warned the regime against
attempting to dissolve the FIS.
Hachani
was placed in custody as part of a growing wave of arrests of FIS
leaders and supporters. Detention camps were set up in southern
Algeria to hold thousands of detainees.(22)
An Algiers court announced the dissolution of the FIS on 4 March,
invoking the constitutional clause prohibiting parties based on
religion. Since then the FIS has been a movement forced underground
and abroad.
Inside
Algeria, the party has concentrated on rebuilding its shattered
network of activists and disseminating information through
clandestine broadcasts and journals. These activities are led by 'Abd
ar-Raziq Rajjam, who is currently in hiding, while Rabah Kebir has
headed FIS efforts abroad to educate world opinion about events in
Algeria.
Throughout
the internal and external upheavals visited upon the FIS since June
1991, the party has demonstrated the high quality of both its
secondary and tertiary command structure. The state has repeatedly
tried to decapitate the FIS by jailing its top leaders, only to be
faced with new leaders possessed of similar levels of ability and
resolve.
While
Hamas and an-Nahdha remain legal parties, the political situation in
the country has been paralyzed by growing civil strife. On the one
hand, Hamas and an-Nahdha have been able to preserve their party
organizations and can continue with "non-political"
activities. On the other, they must continue to voice opposition to
the military coup or be perceived as pandering to the regime.(23)
Nevertheless,
radical Islamists, responding to the state of emergency, have
launched an armed struggle against the state, its symbols and its
functionaries. A number of small maquis groups with names like
Hizbullah and Jihad al-Islami have waged a campaign against police,
soldiers and civilians. The fiercest commandos, known as Afghans,
are Algerian veterans of the jihad in Afghanistan who have since
returned home. Although the armed militants have had an impact that
outstrips their small numbers there is little popular support for
their tactics, which have resulted in the deaths of a number of
innocent victims.
Boudiaf,
in an attempt to seize the initiative and gain some measure of
independence from the army, announced a campaign to create a new
political "rally" of the Algerian people, only to be
assassinated on 30 June. Though initial suspicion settled on the
Islamists, most observers later agreed that the assassination could
not have been executed without some degree of inside assistance.
Ali
Kafi, former head of the ministry of war veterans, took over as head
of the High State Council and pledged to maintain Boudiaf's
policies. Under Kafi the regime has continued its strict security
measures while attempting to alleviate many of the country's
economic problems. Nevertheless, the civil strife has only deepened
as attacks on police and institutions alternate with arrests of
suspected militants. In spite of its control of the state apparatus,
the regime faces a host of political, social, economic and security
difficulties.
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