|
Hamas
The
next Islamist leader to form a political party was Shaykh Mahfoud
Nahnah. A moderate Islamist activist and scholar, Nahnah was the
leader of al-Irshad wal-Islah, the Association of Guidance and
Reform, an apolitical organization engaged in educational and social
welfare issues.
While
Nahnah's announcement did attract a variety of local Islamic
organizations, Madani and the FIS refused to consider any sort of
alliance with the new group. Nahnah formalized his entry into
electoral politics by forming his own party, the Movement for an
Islamic Society (Hamas), in December of 1990.
Hamas
presents itself as a more moderate and gradualist Islamist movement
than the FIS. Hamas activists have criticized the FIS for its
alleged opportunism and simplistic rhetoric, as well as its more
extreme positions. In 1990, Nahnah set forth three points which
served as "a veritable repudiation of the local and national
politics of the FIS." These were "the consolidation of the
Islamic solution...the adoption of moderation and dialogue between
citizens and respect for the woman by permitting her to participate
in the fulfillment of the global Islamic civilizational
project."(12)
Nahnah's
brand of moderate Islamism has attracted a number of professionals
and scholars to the party. Hamas members are generally older and
better educated than the FIS’ rank and file, but the party has
been and remains much smaller than the rival Islamic Salvation
Front.
Hamas'
moderation and Nahnah's outspoken commitment to the multiparty
system have won accolades from across the Algerian political
spectrum. Because of its leadership's emphasis on dialogue, Hamas
has enjoyed a level of contact with the government and opposition
parties not accorded to the other Islamist groups.(13)
Although
other minuscule Islamist groupings were later formed, it is
an-Nahdha, Hamas and particularly the FIS which have dominated
Islamist political activity in Algeria.
Nahnah's
and Djaballah's entries onto the political scene were occasioned by
the FIS' surprising victory at the polls. In a sense, it was Madani,
Belhadj and the FIS who took the real chances and Nahnah and
Djaballah who helped reap the benefits. Many in the Islamic
Salvation Front saw Hamas in particular as a government attempt to
divide the FIS, and referred to Nahnah as "Chadli's man."(14)
Yet
the delay in Hamas' and an-Nahdha's debuts also demonstrates the
reluctance of many Islamists to make the transition from a social
and educational agenda to outright political activity. In any case,
the June 1990 election results were the last to be honored by the
Algerian state.
The
first signs of trouble came in the weeks before the parliamentary
elections scheduled for 27 June 1991. Smarting from the FLN's dismal
showing in the 1990 polls, the government amended the electoral
rules and realigned voting districts in a blatant attempt to swing
the elections away from the FIS.(15)
The
new rules presented the FIS with a stark choice: participate in the
prevaricated elections or boycott the voting and risk being left out
of the new parliament.
Although
Sahnoun attempted to mediate a compromise alliance between Madani,
Nahnah and Djaballah in order to meet the government challenge with
a united Islamist bloc, Madani decided to go it alone. The FIS
leader adopted a tougher tone in his statements and the rhetorical
distance between Madani and Belhadj narrowed.
The
FIS leadership was divided as the elections came nearer, with the
party's Majlis ash-Shura finally advocating participation in the
balloting followed by protest demonstrations. Madani and Belhadj,
however, took the initiative by calling a series of strikes in late
May in an attempt to force the government's hand.
The
strikes met with limited success at first, with FIS supporters
occupying two major Algiers plazas, Martyrs' Square and the Place
ler Mai, but stores, businesses and university classes continued
with their regular activities. As the strikes entered their second
week, it was clear that Madani and Belhadj had to back down in
defeat or raise the level of confrontation. The activists? protest
marches grew larger and noisier, and finally the army moved to clear
the streets. Tear gas was used and shots were fired on 4 June, with
at least 17 police, soldiers and demonstrators killed.(16)
In
the aftermath, Chadli went on television to announce a change of
prime ministers and postponement of the elections.
Madani and Belhadj's satisfaction with their victory in the game of
political brinksmanship with the government was short-lived. For the
first time there was open dissension among the party's leaders, with
three senior members, including the FIS' number three man, Hashmi
Sahnouni, appearing on television to denounce the group's leaders
and label Madani "a danger for the FIS and the Muslims."(17)
Tensions
were heightened by the army's attempt to enforce the state of siege
while the FIS tried to maintain its freedom of action. The showdown
came on 28 June when FIS supporters defied the military's warning
not to congregate at "political mosques" for Friday
prayers. Street clashes broke out after Madani called for the army
to return to barracks soon or face a call for a jihad against the
state. Violence continued into Sunday when the army took Madani and
Belhadj into custody.
They
were later charged with having "fomented, organised, unleashed
and led an armed conspiracy against the security of the state, in an
attempt to take power," and eventually were sentenced by a
military tribunal to 12 years in jail.(18)
Madani
loyalist Muhammad Sa'id led Friday prayers on 5 July, calling for
dialogue and the release of the detainees. He was arrested himself
two days later as he was about to announce his appointment as the
party's temporary spokesman.
The
FIS leadership suffered further splits as a number of members laid
claim to the vacant office of provisional spokesman. Hashmi Sahnouni
now advanced his own name, as did Bashir F'kih, a hard-liner who had
labeled Madani an autocrat. Sa'id Guechi, representing FIS
moderates, also put forth a claim and called for dialogue with the
government. The director of the party's al-Munqidh paper, Benazzouz
Zebda, also supported the idea of dialogue.(19)
These
splits were papered over at a 25 July party conference dominated by
Madani loyalists. As a compromise, the leadership appointed 'Abd
al-Qadir Hachani, a petrochemical engineer and pro-Madani member of
the party hierarchy, as provisional spokesman.
The FIS-regime standoff continued through the summer and autumn.
While Hamas and an-Nahdha took part in an extraordinary
government-opposition conference in August, the FIS only sent
individual observers.(20)
Although
the government reversed some of its earlier electoral law changes
and freed Muhammad Sa'id on 27 November, Madani and Belhadj remained
in jail. Moreover, the FIS was forced to decide whether or not to
run candidates as the parliamentary elections, rescheduled for 26
December, drew near. Less than two weeks before the voting, Hachani
announced that the FIS would participate, though still protesting
the continued incarceration of the party leadership. Hamas and
an-Nahdha also fielded candidates.
If
some observers thought the FIS' popularity was on the wane, the
results from the first round of voting proved them wrong. The FIS
took 188 of 430 seats in the parliament, while the Front of
Socialist Forces (FFS) won 25 races and the FLN captured only 15
seats.(21)
Neither
Hamas nor an-Nahdha won parliamentary races. FIS needed only 28 of
the 199 seats to establish a parliamentary majority. Although the
FIS had insisted on early presidential elections, it entered into
discreet discussions with Chadli on some sort of power-sharing
agreement. Meanwhile, the country prepared for the runoff elections
set for 16 January 1992.
|
