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The Political Imperative
While
the riots of October 1988 were by no means unprecedented, they were
unique in both their severity and scale. A series of strikes
protesting worsening economic conditions culminated in several days
of rioting in Algiers, Oran and other major cities.(5)
These
were met in turn with a fierce governmental response.(6)
Although Islamists were not the first out in the streets it was
local Islamist leaders, particularly Ali Belhadj of the as-Sunna
mosque in the capital's Kouba district, who intervened and helped
restrain the rioters' anger. As calm returned to the streets Chadli
went on television to announce a series of political reforms,
including an end to one-party rule and the implementation of
multi-party elections. These reforms were included in a new
constitution approved in February 1989.
Although
the constitution allowed for opposition political parties it banned
ethnic and religious parties. Curiously, however, the government
approved the application submitted by Abassi Madani and Ali Belhadj
in March 1989 and legalized the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS),
Algeria's first Islamist political party. The FIS was billed by its
founders as the Islamic Da`awa League’s political wing, though
Shaykh Sahnoun and others in the Rabita warned Madani and Belhadj
against direct political involvement.(7)
The
FIS is an amalgam of different currents of political thought within
the Islamist movement. Although the party's members agree on the
ultimate goal of an Islamic state based on the shari'a, there are
disagreements over both strategy and tactics. The FIS' supreme
council, the Majlis ash-Shura, is composed of representatives of
several different tendencies within the party. There are moderate
and radical wings which look to Madani and Belhadj respectively.
Abassi
Madani, a wartime FLN member who split with the party after
independence, was a professor of comparative education at the
University of Algiers prior to his incarceration. As FIS' president
and spokesman, the group's official program largely reflects his
views. Like many Islamist platforms, the FIS program is long on
discussion of social and cultural issues (public modesty, the role
of women, linguistic issues, growing Westernization and rampant
consumerism among others) and vague on political and economic
questions (the exact structure of an Islamic state, foreign policy,
economic restructuring, Algeria's mushrooming debt, etc.). Madani
was an early supporter of Chadli's democratic reforms and has
pledged to preserve the multiparty system under FIS rule. He has
spoken out for equal rights and opportunities for women.
Ali
Belhadj, a schoolteacher, imam and vice president of the FIS,
represents a different viewpoint within the party. He is two decades
younger than Madani and his fiery oratory appeals to many of
Algeria's disaffected youth. It is Belhadj who has mobilized the
party's hardcore supporters with his khutbas denouncing FIS
opponents and painting political issues in Manichean shades of black
and white. Not everyone in the Islamist movement is impressed with
Belhadj.(8)
Given
the rhetorical, tactical and generational differences between Madani
and Belhadj, it would seem that conflict between the two would be
inevitable. Yet they have functioned extremely well together since
many of their apparent differences result from their different
functions within the party.
FIS
officials argue that the leaders' contradictory statements "are
within the same framework but said in a different language, because
they are addressed to different audiences."(9)
Some
of their positions, however, are clearly at odds with one another.(10)
Nevertheless,
the duo's "good cop-bad cop" tactics reflect a degree of
political sophistication unequaled by other Algerian parties. It is
difficult to discuss "the FIS program" since the party's
official statements are freely and routinely contradicted by
different elements within the organization.
Following
the organization's legalization, the FIS leadership quickly set
about building the party in preparation for local and regional
elections set for June 1990. While the FLN continued to enjoy a
considerable edge in funding and organization, the FIS surprised
many with its rapid construction of a party infrastructure. This
resulted from the FIS’ use of an existing network of mosques
throughout the country, its ability to organize cadres already
involved in Islamist activities and the considerable skill and
charisma of Madani and Belhadj.
The
1990 elections were contested not only by the FLN and the FIS, but a
myriad of leftist-liberal parties as well. It was clear that the FLN
and the FIS would dominate the balloting because of the infighting
and rivalries among these parties. While some observers expected the
FIS to do well, few were prepared for the actual results of the June
1990 voting. The FIS won over half of the local council elections
and took 32 of the 48 regional councils, leaving the FLN far
behind.11 The election served both to repudiate the FLN and to
provide the FIS with legitimacy and momentum. In the aftermath of
the FIS' electoral triumph, two former Rabita members decided to
throw their hats into the ring.
The
first was Abdullah Djaballah, a young, conservative shaykh who
stresses the "algerienite" of his an-Nahdha movement and
openly questions both the government's policies and its legitimacy.
Djaballah, like Belhadj, was less enthusiastic about Chadli's
electoral reforms than Madani, who welcomed the regime's moves
towards ensuring multipartyism. While an-Nahdha is the smallest of
the major Islamist parties, Djaballah's movement enjoys considerable
prestige among conservative circles.
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