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Islamist Groups Excluded from the System
It
is actually harder for an outsider to judge the future of Islamist
groups that are excluded from, and working against, the existing
regimes. The committed and convinced will, of course, believe that
their victory is inevitable. But in fact few things are inevitable.
Other groups that tend to see the march of Islamist politics as
inexorable are those who strongly oppose political Islam:
Israel,
some of its friends, and the allies of some secular regimes are the
most likely to subscribe to a "domino" theory of Islamism,
i.e., a success in one country will lead to the "fall" of
others.
On
the other hand, the basic elements which have led to the rise of
Islamist movements will not go away. While improved economic
conditions may strengthen the existing regimes, as the Tunisian
economic boom has helped reinforce the government's successful
crackdown on al-Nahda, economic problems generally fuel social
discontent. The broader demographic problems, including rapid
population increases in Egypt, Iran, and North Africa, add to social
dislocation and discontent with existing regimes. These elements are
likely to get worse in the new century. An Islamic state may not
bring genuine social justice, but, to many, Islam's traditional
emphasis on justice offers a promise of hope.
Democratization
has made some inroads in the Middle East. If it moves apace in other
countries of the region, the role of Islamist parties will be
increasingly debated. Where fairly genuine democratic experiments
have been tried, as in Jordan and Yemen, they have given influence
to Islamist blocs, but not control. The one case where an Islamist
party was poised to win outright control, Algeria, led of course to
a military move to abort not only the elections but the entire
democratic process. Any assessment of the future of those movements
which have been excluded by the state therefore must begin with
Algeria.
It
is clear that there will be no peace in Algeria without Islamist
participation in government. But the situation has grown so bad,
that a collapse of civil society and a fragmentation of the country
could occur as easily as an Islamist success. Signs of struggle
between FIS and GIA are not good news as the result could be an
Afghan situation, with local areas controlled by their own warlords.
The polarization in Algeria today between the secularists and the
Islamists is probably greater than in any other country. Whatever
happens in Algeria will be used by secularists, Islamists, and
others elsewhere as an object lesson for why one should, or should
not, pursue particular policies.
The Egyptian situation is more complex.
The present government is
seen as corrupt and unpopular, but so have most Egyptian
governments. Secularist Egyptian society has a breadth and depth
which differs from the Algerian case both in its strength and in its
Egyptianness: the Algerian elite model themselves on France, while
Egypt's secularists are clearly Egyptian. The security services have
effectively ended serious Islamist attacks in Cairo and most of the
Delta, while the ongoing violence in Upper Egypt appears to have
turned into a regionally limited exchange of vendettas. The Egyptian
regime seems secure for now, though the lack of a successor to
Mubarak could be an Achilles’ heel.
Tunisia
does not now have any visible internal Islamist resistance to the
state and is enjoying one of the highest economic growth rates in
the Arab world. It's 1990-91 crackdown appears to have succeeded in
eliminating al-Nahda as a serious challenge for now. There are
certainly plenty of Islamists in the country, but they are not an
organized threat. An economic downturn or other significant change
could, of course, revive the Islamist appeal.
The
Gulf states are harder to judge because of the lack of political
representation or an open press, with the limited exception of
Kuwait, where Islamists work within the system and do not generally
constitute a major threat to the present social structure.
The
recent troubles in Bahrain have a sectarian element which makes them
a poor model for comparison. There is certainly a growing Islamist
critique of the state in Saudi Arabia, but it is hard to be sure
that its echoes in the country are as loud as its noise making
abroad. Islamist movements in Syria and Libya, long suppressed by
the regimes, are hard to detect or describe. In Morocco, both the
Islamists and other potential opposition groups appear to be biding
their time, emphasizing social and labor issues rather than
political ones, recognizing that change is unlikely while King Hasan
reigns, but may be inevitable after him.
For
Islamist groups challenging these regimes there are many tactical
issues to be addressed. Do they seek allies from secular or other
groups which are similarly excluded from power? After all, the
Iranian revolution succeeded because the Shah managed to alienate a
broad range of critics, from the left to the right, from the clergy
to the Communists, and including the Bazaar. Or do Islamist groups
seek to maintain their doctrinal purity by refusing to compromise in
order to forge alliances against existing regimes? Do they demand
the right to participate in the political system, or do they seek to
overthrow and dismantle the political system in order to establish
one they consider more Islamic? As with every other issue I have
raised here, responses will vary. Each movement must debate these
questions and others.
I
have not addressed the question of how these movements relate to the
West in any detail, because it is only rarely a major issue with
them, something the West often ignores. While opposing Western
sexual and other moral lassitude, they are only occasionally
extremely hostile to the West politically, and then when the West is
perceived as being hostile to Islam or to their own movement. When
movements achieve power, however, they must make choices about their
international relationships.
Political
Islam is neither monolithic in organization nor of one mind about
what it seeks to achieve. Perhaps all believe al-Islam huwa al-Hal,
but how Islam brings the solution about is seen differently from
case to case. As these movements differ from each other, and the
regimes they challenge also differ, so the future will see both
success and failure for various movements. Islamists may take over
by revolutionary effort, negotiation, or through elections. Some
movements will fail because they do not provide the answers sought
by their own specific society, or because they employed radical
rhetoric, tactics, or violence which alienates many who might
otherwise support them.
It
has sometimes been said that if the Islamic revival could produce a
single charismatic leader, with both the religious reputation and
the public persona to lead - a sort of Lenin of the Islamic
Revolution - then it might become a genuine international movement.
But no such figure has emerged. Khomeini was too Shi'ite, and too
Iranian. Hasan al-Turabi is clearly a brilliant man and someone who
can eloquently state his case in English and French as well as in
good classical Arabic; but Sudan is on the periphery of the Middle
East, and while he has influence elsewhere he has not been able to
forge a genuine international following. One cannot predict the
emergence of charismatic leadership, but experience so far suggests
that no such leader is likely to emerge, except perhaps in local
areas.
Islamist
politics - or political Islam - will be a major feature in the
Islamic world for years to come, and it will continue to help force
the debate about democratization, legitimacy of existing regimes,
and the future of Islamic societies. That debate will proceed
whether individual movements succeed, fail, or forge alliances with
secular groups to win power. Future patterns are likely to parallel
the past in one sense: the results will be as varied as the nations
and societies involved, and as different as the Islamist groups
themselves.
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