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The Future
Having
briefly looked at some of the models which exist of relations
between Islamist groups and the state, where do we go from here?
Obviously the future of Islamist groups will differ enormously
according to each individual case. It is not going to evolve in the
same way in Yemen or Jordan, where these groups work within the
existing system, as in Egypt or Tunisia, where they are excluded, or
in the large number of states where there is no open political
system in which to participate.
I.
Groups that are in power
Revolutions
do not end when the palace falls, but often revolutionaries are not
certain what to do once they achieve power. Running a state - paying
payrolls, picking up the trash, making the trains run on time -
requires a different set of talents from organizing an underground
movement. Islamist groups which have succeeded in taking control of
a state apparatus have, at best, a mixed performance so far. On the
other hand, at least in the Middle East, no Islamist group has taken
over full control of a state through an electoral process.
The
Iranian regime was the result of a revolution, the Sudanese was
produced by a military coup against an elected regime. In both cases
there have been clearly visible divisions within the leadership over
how to proceed. In Afghanistan, though the various factions have
proclaimed an Islamic state, the state itself has essentially come
apart.
Many
Islamist groups working against secularist regimes have used the old
Muslim Brotherhood solution al-Islam huwa al-Hal, "Islam is the
Solution." It is a powerful and, to the believer, true maxim;
but it is not in itself a blueprint for running a state
apparatus.
The
Islamic experience is too varied, and the original Muslim Ummah too
remote in time, to provide obvious answers to running a modern
nation-state. This is not to say there cannot be a genuinely Islamic
state today, merely that even the most sincere Islamists may differ
about how to bring it about.
In
the Algerian case, it is worth remembering that FIS had controlled
almost all of the municipalities for about a year before the
cancellation of the parliamentary elections. During that time, the
results appear to have been mixed. In some municipalities FIS was
able to rally broad popular support, even bringing people into the
streets to help collect garbage, while in others local councils
spent more time putting up slogans and taking down symbols of the
FLN than they did running the town.
This
sort of mixed result is natural, and perhaps better than the old
regime could have accomplished; but it is a reminder that once in
power, the challenges are different.
And
here we come to a crucial question, one which secularists invariably
raise against the idea of an Islamist party in power. If an Islamist
party comes to power through democratic elections, as FIS nearly
did, will it in turn yield power if it does not deliver what the
people expect and they vote it out of office? Since, in the Middle
East, Islamist parties have not taken control of any central
government through elections, there is insufficient evidence.
(Examples such as Malaysian state governments are too far afield
culturally and in other ways to depend upon). Western democracies
have long relied on the old axiom vox populi, vox die - the voice of
the people is the voice of God. But some Islamists have openly said
that Western democracy is not Islamic, and that while the Islamic
concept of Shura guarantees the people a voice in affairs,
ultimately they cannot overrule the laws of God. Does this mean that
an Islamist government, once in power, would refuse to accept a vote
to oust it? No, it does not. Certainly many Islamist leaders are
sincere when they say they will play by the rules of democracy. But
the uncertainties are sufficient to make many secularists believe
that for many Islamists the slogan is "one man, one vote, one
time," and that the Islamist party would never yield power, on
the grounds that it is implementing God's law.
II.
Parties Working Within Existing Parliamentary Systems
Islamist
parties already working within existing systems must convince their
secular partners that they will play by the rules if they win power,
and yield it if they lose the next elections. In Jordan, the Islamic
Action Front has moved fairly smoothly from being a member of the
government in 1991 to being the leading opposition bloc.
Its
opposition to the peace treaty with Israel has created new frictions
with the King, but so far it seems to still be playing a functional
role within the system. The role of the Yemeni Reform Grouping in
Yemen has been enhanced by the victory of the ruling coalition
against the southern secessionists last year, a civil war in which
the Yemen Socialist Party (the southerners) tried to brand the
northern government as "Islamic fundamentalists" in order
to win Western support, without success. In Egypt, the Muslim
Brotherhood's role as the main opposition grouping is being rapidly
chipped away by government arrests of Brotherhood leaders and
pressure on Brotherhood organs of opinion. In Kuwait, the Islamists
play a prominent, though not dominant, role in the Parliament.
For
all of these groups, the challenge for the future will be to
maintain their position and, if possible, enhance it. Any attempt to
consolidate power without going through proper electoral channels
would alienate the secularists and, possibly, lead to a
Tunisian-style decision to stop tolerating Islamist participation.
On the other hand, so long as these groups can continue to function
within existing systems, and demonstrate that Islamist parties can
be part of a democratization process (in Yemen and Jordan; the
Egyptian and Kuwaiti models are at best pseudo-democratic), they may
provide a model for persuading other regimes to tolerate a growing
role for Islamist participation in the system.
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