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Differing Relations with the State
Varied
responses by existing regimes have created very different approaches
by the movements. In addition to certain countries where Islamist
movements are in control of the government - Iran, Sudan and
(arguably) Afghanistan - there are other nations where they
participate along with secular parties. The role of the Yemeni
Reform Rally in the Yemeni government is an example; and that party
itself is an alliance between traditional tribal groupings and urban
Islamists.
The
role of the Islamic Action Front in Jordan is another case in point:
in the past it has held cabinet posts, though today it leads the
opposition. Islamists make up one of the major blocs in Kuwait's
parliament. Even in Egypt, where the state is engaged in open war
with radical Islamists and is increasingly pressuring the Muslim
Brotherhood, the Brotherhood still has its role in civil
society:
in
the newspaper al-Sha'ab, its alliance with the Labor Party, and in
most of the professional syndicates. Until it boycotted the last
elections, it was the largest opposition force in Parliament.
Then
there are a number of countries where the major Islamist groups have
always been illegal or, as in the case of Tunisia, have been made so
in response to challenges to the state. The Tunisian case is
particularly interesting. The al-Nahda party did participate (though
not as a party) in the 1989 elections and out-polled all the secular
opposition parties. But Sheikh Rashid Ghannouchi left the country
soon after and in the months that followed al-Nahda and the
government became more and more polarized.
The
government accused al-Nahda of maintaining a parallel secret
organization (like that of the original Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood's al-jihaz al-sirri) and crushed its internal
leadership. Some violent incidents did occur and one of al-Nahda's
leaders, 'Abdelfattah Mourou, quit the party.
The
government cracked down hard, and today, though al-Nahda is visible
and vocal abroad, it has been suppressed rather effectively inside
Tunisia. We seem to have here a case of a movement which, though it
did better in the elections than other opposition groups, decided
that it would seek to use other tactics and moved prematurely.
Of
course, the model of a democratization process that failed is
Algeria. The Algerian tragedy is still unfolding; but with tens of
thousands dead already and the country in a virtual civil war. Had
the elections not been voided, there is no doubt that FIS would have
controlled the new government.
Unlike
other countries where Islamist groups have not had a chance to prove
their strength, in Algeria the strength was demonstrated at the
polls. It was an invitation to disaster, and disaster ensued. Even
today efforts continue to find a formula for restoring some kind of
democratic structure, including FIS; but hard-line resistance within
the government (and radical resistance on the part of GIA to any FIS
deals with the secularists) have frustrated any breakthroughs. There
are many different ways in which states can deal with Islamist
groups, but one thing is unarguable:
the
Algerian approach was a disastrous failure. Some secularists argue
that the mistake lay in allowing FIS to run candidates in the first
place, while Islamists obviously argue that the mistake was in
voiding the elections.
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