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Where Now?
It
is possible to discern certain trends and characteristics in the
evolution of Islamic movements from which we can extrapolate a few
inferences about future developments. First, though, some
definitions are in order.
I
have taken "Islamic movements" here to mean those with a
political agenda, those movements sometimes called
"Islamist" or "political Islam" and, by their
enemies, "fundamentalist." As a matter of convenient
shorthand, I will be referring to those Islamic movements with a
political agenda as "Islamist." This is not a particularly
satisfactory term, but it is far better than
"fundamentalist," a word borrowed from the Christian
vocabulary.
There
is an irony in attempting to discuss the future of Islamist
movements. I, like many other observers of these movements, have
tried for years to convince policy makers and the media in the West
that we must not stereotype these movements as a global, monolithic
structure. Just as the countries in which they have emerged are
quite different from each other, and the societies differ profoundly
at times, so too these movements differ from one another in precise
goals and in their view of their role in the existing system. The
responses of the existing regimes also differ enormously, from
accommodation to outright hostility.
To
ignore these distinctions is to encourage the Western tendency to
see "Islamic fundamentalism" as a monolithic, united
phenomenon which is often perceived as a threat to the West. Each of
these movements is different, and its prospects for success differ
according to the nature of the state and society in which it exists.
Its goals - and its implications for the West - may differ
enormously from another such movement in a very different society.
Having
said and written many times that we must not characterize these
movements as a monolithic phenomenon, I am now asked to venture into
discussing the future of Islamist movements as a whole. Therein lies
the irony, for a short presentation such as this one leaves little
time for the distinctions required by the diversity of these
movements.
It
is important to recognize that, throughout Islamic history, there
have been frequent movements to reform, renew, and purify both
religious practice and society, including the political sphere.
These groups have sometimes effected enormous political
consequences: the muwahhidun or Almohads of North Africa and Spain
were such a movement, as were the original Wahhabis.
These
Islamic reform movements were not, of course, identical to the
groups with which we are familiar today; but they had much in
common: a belief that existing political regimes lacked Islamic
legitimacy, that Islam itself had become stale and weak through
inadequate observance or outright apostasy, and a desire to
revitalize both the faith and society.
Twentieth
century Islamist movements draw from these same feelings and also
from some changed circumstances. Initially, modern Islamist groups,
particularly the two pioneers, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and
the Jama'at-I-Islami in India/Pakistan, also grew up in response to
the presence of European colonialism.
With
the end of the colonial era, they have continued to offer
alternatives to the pervasive social mores of the West. That does
not necessarily mean they are opposed to the West politically or
economically. (Westerners who denounce Islamic revival as
"medievalist" often are puzzled by the importance of
modern technology in the spreading of its ideas: from audio
cassettes in the Iranian revolution to computer diskettes today. To
most Islamists, however, it is not the West's technology that is
deplorable, only its social mores).
Although
the Brotherhood and the Jama'at grew up in the 1930s and the 1940s,
they had to compete with other ideologies, particularly the new
nationalisms, in their countries of origin. Islamist groups and
political parties have been in existence for decades, as other
ideologies - socialism, various types of nationalism, including
"Arab nationalism" - have faded or failed.
For
Westerners, and particularly Americans, political Islam did not
really demand a place in their consciousness until the Iranian
Revolution of 1979. Though Ruhollah Khomeini's ideological and
religious beliefs had much in common with other Islamist movements,
the distinctively Shi'ite elements of Khomeini's thought mean that
the Iranian experience will never translate precisely in a Sunni
context despite a Western tendency to see every Islamist movement as
seeking to create "another Iran." In the Sunni world,
Mawdudi, Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb have far more influence than
Khomeini.
There
is also a clear distinction to be made between Islamist groups
seeking to engage and reform the secular state and those who
consider the secular state unredeemable. This is sometimes linked
with the doctrine, attributed usually to Sayyid Qutb's later years,
of seeing the secular state as jahili and thus non-Muslim and the
proper target for jihad. The movements embracing this idea of the
secular state as deserving destruction and secularists as not fellow
Muslims tend to be much more violent and unwilling to compromise
than those who seek state and societal transformation through
political participation.
As
Islamist movements have evolved, their goals, tactics and roles have
changed. The role of the underground organization and the use of
violence is one area where varied approaches have evolved in
response to specific events. Sometimes, when efforts to work within
the system are thwarted by the incumbent regime, more radical
responses result. The apparent shift of influence from Algeria's
Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) to the more radical and extreme
Islamic Armed Group (GIA) is a case in point.
There
is also a diversity of leadership in Islamist movements, ranging
from traditional 'ulama to educated persons with religious training
but without traditional credentials as religious scholars (Hasan
al-Banna was a schoolteacher) to young revolutionaries with little
formal religious training. This too makes a difference in the
tactics applied and the willingness, or lack thereof, to work within
the system.
The
nature of the supporters also matters. In Egypt, for example, the
Muslim Brotherhood still draws much support from the professional
classes, educated middle-class people, and has much influence in the
doctors', lawyers', engineers' and journalists' syndicates, though
that is being eroded by government action. On the other hand, the
radical, violent al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya and Jihad groups draw their
support from more socially dispossessed groups.
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