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The Islamist Agenda
In
broad terms, all Islamist groups share a common objective-building a
society where the government's domestic and foreign policy reflect
Islamic values and beliefs. Rather than "modernizing
Islam," they seek to "Islamicize modernity" by
constructing a polity where Islam is not only respected by the state
but is reflected in all aspects of society.
As
to their modus operandi, Islamists are "divided into two groups
according to the methods they employ to achieve their aims."
The majority are the "mainstream Islamist trend [which] seeks
to accomplish its aims by working within the existing rules and
regulations of its members' respective societies. They are generally
not opposed to a degree of political pluralism, to working within
the system, to democratic participation, and acknowledge the
interests and rights of minorities."(19)
The
minority are "the militant, radical and revolutionary Islamists
who use violence to unseat existing governments."(20)
This
latter group tends to capture the media's attention, often resulting
in all Islamists being labelled as violent fanatics. It is
important, however, to note the correlation between state repression
of political dissent and the recourse to violence by groups denied
political participation. The democratic experiment in Jordan, Turkey
and Pakistan suggests that given the opportunity to work within the
system, Islamists have done so non-violently.
Despite
their rhetorical critique on the current state of North-South
relations, Islamists' energies are invested in altering the internal
situation in their countries. Islam's contemporary challenge is,
"demagogy on both sides apart, not about inter-state relations
at all, but about how these Islamic societies and states will
organize themselves and what the implications of such organization
for their relations with the outside world will be."(21)
Despite
contrary Western views, "the concern of the Islamic revival has
much more to do with the internal order of states than with the
international order, although the boundary between the two may not
always be clearly distinguishable."(22)
Islamists
are clearly concerned with the internal decay of their societies. A
leading Islamist theoretician, Sudan's Hassan al-Turabi, has spoken
lucidly on this issue. The Islamic awakening...is no longer
interested in confronting the West.... The West is not our
preoccupation. We are concerned with the constructive regeneration
of our societies by mobilizing our souls and minds, not fighting
'Great Satans.' Except when a policy is directed against Islam, the
West is not the enemy for us.(23)
Some
Western observers refute such statements claiming that, doctrinally,
Islamists are inherently anti-West and are thus a threat.
Investigative reporter Steven Emerson writes that the "hatred
of the West by militant Islamic fundamentalists is not tied to any
particular act or event. Rather, fundamentalists equate the mere
existence of the West...as an intrinsic attack on Islam."(24)
Bernard
Lewis puts forth another variation of this theme: "It is clear
that it is the seductive appeal of American culture, far more than
any possible hostile acts by American governments, that [Islamists]
see as offering the greatest menace to the true faith and the right
path as they define them."(25)
The
problem with this perspective is two fold. First, it implies that
Islamists are motivated solely by an ideological zeal divorced from
any relevant historical experience. Such a perspective negates the
appalling socio-economic conditions in much of the Muslim world.
Second, it precludes any possibility of a dialogue, for the premise
indicates that Islamists will only be content when the West ceases
to exist in its present form. Such beliefs are ideal for waging
ideological warfare and galvanizing public opinion against an
implacable global foe, but they do little to enhance cross-cultural
understanding. The case of Iran illustrates the point. Iran's
vociferous denunciations of the West and the United States since the
1979 revolution have angered many. Rarely, however, has the one
hundred and fifty year interaction between Iran and the West been
part of the debate.(26)
The
1872 Reuters Concession described by Lord Curzon as "the most
complete and extraordinary surrender of the entire industrial
resources of a kingdom into foreign [i.e. British] hands"(27)
and the 1891 Tobacco Rebellion infuriated Iranians. British and
Russian intrigue in Iran eventually led to direct military
occupation of the country during the Second World War. Interference
in Iran's internal affairs was further exacerbated during the
Mossadegh years, culminating in the 1953 CIA restoration of Muhammad
Reza Pahlavi to power. This was followed by 25 years of American
support for a regime Amnesty International described as one of the
"worst violators of human rights" in the world.(28)
Emerson's
claim that Islamist rhetoric against the West "is not tied to
any particular act or event" is misleading at best,
deliberately deceptive and malicious at worst. It is equivalent to
explaining the Allied invasion of Normandy during World War II
without reference to the Nazi occupation of France.
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