|
Conclusions
The
Muslim world's present trade structure and trade policies are not
adequately equipped (except for a couple of Southeast Asian
countries) to meet the challenges posed by the new world trade
order. As it is, the Muslim world's share in world trade is meager.
Exports have stagnated and in some cases declined.
In
the emerging world trade system, the Muslim world faces severe
difficulties in even the maintenance of its meager share.There is a
lack of export diversification, and export markets are limited.
Almost 60 to 80 percent of exports are agricultural and
semimanufactured. The quality of the products is low. Very few
Muslim businesses obtain quality product certificates. At present,
quality certification is not recommended as prequalification for
selling on the international market. However, within the next few
years, quality certification is likely to become an essential
precondition.
The
antidumping safeguard provision is one of the two weakest points of
the WTO; the other is the threat posed by increasing enthusiasm for
regional cooperation, particularly in developed countries, like
NAFTA and EEC. Both of these tend to restrict global trade rather
than promote it.
In
the emerging new trade system, the cutthroat competition in the
international market will make it quite difficult for the developing
countries. Muslim countries will have to establish long-term
policies instead of the usual short-term policies to make them more
competitive. To be and to remain active participants in global
trade, they need to evolve a policy that encourages restructuring of
production processes to make them efficient and cost effective;
provides for quality upgrade and control; promotes exports which are
intensive in design, technology, and human skill; ensures protection
of their nascent domestic industries; and leads to export
diversification, especially in the manufacturing of those products
in which the Muslim world has an advantage, in particular, cotton
and cotton goods.
|
