The Iranian elite is quick to eulogize their state for being Islamic and despite the victory of reformers in Iran, skepticism abounds in the Persian world regarding the morality of some of Iran’s foreign policies. Currently, Afghans are worrying about whether Khatami’s Iran will be as open and friendly toward Kabul as that of Nateq Nouri or Khamenei. Given the present power structure, the policy toward Afghanistan will most likely remain unchanged. However, if the reformers really prove to be reformers, those holding power, and the amount of power they hold, may change.

The main seat of power in Iran is not the president but the Majlis, Council of Guardians and the Supreme Jurist. At the height of the Red Army’s engagement in atrocities in Afghanistan, it was the same powerful entities that maintained good relations with the Soviet Union, despite the horror that was inflicted on their Afghan brothers. It is likely, therefore, that the present policy of Iran toward Afghanistan may continue.

There are a few reasons the Afghans cannot absolve the Iranian state from blame. The very Islamic principles of justice and fair play that are supposedly enshrined by the Iranian state are denied when it comes to external affairs with Afghanistan. During the ‘80s, at the height of Iran-Iraq war, some Afghan refugees were forcibly drafted, while others were drafted for Iran’s proxy war in Lebanon. Moreover, the social treatment of the Afghan minority (especially the Hazara ethnic minority) inside Iran is based on racial bias and not Islamic values.

More recently, the political myopia of the Iranian ruling elite has been demonstrated by their support for the Northern Alliance in opposition to the Taliban. Despite the ideological and social agenda of the Taliban, it is important to realize their role in power consolidation and to recognize their revolutionary nature, which is essential in the first phase of state-formation. It is neither conceivable nor desirable for many Muslims of the region to have the forces of Ahmad Shah Masood reign over the vast majority of Afghans.

The strategic and economic betterment of the whole region lies in cooperation at all levels among the Muslim nations of southwest Asia. While Iran has achieved some working relationship with Pakistan in this regard, it has done nothing to ameliorate its relations with Afghanistan. The coming to power of the Taliban movement in 1996 culminated in the amassing of Iranian forces at the Afghan border under the commandership of officer Affshar (reminiscent of his namesake, who invaded Afghanistan in the early 18^th century).

Iran has shipped arms to central Afghanistan for the resistance against the Afghan government, has become involved in espionage leading to unnecessary meddling in its neighbor’s internal affairs, and treated Mazar-I-Sharif as the capital instead of Kabul.

After the elections, perhaps the political structures in Iran can evolve in the right direction, represent the sensibilities of the people and base their policies on mutual respect and understanding instead of belligerence towards smaller neighbors. After all, Afghanistan and Iran share the religious, linguistic and ethnic history of Khorasan.

If Iran claims to be a truly Islamic state, it should extend its “Islamicness” across its borders .

Ejaz Akram is the editor of the political section of the Global Examiner. He is also working on a Ph.D. in International Relations at the Catholic University of America, Washington D.C.  For feedback, e-mail editor at ejaz@islam-online.net