Inhabitants of South Asia have long been interested in events in Afghanistan. Long before the former Soviet Union attempted to “aid” Afghanistan on its path to socialism in hopes of fulfilling its desire for a “warm-water port” either in Iran or Pakistan, Afghanis maintained the mystique of an unconquerable people. The Mongols had tried and failed. The British Raj concluded it was better to equate the fair-skinned, mountain-dwelling, and sometimes blue-eyed, residents of Afghanistan as akin to themselves (after all, how could the mighty British be defeated by Orientals?) and romanticize humiliating defeats (e.g. The Charge of the Light Brigade) in order to justify continued failed military adventures in the region.

These lessons learned, the attempts at foreign domination in the region have proven unsuccessful. Somehow they have triggered the emergence of a twisted converse theory centered upon Afghanistan-initiated political adventurism outside its borders. More specifically, the central focus of these fears targets the Taliban, an Islamic politico-religious movement currently controlling more than three-quarters of the country. For now, let us not forget that most of this fear is the direct result of prior direct support for the mujahideen forces that combated and eventually toppled the puppet regime of the former Soviet Union. For now, let us not think that after the Soviets/Russians withdrew from Afghanistan, all support and aid to Afghanistan vanished, and that the Taliban trained militarily with resources and equipment from that support. What remained was a country left in a political vacuum deemed too chaotic to resolve .

As a direct consequence of this neglect, the social and political situation in Afghanistan has largely become more muddled as other foreign nations and the Taliban continue to weave an increasingly complicated and often contradictory set of policies with one another. States bordering and in near proximity to Afghanistan, including Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the central Asian states, Russia and China all have stakes invested in the fortunes of the country.

However, only Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have officially recognized the Taliban as the leaders of Afghanistan. But both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan live in a world of contradictions in their respective Afghan policies. Saudi Arabia initially supported the Taliban financially and with scholarships teaching conservative Wahhabi Islam, but has become increasingly displeased due to the Taliban’s continued harboring of Osama Bin Laden.

Although the Taliban receives great support from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI); the Pakistani Deobandi established Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) political party and its madrassas in the refugee camps that trained the Taliban; and recruits from within the country – Pakistan, in the eyes of some, may in the near future pay a heavy price for this support.

In the most recent issue of Foreign Affairs  (November/December 1999), author Ahmed Rashid of the Far Eastern Economic Review writes concerning the very likely possibility (in his view) of the Taliban exporting its interpretation of Islam to neighboring countries, like Pakistan. What the author fails to recognize (and which any foreign policy pundit truly familiar with Pakistan would recognize) is that this exaggerated fear is baseless. Pakistan is not a falling domino. One would think that after American foreign policymakers found the Domino Theory concerning the former Soviet Union and its expansionist propensity fundamentally incorrect and entirely too difficult to enforce, a similar conclusion would have imprinted itself within the foreign policy-making psychosis .

Apparently it has not, and old horse foreign policy-making intelligentsia who made their living off of the Cold War have found new ground to be proven incorrect once again. Anyone remotely familiar with Pakistan and Pakistani society would know that a Taliban movement could never gain popular favor, much less force its way upon Pakistan. The only manner in which such a conclusion could be reached was if one were to simply look at a regional map, see that Pakistan borders Afghanistan and presume merely because of geographical proximity that Pakistan will fall to the Taliban .

But Pakistan is more than just a state that happens to share a border with Afghanistan. Even a brief look at the country proves the inadequacy of assertions that Taliban social or political influence could sway a significant amount of the population to its appeal. On the face of it, conclusions that Pakistan will fall like a domino are understandable given the country’s apparent problems .

Pakistan seems to be on the brink of economic collapse every six months, ethnic and religious animosities violently persist, drug smuggling from Afghanistan (which tremendously aids the Taliban with their 20% tax on suppliers and transporters) and the “Beruitification” of Karachi all contribute to the perception of political and economic instability ripe for revolution .

But despite its fragmentation, Pakistan is a diverse society that somehow remains remarkably cohesive. Although extreme political animosities exist within Pakistan, no singular ethnic or political population dominates. Pakistan is a Muslim country that contains significant amounts of Islamic social and political stratification (Sunni, Shi’a, Tablighi Jamaat, Jamaat-I-Islami, Sufi sects – Deobandi, Chisthi, etc). Basically, Pakistan is too diverse for any one religious group, especially an external one, to hold any sort of disproportionate share of power or social influence, much less to dominate the entire multitude of political, ethnic and social loyalties within the country. And Pakistan is not without options .

Primarily, Pakistan’s military would not tolerate Taliban influence or intrusion within the country. The Taliban in Afghanistan is another matter though. Initially, Pakistan believed it strategically wise to promote the Taliban, especially if they controlled their support, in order to provide a buffer against Iran and an ally against any future hostilities with India. One of the primary reasons for Pakistan’s current military takeover was the efforts of the previous civilian government of Nawaz Sharif to divide the military utilizing the banner of Islam. It’s not that the military is anti-Islam, far from it. Pakistan’s military is extremely loyal to its religion. What the military found disturbing was attempts by the previous government to de-legitimize the military in order for Sharif to mold the institution towards his personal loyalty and agenda, rather than that of the country, by superficially promoting an “Islamification” policy. The interesting question was, “How can you Islamicize an institution that is already Islamic? ”

Pakistanis are not naïve. They have seen the banner of Islam utilized before to justify personal dictatorship (Zia ul-Haq). This may be one reason why Pakistani citizens were relieved to see Sharif leave and see some form of stability arrive after years of corruption .

In addition, militarily Pakistan is not Afghanistan. Pakistan’s military is not a shell of an armed force or one that has to compete with other armed elements within its country on an equal basis; similar to what was left in Afghanistan after the Soviet/Russian pullout. When the Russians pulled out of Afghanistan, the country contained no clear and dominant power center. Several groups ended up vying for leadership within a political vacuum. Pakistan contains no such vulnerabilities and its armed forces are more than able to handle a Taliban military adventure. Any theory or fear that propounds to state that the Taliban is an immediate and lethal threat to Pakistan may at this point be both premature and misguided .

As a side note, although the Taliban contains some aspects of Islam that might appeal to Muslims outside of Afghanistan, in a number of ways the Taliban is a bit immature. Its treatment of women and prohibitions on television, music or photography indicate a rudimentary and incorrect understanding of Islam. Others within the Muslim world find some appeal with the Taliban merely because they are vociferous and revolutionary, taking a stand against established powers. But Lenin and the Bolsheviks were also described as such. Loving the Taliban merely because they are revolutionary, advocate Islam, and “stand up to the West” may be a bit imprudent. We must not in desperation try to take to our bosom any and every movement that comes along and says they are Islamic. Genuine and just movements will arise, and maybe the Taliban will one day become just that, but for now it seems better to err on the side of caution .

Jamshed Bokhari is a freelance writer for Islam Online. For feedback, e-mail at jambokh@hotmail.com