The responsibilities of statecraft and diplomacy seem to be overwhelming to the Taliban, who have much to learn about the dynamics of world politics and state building. They seem to be caught between the competing demands of living up to their own rhetoric to create an Islamic state and to act judiciously in the interests of Afghanistan. The two forces that are tugging the Taliban can be best described as self-interest and national interest, or what is good for the Taliban versus what is good for Afghanistan. 

At times, the Taliban seem to act as if their primary goal was to underscore their so-called Islamic identity at any cost. This was the reason why they refused to handover Osama Bin Laden to the United States, or the United Nations. They wanted to appear to be upholding the ideal of Islamic solidarity even against the might of the United States. The recent decision to unilaterally recognize the independence of Chechnya is another action designed to emphasize their commitment to Muslims fighting the global domination of imperial powers like Russia and the United States. Both these actions will cost Afghanistan. The Bin Laden affair has already attracted U.N. sanctions. The Chechnya recognition will probably incite Russia into more aggressively supporting the Masood militia combating the Taliban for control over Afghanistan.

On other occasions, they seem to be acting as if they really are interested in advancing the national interests of Afghanistan. Consider their recent actions. They went beyond the call of duty to cooperate with India and help it resolve the recent hijacking crisis. They even interceded successfully on India's behalf convincing the hijackers to drop some of their demands. In the past, the Taliban have made many negative comments about Iran, primarily because most Iranians are Shi’a while Taliban practice a strict, puritanical form of Sunni Islam (Wahhabism). But after the imposition of U.S./U.N. sanctions, they have cut the anti-Shi’a rhetoric and are actually appreciative of Iran's efforts to provide food and other essential supplies cut off because of the sanctions.

The Taliban seem to be oscillating. On one hand, they are determined to score symbolic points at home as well as on the global stage, while on the other they realize that they have to moderate their rhetoric in the interest of strategic gains. The reasons for such inconsistency, even confusion, can be easily identified. The Taliban are first and foremost overwhelmed by their own spectacular success. They have achieved in a very short time, with minimum action, what the celebrated Mujahideen failed to do in nearly two decades. They also routed rather easily the famous Mujahideen who defeated the mighty Soviet Union. This unexpected and near complete victory has exaggerated their own self-conception as God's Soldiers on a divine mission while exposing them to
their own inadequacies.

Driving trucks and tanks while shooting rockets and guns from Peshawar to Kabul is one thing; designing foreign policy and determining domestic priorities is another. Like any political animal, they intuitively act in the interest of self-preservation. But to do anything more requires a vision, and that is one thing that the Taliban lack desperately. They are in charge, which is something they did not expect. Now they are at a loss with regards to the future of Afghanistan. The madrassas they came from taught them how long their beards should be, but it did not train them to deliberate on issues of governance. In the absence of a long-term vision about the nature of the Afghan state and its place in the global scheme of things, they are reduced to reacting to the daily crises that emerge.

Taliban have to first identify their short-term and long-term goals. Their short-term goal must be consolidation and their long-term goal must be development. By consolidation, I do not refer to the mere strengthening of their physical control over Afghan territory. I am implying taking steps which will: 1) generate domestic support from the people of
Afghanistan, 2) convince whoever have been supplying them with arms and resources until now that they are independent but remain a good investment, and 3) stop cultivating new enemies and work towards minimizing international resistance to their de facto
sovereignty. Each of these actions requires nimble diplomacy toward allies and potential/active enemies, and compassionate policies over those within their
 jurisdiction.

Their long-term goals must be geared towards providing a vision of the future of Afghanistan that will inspire all the different ethnicities and political groupings to work for a better Afghanistan. Hopefully, this vision will carve out an identity for the new Afghanistan, which will not put it at odds at home or abroad.

They need a vision that will:

1)      Articulate a clear strategy for political and economic development. They need to answer questions such as what the form of their government will be? How will the rulers and the ruled decide what is good for Afghanistan? How will the present state channel people's political desires and their energies to create a political structure that will facilitate good governance? What indicators will be used to determine what is good governance (peace? satisfaction of basic needs? welfare?). On all these issues they must inform and consult the population through town meetings (mashwaras in mosques perhaps).

2)      They must design a plan for economic development. Where will the capital and know-how to rebuild Afghanistan come from? Where will the diplomats, the economists, the judges and the teachers needed for this project come from? Even if they do not have any answers, it is time they started discussing these issues.

Muqtedar Khan is a Ph.D. candidate at the Department of Government in Georgetown University. He is the associate editor of American Journal of Islamic & Social Sciences. For feedback, e-mail khanm@gusun.georgetown.edu