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 The
Caspian Sea region has been under serious scrutiny in recent
months, if not years. But even though the horrific events of
September 11 have taken center-stage in world politics, the region
remains to be of vital importance. In fact, one can say that the
war and U.S. reaction will be instrumental in In spite of the
substantial retreat of the crisis condition in the Caspian Sea due
to the US bombings of the 11th of September 2001, the situation in
the region continues to be extremely important. It may even be
said that what has happened in the United States and its reaction
are not aloof of shaping the future of the Caspian Sea region.
The
legal rights to thestatus of the Caspian Sea are disputed by its
shore states. Each state reflects its own interests and objectives
in its attitude and conception of the appropriate legal status.
There are three viewpoints on the assumed legal framework for
distributing the Ssea’s resources, regulating its navigation,
and oil drilling:
The
first is the view held by Iran,’s view which considers the
Caspian Sea region as indivisible among its the states overlooking
it. It suggests that all the Caspian resources be exploited
collectively by the states overlooking it, whether these resources
are the sea waters, wealth or, revenues, so to be distributed
jointly betweenamong them all, or to regulate the matter by
letting each state attain approximately 20 percent of the Caspian
output.
The
second is the view of Azerbaijan’s view as a of the closed lake.
TIt provides that the Caspian Sea is a lake that can be divided
among the states according to the coastal length of each
overlooking state.
The
third is the view held by Kazakhstan’s view. It separates the
seabed and its deep wealth under it from theits water water
surface and its use in navigational passage. By considering the
Caspian Sea a lake in regard to its latent resources, the
overlooking states will be able to exploit themsuch resources
individually, while they collaborate in on the issues such as
navigation, and pollution al control.
Political
and Economic Interlacement
The
conflict in the Caspian Sea region is not only legal; but it
is also primarily economic and political due to the complex
geographical and geo-strategical settings, which in turn
complicates interactions, relation, and crises of the region. When
the crisis between Iran and Azerbaijan was emergedstirred up, the
dispute was interlaced with the Turkmenistan’s emergence in
mid-August, this year, claimposing similar accusations thato
Azerbaijan isof infringing upon its territorial waters through oil
drilling. Thus Iran declared its support for Turkmenistan.
On
the other side, a semi-alliance was shown among three other states
- (Russia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan -), when the Azerbaijani
President, Hydar Aleeve, declared that there would be a summit
between the three presidents to take a unified stance toward the
Caspian situation. Aleeve’s statement included that the
Independent Countries Association will protect its external
borders through joint efforts, a matter considered by the
observers as an indication of a radical transformation in Baku’s
rejection of a military existence on its territories, for it once
refused to join the Commonwealth Collective Security Treaty.
Some
analysts maintain that Moscow replaced Iran’s satisfaction with
Azerbaijan’s friendship. However, an anonymous official in the
Russian leadership leaked a statement by an anonymous official
stressing the necessity of Iran’s participation in any
collective effort to discuss the Caspian Sea problem.
Stances
and policies are neither solid nor absolute. Moscow coordinated
its positions with Kazakhstan. Iran underwent a mutual
understanding with Turkmenistan. Turkey supported Azerbaijan.
Washington appeared in the screen to declare its support forto
Azerbaijan’s position in its border dispute with Iran. Yet, Baku
accused Tehran and Moscow of delaying drilling operations in a
pretext of allowing foreign intervention in the area.
Multiple
Scenarios
The
economic interests may provide the states overlooking the sea more
than meets the eye. They are the driving force in steering the
political background of the relations betweenof such countries
towards an adoption of certain stances and policies. The economic
and legal differences may simultaneously instigate old political
issues. For instance, senior Iranian officials publicly re-raised,
not for the first time, the idea of restoring Azerbaijan to Iran,
which encompasses an 18-million-Azerbaijani minority. This
tendency emerged as a reaction to Baku’s decision in rejecting
the Arabic language charactersalphabets and adopting the Latin
charactersalphabets like Turkey:, a position that enraged Iran.
Yet, the Azerbaijanis are upset over Iranian support forto
Armenia, a Christian state, occupying 25 percent of the
Azerbaijani territorylands.
Thus,
the political dimensions overlap to make things more difficult.
Iran is charged withof financing and supporting fundamentalist
movements in the states overlooking the Caspian Sea, as well as
being bias toward the dispute over Nagoreno KaraAbakh. This is ,
while Iran believes that some of the states overlooking the Sea
and other Central Asian countries have becoame a spear-lance head
of the U.S.,nited States and Israel. In addition, Iran fears
Turkey, its traditional regional rival, which in fact strives to
widen its influence in the area.
The
economic actions, which are underway, explicatetranslate these
complications and add to their entanglement. Washington strongly
bolsters the Baku-Jehan gas pipeline. There are other pipelines on
which Kazakhstan has agreed made agreement with Russia on to
export its oil products, whereas suggestions from Tehran to have
pipelines pass through its territorylands are faltered in spite of
its proximity and lower costs.
Another
leaked reportNews leakage reveals that an agreement has been made
between Moscow and Baku, stipulating that Tehran will take 11
percent from the Caspian area, while the remainder will be divided
among the four ex-Soviet Republics. The biggest dividend will go
to Kazakhstan at 30 percent. , Russia will take 19 percent,
Azerbaijan 23 percent, and Turkmenistan 17 percent.
In
spite of multiple scenarios, and disparate interests and
perceptions, post-September 11 eventsthe sudden recent
developments will discard all of themtopple them all, making
wayopening the door for a future based on entirely different
facts.
Expected
Consequences of the American Intervention
There
is a well-known strong difference between The difference between
Washington and Tehran inover the way of distributing the resources
of the Caspian Sea is well known. Washington supports Azerbaijan
with and backs the gas pipeline projects passing through the
Turkish landslands in order to ensure that the flow of the Caspian
oil is away from Russia and Iran, besides restricting the economic
gains and privileges that Moscow and Tehran willcan reapobtain
from the Caspian Sea wealth. This is within the context of its
competition with Russia, and its policy of tension and appeal with
Iran.
Therefore,
the current and future events in Afghanistan will play an
instrumental role in steering Washington- Moscow and Tehran
relations with Washington. One aspect of these relations is the
future situation in the Caspian Sea. How will this issue be
affected by what is going on now?
It
should be emphasized that there is a common interest between
Washington, on one hand, and Moscow and Tehran, on the other, in
the war in Afghanistan. The three parties consider the Taliban
government in way or another an enemy in one-way or another. The
same is true for Osama bin Laden. Thus, it is unexpected that Iran
and Russia will stand in the way of the current American
arrangements, as shown by the attitudes of the two states until
now. The situation is the same for Uzbekistan and Tajikistan who
also have an interest in jettisoning the ruling party getting rid
of the present ruling system in Afghanistan, not merely for
religious and political motives; but, for intrinsically ethnic
ones.
However,
Iran and Russia are aware that the future of Afghanistan after the
war will be totally different from nowits present condition.
Whether the Taliban government is overthrown, or replaced, with
another or is just struck and weakened, there are signs indicating
that the U.S. forces will be stationedstay in Afghanistan or on
its parameters for a long time, unconditioned by the time it will
take to militarily get rid until thefrom Taliban government
and Bin Laden’s camps are non-existent.
At
this point appears the other side of the results triggered by the
Afghanistan war. Although Tehran and Moscow will benefit from the
war, but it will be at the expensein return of having the
proximity of the U.S. political and military mightrole being in
the proximityat the threshold of the Caspian Sea. This means a
withdrawal of measures and calculations toward the future of the
Caspian Sea resources and wealth made before the American
intervention. Washington has tried to interfere to influence the
situations in the Caspian region through either the representation
of Turkey, or through direct coordination with Azerbaijan. Things
will be extremely different, particularly the war in Afghanistan
will only help Washington toin utilizeing its military bases and
installing forces in the ex-Soviet republics, some are Caspian and
others are Caucasian.
The
following are the most important results that will be ensued by
this transformation:
-
Moscow
and Tehran, and relatively Turkmenistan, will find themselves
compelled to directly deal directly with Washington concerning
the future of the Caspian Sea. The dispute will be no more
with Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan, but rather with the United
States directly.
-
Russia
and Kazakhstan will not more enjoy the advantage of the
intermediate attitude attained at the present. Now there are
not real pressures on them both to foster a clear stance with
or against the perceptions concerning the future of the
Caspian Sea wealth. We find a fluctuation in their positions
according to the bargaining and contacts taking place between
Iran and Turkmenistan on one side, and Azerbaijan on the
other. Thus the entrance of the U.S.America will deprive
Moscow from the scope of movement now, as it will find itself
requested to adopt a clear and determined stance, which will
most probably be an alliance with Tehran to confront the
U.S.-American Azerbaijani coordination. , especiallyThe gains
that Moscow expected gains from supporting Azerbaijan or
coordinating with Kazakhstan will disappear. with the American
presence. Moreover, Tehran and Moscow converge onat a
number of agreement aspects concerning their stand and
relation toward the United States and its ambitions and
policies, not solely in the Caspian region but also in many
other regions.
-
·
The American approach to the Caspian shores only prompts the
process to agree on a final status concerning the distribution
of the Caspian resources. The different parties will find
themselves before a new state of de facto, rather than an
agreement to choose a distribution method for
distribution that is postponed from one stage to another
without any pressures, limited or otherwisepressures, posed on
the states overlooking the sea. The U.S. military and
political proximity necessitates the swiftness in determining
the vagueness and puts an end to the continuous disputes
concerning the economic and legal status of the Sea.
-
·
Therefore, it is projected that a resolution will be taken
soon to determine the economic and legal settings of the
Caspian Sea and how to distribute its mineral and oil
revenues. Iran and Russia in particular will try to accelerate
such determination before the war ends in Afghanistan, in
order to make use of the ongoing negotiations, and the
processes of frightening and appeasing carried out by
Washington with the countries of the entire world. On the
contrary, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan will not be with the same
enthusiasm and promptness. They will wait for the new
balances, which are expected to be for their interests and the
interests of their ally, the United States. Yet the need of
the support of the U.S., Tehran, and Moscow in its campaign in
Afghanistan may drive Washington to approve determining the
Caspian Sea situation soon. This will be after making an
agreement with Moscow and Tehran on a satisfactory settlement
for them and at the same time fulfilling its requests. Such
requests are that Tehran obtains 20 percent of the Caspian Sea
resourceswants, while undermining its gas pipeline projects to
pass through its territories and U.S. recognition of a Russian
Kazakhi agreement on exporting the Kazakhstan’s oil through
Russia.
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