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Freedom and the Cartoon Crisis
From the Incident to the Approach
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Interview by `Amr `Abdul-Kareem**
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Mar.
17, 2006
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Dr. Saif Ad-Deen `Abdul-Fattah
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The
crisis of the abusive cartoons published in a Danish newspaper
depicting Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him) has
revealed many issues on the theoretical and intellectual levels, as
well as on the practical level. The main problem with relation to
this crisis lies in the concept and practice of "freedom,"
which many have used to prove the veracity of their positions. This
has led us to stand before an ambiguous concept and practice. In
order to explore this obscure area, we have conducted this interview
with Dr. Saif Ad-Deen `Abdul-Fattah, professor of political theory
at Cairo University who is known for his remarkable contribution to
the branch of jurisprudence that deals with al-maqasid
(the objectives of Shari`ah). In this interview, Professor
`Abdul-Fattah has deconstructed the concept of freedom in an attempt
to understand and digest it, and at the same time perceive the
position of Islamic thought towards this issue, regarding justice as
the superior and upper concept in the system of our Islamic thought.
Therefore,
if we want to discuss freedom, we should pose the concept of the
justice of freedom. Thus the discussion within the Islamic vision
will be about the limits of freedom, not about the constraints
of freedom. This is based on the fact that limits represent the
area of movement, while constraints are things that hinder such
movement. According to the Islamic understanding, freedom is
associated with responsibility, so it is not an absolute freedom.
That is why there is always a connection between the idea of freedom
and the objectives of Shari`ah.
`Abdul-Fattah
stressed that we should move from regarding the incident of the
Danish cartoons as a single incident to discussing it
methodologically, emphasizing the fact that there is a structural
flaw in the West's definition of the value of freedom, which leads
it to cause gross injustice to others; it is a freedom that
lacks balance.
`Abdul-Fattah
was so critical of the practices that marred Islamic history, as
well as some sayings that represented the base of the idea of
constraining freedom. Examples of such sayings were "There is
no way but to obey oppressive rulers"; "an unjust ruler is
better than constant sedition"; and "sixty years with an
unjust ruler are better than a night without a ruler."
Criticizing
such sayings, `Abdul-Fattah assured that Islamic thought has often
faced them with some free and strong sayings, such as Imam Malik's
saying "A coerced person's oath is void."
The
conversation tackled the following issues:
Deconstructing
the Concept of Freedom
IOL:
To begin with, freedom is one of the greatest
concepts which governs man's consciousness and directs his feelings
and actions; the same as the concepts of life, death, and hope do.
Freedom is among the systematic concepts which evoke a system of
concepts. We have learned about the triangle of values: equality,
freedom, and justice; and that as Socialism introduces the concept
of equality and Western thought presents the concept of freedom, the
Islamic model introduces the concept of justice. So would you please
deconstruct the concept of freedom?
`Abdul-Fattah:
In the Name of Allah, Most
Gracious, Most Merciful; Our Lord, do not punish us if we forget or
fall into error.
The
world of concepts is actually one of the main worlds connected to
Muslims and their world. There is no way but to assure that words
represent a part of our nation's identity, and according to this
principle, words stand for a sanctuary which we must defend.
Words,
according to Mustafa Sadiq Ar-Rafi`y [a well-known Egyptian man of
letters], are like "honor and land." So we can assure that
"words of the nation" are worthy of considering and
discussing, along with the concepts which come to us from
everywhere. We are also to deal with the concepts which come from a
civilization, a culture, and an identity other than ours.
In
this context, I think that concepts vary, so we have to look into
the world of concepts with a general and a special view at the same
time.
These
general and special views are expressions of the conceptual circle
as you said. Among concepts, there are ones which are
civilizational, and there are also secondary ones which are included
in a system. In addition, there are concepts which represent systems
in themselves, so they evoke a family of concepts. Other concepts
are like a tree, or a seed of a tree, which grows and contains
roots, a trunk, branches, and fruits.
From
this point, we think that the world of concepts needs more
investigation and elaboration. The concepts which are related to the
system of values are very important concepts and they fall under
"umbrella concepts" or "system concepts." If we
want to talk about the cognitive and intellectual systems in the
West and inside the Islamic civilization, then we can say that the
system of values with Marxists considers equality the supreme value.
We will also see that Socialist thought, with its Communist thought,
has depended on the issue of equality as a supreme value. When we
understand the supreme value, we will find that it means, among
other things, that such a supreme value affects other values and the
way of understanding such values. That's why when the Marxist
cognitive system raises the issue of equality considering it a
supreme value, then it, at the same time, shapes the other two
values (freedom and justice). Thus, neither freedom nor justice can
be understood except through the concept of equality.
However,
the concept of equality has become a mathematical concept, which
tries to make all people equal to the extent that it makes equal
those who are not equal by any means. In other words, we can say
that sameness is different from equality.
Here,
we have to talk also about the cognitive system of the liberal
capitalistic West; for this system adopts another value: the value
of freedom. It neither understands the value of equality nor the
value of justice except from within the framework of the value of
freedom. Thus, this system makes freedom an absolute value that
shapes other systems of values. As for Islam, it regards justice as
the supreme value, through which the other two values are shaped.
Examining
how these values are shaped in this way, we assert that the value of
freedom cannot be understood except in the context of justice. The
"justice of freedom" differs from the "value of
freedom." What does that mean? And how can the value of
freedom be examined in this context?
From
the Islamic viewpoint, freedom is not an absolute value that should
be accepted with all its blemishes, but it is rather connected with
a number of limits. There is no freedom without limits. Here we have
to ponder upon how the Islamic viewpoint handles this: Islam talks
about the "limits of freedom" not the "constraints
of freedom," because limits are a space for motion while
constraints obstruct freedom. In this connection, we
stress the meaning previously emphasized: that freedom is
conditioned by a system of limits which surrounds it and realizes
its effectiveness within the framework of justice. Fair freedom,
or justice of freedom, is what we can understand from this value
connected to freedom.
In
this way, we have to touch on a very important subject: What was the
opinion which pointed out the value of freedom in the Islamic
tradition?
Contemplating
this issue, we find that the word used to indicate the value of
freedom in this context was the word choice, and choice is a
concept that denotes responsibility. Choice here is not according to
one's wishes, but it is a choice of whatever is good. The words choice
(ikhtiyar) and good (khayr) in Arabic derive
from the linguistic root of khayr (good). Thus, it becomes
clear that choice is a commitment and a responsibility, and hence it
surely entitles accountability.
In
the light of all these concepts, we can examine the value of
freedom. It is also the choice of justice. The issue of equality
cannot be understood without the concept that asserts that fair
equality, or justice of equality, cannot be perceived except within
the frame which maintains that different denominators cannot be
added except after making them common. We have been taught this as
an arithmetical fact; arithmetical equality would never apply to
those who are not equal.
Here
we do not mean by equality a form of sameness, but we mean that the
scale of rights and duties is connected with justice. [Are those
who know equal with those who know not?] (Az-Zumar 39:9).
These
matters are related to how a certain value comes to be regarded as a
supreme value in an intellectual or cognitive system.
Then
comes the necessity of connecting between the concept of freedom as
in Islamic thought and the concept of freedom adopted by Western
thought. As for the concept of freedom related to the abusive Danish
cartoons that offended the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him)
as a person and a symbol for the Muslim nation and the message these
cartoons convey, it asserts the issue we are tackling here. What
sort of freedom are we talking about? Is it a freedom void of any
limits? No, freedom from the Islamic viewpoint is that which is
connected with choosing good as I have clarified.
IOL:
Does this mean that we are judging the West
according to our system of intellectual values?
`Abdul-Fattah:
We are not judging the West according to our system of intellectual
values. The issue is about the concept related to the correct
freedom. One has to know that one's freedom ends when others'
freedoms begin. It is by no means of freedom that you may insult my
religion, my prophet, or any of the symbols related to me. I too
have no right to insult the symbols related to you. In fact, Islam
is the religion which asserts the protection of all religions
against such acts.
Approach
Before the Incident
IOL:
Professor `Abdul-Fattah, we would like a clarification about the
approach of dealing with the problem rather than the problem itself,
or the Danish incident itself, which was dealt with by many writers.
Muslims' reactions towards it indicate that the Muslim nation is
still alive. What do you think?
`Abdul-Fattah:
Actually, we are talking about the approach. When we talk about the
issue of concept and that we should not understand it as being of
one form, we are saying that there are "concepts of
situation." There are concepts within our intellectual system.
It is impossible to say that we do not possess an intellectual
system because we have a distinguished one.
IOL:
In this
system, does freedom come late?
`Abdul-Fattah:
Freedom is not late. The issue of freedom has its special status.
What is important is not the priority of a value, but rather the
ability to consider these values in their position, which preserves
the freedoms of all human beings.
Therefore,
the effectiveness of the concept stems from a very important matter,
which is that the value would preserve freedom for me and you
equally. In this regard, we have to stress these meanings. But when
your freedom means violating mine, the concept here becomes
problematic; a thing which has caused the matters we are now dealing
with in analyzing the Danish incident.
IOL:
The subject of "the sacred" is an important one in Western
thought. What is common is that the West does not care about
sanctities and devalues them. It attacks Christ and the Divine
Being, or as they say, it tries to break taboos.
`Abdul-Fattah:
This is something the Westerner would do; to break the taboos
related to whatever is sacred, because he wants to say that he is
only attached to the affairs of life and living. He has the right to
believe in this, but has no right to force the rest of the world to
believe in it, too.
Thus,
it becomes a necessity for the cognitive and intellectual systems to
examine the relationship between the sacred and the human being,
which asserts the nature of the relation between the religious and
the political, the sacred and the profane. If the Westerner thinks
that excluding, or even marginalizing or profaning, the sacred is a
part of the core of his secular belief, then we are facing a highly
dangerous problem. If the sacred is
not revered by him, he is free in his own sacred symbols, but he is
by no means free to violate my own sacred symbols.
It
is really a wonder that Islam, as a universal religion, raises a
sacred symbol in all levels. In this regard, a very important
command is mentioned: [The Messenger believeth in that which hath
been revealed unto him from his Lord and (so do) the believers. Each
one believeth in Allah and His angels and His scriptures and His
messengers. We make no distinction between any of His messengers and
they say: We hear, and we obey. (Grant us) Thy forgiveness, our
Lord. Unto Thee is the journeying] (Al-Baqarah 2:285).
Thus,
we do not make distinctions between any of the messengers, and,
similarly, we do not make distinctions between the origins of the
sacred, which means every religious group. Whenever they abuse
Christ, they abuse the messengers of Almighty Allah. Thus, it is
incumbent upon the Muslim to rage in the same way if Christ is
abused; it should not be said that they are their messengers,
because we must respect all messengers according to our religion. In
the end, we assert that it is not of the freedom of others to insult
my religion.
IOL:
Even if the other does not consider this as an insult, but as matter
of freedom of expression?
`Abdul-Fattah:
No, there is a difference between freedom of expression and insult.
We said that freedom does not give anyone the right to do anything
that leads to a state of aggression, as then it would be said that
he has the right of aggression. We see freedom as thus. The Western
civilization alters scales and uses double standards. For example,
the United States' freedom and preservation of security are in the
occupation of Iraq and depriving it of its freedom; and the United
States' freedom and preservation of security are in the occupation
of Afghanistan and bombarding it with heavy bombs that weigh
thousands of tons.
The
United States also says that its intervention in Iraq is
"liberation." How can occupation be considered liberation?
Americans also say they are reconstructing, while they are actually
destroying. Why do you destroy to rebuild? Such contradictions are
found within the system of Western thought, in its cognitive world
and value world. What is more, it wants to impose this vision upon
us. So, when the West says that what it is doing is not an
occupation but a liberation, we have to repeat in a parrot fashion:
"It's freedom! It's freedom!"
It
is not this way. Therefore, we are stressing that there is a
structural flaw in the definition of the value of freedom in the
West, and this flaw leads the West to a state of grave oppression.
It becomes a freedom which loses balance and criterion at the same
time. Thus, freedom becomes chaos and dissoluteness not an
obligation or a responsibility.
Single
Standard for Freedom
IOL:
But is the West free in its system of values?
`Abdul-Fattah:
The West is free in
its system of values as long as it does not transgress mine. The
issue here is about the limits of this freedom and the fact that my
limits are being transgressed. This transgression forces me to
defend these limits and ward off transgressors. Doing so does not
imply that I do not want freedom of opinion or expression, but I
want this freedom to be a responsible one; of one scale and one
criterion.
Look
what Iranian president Ahmadinejad did. What was the Danish story
about? We will not go into details here, but we will learn the
method. Let us learn the method from this Danish story. There was a
cartoon competition, whose theme was drawing cartoons of Prophet
Muhammad. Twelve cartoons were selected out of many more (apparently
more than a hundred), then they were published in that newspaper in
what was called drawing lots, after which it was said that those
cartoons had won.
What
was Ahmadinejad's response? He said they would make a competition
for drawing cartoons of the Holocaust and would give the cartoonist
of the most distinguished drawing a prize, too. At this point, the
West was extremely raged because of an issue of history; so the West
has its own sanctities, but in this case it is a worldly one.
Moreover, it wants to impose, in this connection, its elements and
criteria of sanctification upon others; as if talking about the
Holocaust, which is a historical incident, has become holy, whereas
talking about the Messenger of Allah is a matter related to freedom
of expression. The West says that whoever raises doubts of the
Holocaust could face imprisonment.
IOL:
I know that the West as a whole is intellectually hypocritical as
regards double standards.
`Abdul-Fattah:
The idea of double
standards is a structural one within its cognitive and ethical
structures. It is a basic idea within Western civilization, which
has not understood anything different for a very long time. Ever
since this civilization began, there have been genocides. We can
even say that the civilization was established this way: there were
original inhabitants who had to be annihilated. What is the
difference between eradicating Red Indians and the Jewish Holocaust?
It
is the element that can eradicate with its strength, and which can
also protect, but it only wants to protect Israel, about which Dr.
`Abdul-Wahhab Al-Misiri says, "Israel is a functional country;
it performs a functional task inside the region for the interest of
the United States and the Western civilization."
Does
Freedom Mean Chaos?
IOL:
Going back to the issue of deconstructing the concept of freedom
within Islamic and Western thoughts, and comparing the two; we want
to analyze the Danish incident in view of this deconstruction and
comparison. It seems that the concept of freedom in the West has
become absolute, even if it leads to chaos and dissoluteness.
`Abdul-Fattah:
Freedom is what makes the absoluteness of relativity the rule;
everything becomes relative; there are no constants or sanctities.
In this way, this problematic issue emerges: absoluteness of freedom
and absoluteness of relativity.
IOL:
Why can't freedom be a supreme value in Islamic thought?
`Abdul-Fattah:
Freedom is already a supreme value in Islamic thought.
IOL:
But it is late.
`Abdul-Fattah:
The issue here is not being
late or advanced. What matters is how one understands freedom
through the concept of supreme value. Why does Islam regard justice
as the highest value? Because the concept of justice means putting
everything in its rightful place, giving all people their rights.
One of the important sayings that we are talking about is
"justice is a balance;" it weighs freedom and equality, so
it makes equal the things that are truly equal. And no one can be
free except if he is responsible.
IOL:
What are the limits of freedom in Islamic thought?
`Abdul-Fattah:
We have already mentioned many. They are the rules of general order;
for example, one of the necessities which preserve human freedom is
freedom of religion. Allah says: [There is no compulsion in
religion. The right direction is henceforth distinct from error]
(Al-Baqarah 2:256) because whoever embraces this religion without
conviction is actually worthless.
Freedom
also has basic dimensions. Anyone who does not have his daily bread
does not talk about freedom; therefore, freedom has its material
basis, as well as its immaterial one. Islam combines both bases of
freedom with fairness and equilibrium. It does not regard man as
this physical being who only talks about his freedom in enjoying all
elements of consumption, but rather commands him to eat from Allah's
good things and not to eat any of the evil things, considering this
part of his freedom. All that is limited by legal and social limits,
limits related to the general order, limits connected to
conventions, limits related to whatever benefits people, and limits
connected to justice and quality in justice.
Islam
regards freedom as a collective freedom, not as an individual one.
This collective freedom leads to entering into relations. And the
freedom of individuals cannot be controlled except through the
concept of justice because justice asserts the individual balance
before speaking about absolute freedom.
IOL:
The concept
of absolute freedom is a traditional concept; it is approaching its
end even in the West, isn't it?
`Abdul-Fattah:
No, it has not ended.
IOL:
I mean that your freedom ends when the freedom of others starts.
Does this mean that absolute freedom is not exactly absolute?
`Abdul-Fattah:
There has been some kind of a violation of others' freedom under the
guise of freedom of publication and information. The West hurts us
when whole companies launch a certain sort of propaganda on the
Internet. Isn't that a form of violating people's freedom? They
claim that this is practicing the principle of freedom.
IOL:
That sort of thing does not conflict with their general order as
long as it is within the limits of law, right?
`Abdul-Fattah:
Yes. This does not contradict with the general order. They want to
corrupt people; spread vice and corruption. To us, this contradicts
with the general order. To us, the human being is honored; woman is
not something to be sold and bought. They say they are free to
practice same-sex marriage, but this is not freedom, because it has
caused harm to that society, those people, and their interests.
Whenever
the West causes problems because of its values, while it knows that
the bases of its values bear those elements of contradiction, it
attempts to create a state of adaptation — like, for example,
taking precautions for safe sex. These are all very dangerous
issues.
Reckoning
of Norms Not Years
IOL:
I'm asking you a direct question: If Muslims were as powerful as
America today, would they do in the world more than what America is
already doing?
`Abdul-Fattah:
No.
IOL:
Maybe in the name of freedom of conquering
countries and freedom of calling to Islam (da`wah)?
`Abdul-Fattah:
No, the matter was not like
that. When the Islamic conquests (al-futuhat al-Islmaiyyah)
adhered to the Shari`ah and relied on an Islamic referential
authority, they truly represented a process of liberating nations.
They did not eliminate languages or eradicate races, but rather they
saved such races, languages, and cultures. Moreover, those who did
not participate in war and remained in their own towns are the very
people who helped build the Islamic civilization.
IOL:
But I'm talking about the so-called Islamic
history as a whole, as some people see that the dark side of this
history is more evident than the luminous side.
`Abdul-Fattah:
I have only one word to say
in this point; it's a word related to the method. When you talk to
me about something, don't talk about it in terms of years but in
terms of norms. Tell me when we adhered to our Islam and were weak,
and when we adhered to it and were powerful!
IOL:
Take, for
example, the person who said, "The caliph is this (pointing to
the caliph), and after him it's that (pointing to the caliph's son),
and whoever refuses will be dealt with this (pointing to a
sword)." Take also the issue of freedom and the long history of
dictatorship; that is, the issue was not only that some rulers took
power by means of dominance, while others were dictators.
`Abdul-Fattah:
This is one of the problems
of Islamic reality.
IOL:
But some scholars granted legality to such a
reality when they admitted the governance of dictators and
dominating rulers.
`Abdul-Fattah:
Their granting of legality
was in terms of potentiality, which meant that it was the exception.
Then the exception turned into a rule; and that was the wrong thing.
Among such wrong practices also were the sayings which were common
in our heritage. Examples of such sayings are "An unjust ruler
is better than constant sedition"; "there is no way but to
obey oppressive rulers"; and "sixty years with an unjust
ruler are better than a night without a ruler." All such
sayings only justify dictatorship and have nothing to do with
Islamic referential authority. We must also discuss the faults and
wrongs that hindered freedom from taking its real status in Islamic
history, which means that freedom itself is at a low status in the
Islamic system of values.
Besides,
look at what Ibn Taymiyah said: "A just state endures though
unbelieving; and an unjust state perishes though Islamic." This
shows the most brilliant example for freedom.
When
we talk about the value of freedom, we should also talk about the
slogan of monotheism. But when the Islamic world retarded, the
Muslims' understanding of their religion also retarded. Thus, it is
clear that the words of monotheism indicate freedom. It is a
testimony that there is no god but Allah; there are no multiple gods
that dispute over the human being.
IOL:
I think
that this is the problem with Islamic thought. Do you think,
Professor, that
the making of mistakes in practice throughout long centuries proves
the invalidity of the origin of freedom?
`Abdul-Fattah:
It was not a mistake throughout history, because you are looking at
Islamic history partially not wholly and comprehensively. For
example, when we talk about " trial," we remember how the
four Imams were trialed, and the trial of the creation of the
Qur'an, from which Imam Ahmad suffered.
IOL:
Are those the Mu`tazilites, the
advocates of freedom?
`Abdul-Fattah:
Shouldn't we talk about Imam Ahmad's position regarding freedom?
That is how we should understand the lesson, from its two sides; the
first is that of the rulers who were tempted by bad scholars who
attempted to endorse the rulers' oppressive absolute acts. The
second is that of a scholar who stood up for an important issue and
made a free statement which was "If you say they said (that is,
some scholars said what Mu`tazilites wanted), (as for me), by Allah,
I will never say (what they want me to say)." This happened
after his students asked him to say what Mu`tazilites wanted in
order to save himself from torture, considering that a rukhsah
(legal concession). But Imam Ahmad continued to be imprisoned and
tortured for so long that he was in prison during the reign of the
three caliphs Al-Ma'mun, Al-Mu`tasim, and Al-Wathiq.
IOL:
And those were the examples of the Islamic caliphate?
`Abdul-Fattah::
Please, brother, don't take politics as equivalent to authority. The
word policy (siyasah) in Arabic means performing
something in a way that makes it better. Those caliphs perished
while Imam Ahmad survived as a symbol which emphasized the meaning
of freedom, and which produced free texts.
Imam
Malik also produced a free text when, in his time, the pledge of
allegiance to the caliph was taken by obliging each one of his
subjects to swear that his wife would be divorced if he rose against
the caliph. When Imam Malik was informed of the matter, and how
those people had politicized this affair, he also introduced a free
text saying "A coerced person's oath is void." Through
this fatwa, as a general rule, Imam Malik emphasized that whoever is
coerced to do something is not liable to the responsibility arising
from it. With such a rule, the thing sworn for is deemed void, as
coercion annuls the contract.
IOL:
The examples you have just introduced are actually few bright spots
in Islamic history, while the mainstream is not like that.
`Abdul-Fattah:
These are not few spots but situations. The greatness of a situation
is not in the number of years it lasts or the number of words it
takes, but the greatness of the situation here is measured by its
conformity with the principles of Shari`ah.
When
Az-Zamakhshari talked about those who called themselves people of
authority (rulers) (while they were not), he said, "They are
not people of authority; they are just like dominant thieves who
block the way between the Shari`ah and the nation."
Imposing
Thoughts and Demanding Freedom
IOL:
With appreciation to Mu`tazilite thought, but they oppressed people
when they assumed power, and tried to impose their thoughts on
people, though they were advocates of freedom.
`Abdul-Fattah:
Yes, that's right. The violation of freedom came from those who were
allegedly freedom advocates. Yet, this is not due to a fault in the
principle but in people.
You
can also say that so many of the Mu`tazilites who were
contemporaries of Ahmad ibn Du'ad — the scholar who tried Imam
Ahmad during the reigns of Al-Ma'mun, Al-Mu`tasim, and Al-Wathiq —
stood against Ibn Du'ad and said he was a scholar who subjected to
rulers.
IOL:
Concerning the Islamic and Muslim viewpoint of others' religions, of
course every human being has the right to believe that his religion
is the true religion. But where is the issue of coexistence, or the
acceptance of the other, as said now? It is also notable that other
religions are subjected to restriction within Islamic societies. It
is a substantial matter and has its roots in Islamic thought.
`Abdul-Fattah:
If you are referring to what Ibn Jama`ah said in the book Tahrir
Al-Ahkam fi Tadbir Ahl Al-Islam, where he talks about the
necessity of restricting people of other beliefs, we have to explain
the context in which those texts appeared. Any text cannot be fully
understood except through its context. These texts appeared during a
period when the Muslim nation was targeted by Crusades, among other
threats. Due to the fact that some of those people had joined
Crusaders in the outskirts of the Muslim nation, betraying their
nation and violating its security, such texts were spread.
On
the other hand, the accounts related to `Umar ibn `Abdul-`Aziz and
his kind treatment of the Dhimmis are not shown. This also applies
to `Umar's convention for the Dhimmis and the document about which
Ibn Al-Qayyim wrote two books.
We
are dealing with a very important issue. Do not use historical
events as an argument, because this makes me seem as if I have no
standard like the West. I believe that when those people erred, they
deviated from the right course; the fundamentals of Shari`ah and its
observed rules.
IOL:
But what about the Islamic viewpoint of others' beliefs? Isn't that
considered violating others' beliefs according to your standard?
`Abdul-Fattah:
The Islamic point of view
is so much balanced that Islam even prohibits abusing others'
deities, so that Allah would not be abused by others out of
ignorance. [See Al-An`am 6:108.]
Religious
Freedom
IOL:
What about calling others to Islam (da`wah)?
`Abdul-Fattah:
Calling others to Islam is a proposition, not an obligation, while
Christianization is an organized churchly vocation aiming at
converting people from their religions to Christianity.
IOL:
Isn't that what Muslims do too?
`Abdul-Fattah:
No, calling others to Islam is a proposition. A person may willingly
accept or refuse. In case of refusal, he remains an honored and
dignified citizen in the nation. The Messenger of Allah (peace and
blessings be upon him) said, "Whoever
oppresses a covenanter or hurts a Dhimmi, I will be his enemy on the
Day of Resurrection."
IOL:
I think that the two sides call to their religion in an organized
manner.
`Abdul-Fattah:
No, he is Christianizing while I am just calling; I am proposing. I
say to a person that there are such and such matters in my religion;
if you would like to join me, you are most welcome, and if you would
not, I stop and do not fight you. I never do anything to force him
to come. The noble Qur'anic verse saying [There is no compulsion
in religion] (Al-Baqarah 2:256) was revealed in connection with
a woman who tried to force her Christian children to embrace Islam.
IOL:
But it
is not allowed in Muslim countries to call to other religions whose
believers think they are following the right religion.
`Abdul-Fattah:
Calling to a religion is permitted as long as it is done through
persuasion. But missionary work (Christianization) is rejected.
IOL:
Is the
difference in the term or is it in the means?
`Abdul-Fattah:
It is a difference in the means and the objectives.
IOL:
What about building places of worship for non-Muslims within Muslim
societies?
`Abdul-Fattah:
They are welcome as long as it achieves their goals and answers
their needs. It is even a required matter.
IOL:
But there is a famous fatwa about not giving permission for building
places of worship in the countries conquered by war.
`Abdul-Fattah:
Fatwas are related to their time.
IOL:
So, is building places of worship allowed?
`Abdul-Fattah:
Yes, it is. As for the fatwas, they have their own contexts, like
that which pertains to the people of Cyprus. A number of scholars
gathered there to state their opinions individually about whether or
not the covenant should be revoked. That incident was mentioned in
Abu `Ubayd ibn Salam's book Al-Amwal. Those scholars differed
in opinion about the matter, which was their right, and this led to
the difference in judgments. But most of them asserted the covenant
with the people of Cyprus and said it should not be revoked.
IOL:
It is permissible then to build places of worship for non-Muslims in
Islamic countries.
`Abdul-Fattah:
Places of worship are available for every non-Muslim to practice his
religion. There is no question about that; but there is no need to
enter into the concept of minorities, which the West created to
fragment the Islamic world. In this regard, we should examine the
Ottoman period and the issue of foreign capitulations carefully, for
the concept of minority is a fragmentizing one; it is what prominent
Professor Hamid Rabi` used to call "the policy of pulling the
limbs to weaken the heart."
IOL:
There is reciprocity here. Many of the Islamic communities in the
West are allowed to practice their beliefs, build mosques, and work
in Western societies with much freedom.
`Abdul-Fattah:
Not exactly so. In the United States, there is regression in these
sorts of things.
Freedom
and Objectives of Shari`ah
IOL:
Going back to the foundational side — freedom and objectives of
Shari`ah — you are a professor in the objectives of Shari`ah; so
what is your opinion about the ijtihad (personal reasoning)
of At-Tahir ibn `Ashur in which he says that freedom is the sixth
objective of the Shari`ah?
`Abdul-Fattah:
Sheikh At-Tahir ibn `Ashur is an honorable prominent scholar, whose ijtihads
should be considered with much respect, but I am from the group who
are reserved with his ijtihad.
The
objectives of Shari`ah are five, which represent foundational
aspects: religion, soul, lineage, mind, and property. If we want to
add to them another objective, we have to look at the category of
these aspects. Freedom does not belong to the same category, but it
rather belongs to another one, which is the category of values. Imam
Ibn Al-Qayyim teaches us that there are four important categories in
which we should think and between which we should relate:
The
first is the cognitive system. Shari`ah is all about wisdom and the
word "wisdom" implies justice, the cognitive justice. It
is a kind of balancing between the individual and society, the
material and the spiritual, and a kind of equilibrium between all
what the West considers conflicting elements. I think that this
matter is explained as such.
Shari`ah
is all about justice, which is a balance of values; and that is why
Professor Hamid Rabi` considers justice the supreme value and the
symbol of our system of values.
Imam
Ibn Al-Qayyim says also that Shari`ah is all about mercy. And when
we stress on the meaning of mercy in Shari`ah, we are stressing also
on the behavioral system. This means that the cognitive system comes
first, then the system of values, and then the behavioral system.
Thus, Imam Ibn Al-Qayyim adds that Shari`ah is all about interest,
and this is the objective system.
Therefore,
according to him, the four interactive interrelated systems shape
the Muslim mind and also make the value of freedom one of the
fundamentals, but within the system of values. I also give freedom a
meaning further than this, which is the meaning of honor, as Allah
says, [Verily We have honored the children of Adam]
(Al-Israa' 17:70). Man is not free to give away his honor, because
it is a divinely-bestowed honor. It is therefore incumbent upon man
not to be weak, submissive, surrendering, haughty, or arrogant. Man
should preserve his honor as much as others' honor.
As
for the issue of human rights, we do not have the meaning which
indicates that these rights are absolute or pure without any
obligations. Islamic thought connects between right and duty. Each
right is followed by the four following duties:
The
first duty: to be aware of it and
its fundamentals (the right or duty of knowledge)
The
second duty: to practice it
effectively and actively
The
third duty: to protect it if
violated
The
fourth duty: to observe it in the
other's right
The
idea of right and duty and the merging of the two ideas in one
structure is what establishes this fair balance between the two.
Thus, every right is not void of duties and every duty is not void
of rights.
Shari`ah
Is Applicable Wherever Justice Exists
IOL:
The relationship between freedom and authority has always been
problematic in the Islamic political system. It seems that Islamic
practice has put authority above freedom, so we have not seen the
balance between practicing freedom and practicing authority.
Authority has always been for the victorious and freedoms were
generally repressed.
`Abdul-Fattah:
You are talking about a very important matter which pertains to
freedom procedures or the means by which the human being's freedom
can be measured. This is one of the very important issues that is
also related to the idea of democracy.
The
idea of democracy in the West is related to freedom, which is
therefore transformed into tools. The same should be applied to shura
(mutual consultation), for shura is part of making
decisions; it is binding not informative. Moreover, the element of
majority is one of the elements that we should resort to in this
connection, and accepting positive ijtihads is one of the
matters related to Islamic legal policy, which is the policy that
agrees with Shari`ah. That is why Ibn Al-Qayyim says, quoting his
teacher Ibn `Aqil, "Some would say that there is no right
policy except that which agrees with Shari`ah. If they mean that
Islamic legal policy is only that which is stated in legal texts,
then this would be wrong and accusing the Companions of
misunderstanding. But Shari`ah is applicable wherever justice
exists."
IOL:
What is the most important criticism you see to the concept of
freedom in Western thought?
`Abdul-Fattah:
The Western concept of freedom has destroyed the circle of the
sacred, and has also destroyed the circle of protecting the human
self. This concept has also demolished the circles of unifying
standards and caused absoluteness of relativity. This has led to a
state of injustice, which everybody witnesses and many persons,
either from the West or from other civilizations, have pointed to.
IOL:
Another issue related to freedom is the penalty for apostasy. Some
point to the Prophet's hadith which reads, "Kill whoever
changes his religion." What do you think about this issue?
`Abdul-Fattah:
Professor Taha Jabir Al-`Alawani has introduced an ijtihad in
this issue, and he wrote a book on the penalty for apostasy. This
issue actually needs some elaborate discussion.
I
think that the rule that governs the issue here is Allah's saying [There
is no compulsion in religion] (Al-Baqarah 2:256). Religion
cannot by any means be compared to a trap; whoever is trapped in it
can never get out. Muslims are in no need of new hypocrites. From
this point, I can assure that those who apostatize are always to be
asked to repent. The incidents of apparent apostasy in our history
are those of collective apostasy. This kind of collective apostasy
is considered as cases of state security and national security, in
which the penalty for apostasy is applied to protect the whole
state.
An
example of this was Abu Bakr's fighting against the apostates, the
incident in which he said his famous saying, "By Allah, if they
refuse to give me even a tying rope which they used to give to
Allah's Messenger, I would fight them for withholding it."
IOL:
Can the peoples of the world agree to general human principles, with
which they bypass heavenly religions — I mean in order to prevent
any follower of a given religion from attempting to impose his
religion's principles on others?
`Abdul-Fattah:
None has the right to impose his religion's principles on others.
There are humanly-common principles. And among the signs of true
faith is respecting others and not regarding them from a racial
perspective. This is Islam; it sees others as possessing the right
to have their own religion, whether heavenly or nontheistic
religions.
IOL:
Does Islam allow nontheistic religions, like Buddhism, to proclaim
themselves?
`Abdul-Fattah:
Yes, Allah Almighty says: [To you be your religion, and to me my
religion] (Al-Kafirun 109:6). And the Prophet used to talk about
that with the polytheists.
IOL:
Can Muslims be engaged in intellectual alliances with followers of
other beliefs?
`Abdul-Fattah:
Yes, if it is like Hilf Al-Fudul (Alliance of Nobility; an
alliance whose purpose was to help the oppressed, and which took
place in the pre-Islamic period. The Prophet engaged in that
alliance).
IOL:
Can they agree to the concept of freedom and bypass the issue of
religions?
`Abdul-Fattah:
Why should they bypass the issue of religions? In this context,
religions urge respect for followers of other religions; and if
religions are as such, then why should they be bypassed?
IOL:
To make the ceiling of freedom higher than the ceiling permitted by
religions.
`Abdul-Fattah:
There is no freedom without limits. Freedom must have limits to
abide by, and it must be responsible. Such limits would not
constrain motion, but rather they would serve as a warning to the
limits of motion. This is how values act when they turn into
behaviors.
IOL:
How could dictatorship in our Arab and Muslim world kill freedoms?
`Abdul-Fattah:
This is an issue of utmost importance. I advise whoever is
interested in reading to read Al-Kawakbi's book Taba'i`
Al-Istibdad, as he talks about dictatorship as a network
concept, and how dictatorship is created, and then surrounds all
people. But whoever does not call for freedom and attempts to
extract it, is not worthy of it.
IOL:
Is it easy to dismantle the network of dictatorship, especially in
the Islamic world?
`Abdul-Fattah:
Sure, but this requires hard work and sacrifice.
IOL:
I think the tyranny which has destroyed the ability in these
peoples' souls has deprived them even of the ability to sacrifice?
`Abdul-Fattah:
Everything can be achieved through education. There is tyrannical
education and there is free education. As we previously said, our
rulers are always chosen for us; it is not we who choose them —
and this has nothing to do with conspiracy theory. Such rulers come
and practice dictatorship while protected from abroad. But when
peoples rise to say their word, it will be the cry of freedom in
this vast area of dictatorship.
IOL:
[They
say: When will it be?]
(Al-Israa' 17:51).
`Abdul-Fattah:
[Say:
It will perhaps be soon]
(Al-Israa' 17:51).
*`Amr
`Abdul-Kareem is
the head of the Islamic Book Review which is available on www.ibrsafeer.com
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