From
the classical Greek Odyssey to the West-African Sunjata
epic and the 20th century British novel Lord of the Rings,
the archetypical heroic epic is distinguished by the exploration of
the unknown and the shifting of boundaries; the journey is always
life-threatening and generally pursues an ethical or spiritual goal
that serves as well as transcends the limited interests of the
community. It is courage that transforms these paradigmatic
travelers into heroes—the courage to overcome fear of and
accommodate the unknown so that the cosmic order can eventually be
restored.
But
how can fear of the unknown be overcome? In her lecture on
language, identity, and ethnic and religious minorities, on the
occasion of the 430th anniversary of Leiden Universiy in the
Netherlands, Dutch professor of Greek Ineke Sluiter posed that one
can speak of a “moral panic” when there is a common perception
among the citizens of a nation that “societal values” are
threatened—in this case by “the migrant” or “the
Muslim”—and when this fear is increasingly expressed through the
medium of important social, media, and political institutions.2
Sluiter
argued that this panic reflex is not irrational and is generally
based upon real problems. However, she warned, a society in the grip
of “moral panic” should be wary of a lack of focus and precision
in the definition of the problem and the inclination to exaggerate
its gravity. From this she inferred that a significant part of the
solution lies in care and subtlety in the diagnosis and formulation
of the problem, but more so in continuous and honest communication
between communities, without legal infringement upon freedom of
expression. Censoring the debate would be a victory for the
extremists, whoever they are, she argued.
In
spite of the expediency of the concept of “moral panic”3
to describe the political and cultural tensions in much of Western
Europe today, the suggested solution is premised upon a set of
common and stubborn assumptions that ignore important aspects of the
current realities in countries such as France, Germany, the
Netherlands, and Great Britain, where large numbers of Muslim
migrants have settled.
Firstly,
Sluiter’s argument assumes that the “problem” primarily lies
with the “other,” in other words, with the migrant or the
Muslim. This argument disregards the fact that cultural and
religious tensions generally revolve around the historically defined
norms and values of the majority with regard to “civilization”
and “tolerance”—now challenged by newcomers. These
“aliens” possibly accrue a different theoretical significance
and practical content to these norms. It is often forgotten that
these norms are far from monolithic or absolute among either the
natives or the immigrants, and that true acceptance of the
“other” necessarily also demands a questioning of one’s own
accepted “truths.” By holding the “other” exclusively
responsible for the problem, the dominant group moreover refuses to
recognize that the irrational aspect of fear cannot be exorcised by
merely “changing” and “neutralizing” its object. A
comprehensive approach to fear requires introspection, in order to
retrieve the experiences in our own past and the workings of our
psyche which make us more susceptible to panic.
The
second assumption is that every citizen has access to the public
debate and can thus communicate with others on an equal footing.
This, of course, is a myth. Education, language skills,
discrimination, and market demands are all important factors
determining whether the grievances and opinions of an individual or
a community will be heard. Because a large percentage of those who
are feared are seriously disadvantaged with regard to all of these
factors, the suspicions that fuel the “moral panic” cannot be
structurally challenged by those that are perceived as a threat.
Freedom
of expression can have disastrous consequences when an important
group of citizens is legally sanctioned to express its opinion but
does not have equal access to the necessary platform. The ability to
counter public criticism becomes particularly crucial when a society
is grasped by “moral panic” and, according to Sluiter, the
dominant group is constantly anticipating a confirmation of its
fears and suspicions, whether these are justified or not.
Because
of speedy globalization, the “unknown” is no longer something
outside of our national borders with which only a lone hero is
confronted from time to time. Large-scale migration confronts all of
society with large numbers of “others” and a real challenge to
integrate them. It is now everyone’s responsibility to
show courage in encountering and accommodating newcomers. The
“moral panic” that this conjures up can only be overcome when a
meeting place is created where people can enter into a dialogue on
the basis of true equality and when a sincere willingness to
introspect exists, rather than always locating the problem with the
other. The courage to be open and self-critical instead of
complacently pointing a finger will surely benefit the social—if
not the cosmic—order.
