Unlike
the autochthonous epoch, the second epoch, characterized by Western colonial
dominance over Asia, caused much more stress and strain to intercommunity and
intercultural relations. There is no need to repeat that whether it was the
British or the Dutch or the French, colonial policy invariably sought to
“divide and rule” the local population. Thus, Hindus were pitted against
Muslims in British India, the Javanese against the Sumatrans in Dutch Indonesia,
and the Khmers against the Vietnamese in French Indochina. Specific policies in
relation to land, agriculture, employment, the public services, and education
served to widen the chasm between the communities.
There was yet another dimension to colonial policy which also generated negative
consequences for ethnic ties. In Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and the Fijis, among other
countries, the British brought in immigrant labor to work in certain sectors of
the economy and thus created ethnic enclaves, which remained separate and
distinct from the indigenous communities. Because the economic and political
dichotomies which divided the immigrant and indigenous communities were so
severe, the communal problems associated with these two groups have often been
perpetuated into the postcolonial era. [1]
But more than the policy of divide and rule, the greatest disservice that
colonialism did to intercommunity, intercultural and intercivilizational
relations in Asia was to redirect the face of each and every Asian country away
from its neighbor towards the metropolitan power in the West. From the economy
to education, from administration to entertainment, the colonized state was
influenced by, and paid obeisance to the colonial overlord in London, the Hague,
Paris, or Washington. It was not just a question of dependence brought about by
the colonial exploitation of indigenous resources, or economic bondage created
by colonial hegemony. For the colonized, the colonizer became, through coercion
and persuasion, the exemplar par excellence. Laws, institutions of governance,
the mechanics of the market, the school curriculum, the health system, public
transportation, and indeed each and every facet of life derived its guidance and
inspiration from the colonial model. [2]
As a result, the colonized developed a vast corpus of knowledge and information
about the colonizer—his land and history, his culture and geography, his
politics and social mores. A student in colonial Malaysia, as a case in point,
would know much more about English poetry and British history than he would
about Thai music or Indonesian geography. Likewise, it was very likely that a
Filipino living under the aegis of American rule would empathize more readily
with American literature than with Vietnamese literature, even if it had been
translated into the English language. To extend the argument further, an English
educated Hindu in British India would have greater rapport with
Christianity—because it was perceived as Western—than with Islam, which had
millions and millions of adherents in the Indian subcontinent during the height
of colonial rule (compared to a few thousand Christians).
By altering relations between cultures and religions in the Asian neighborhood,
colonialism erected formidable barriers against civilizational dialogue. It
removed the objective conditions—the political, economic and social
imperatives—which would make dialogue a necessity. Since there was no real
relationship with one’s neighbors, there was no compelling need to engage and
interact with them.
Besides, colonialism developed the notion that Asian cultures and communities,
religions and civilizations had little to contribute towards human progress. [3]
It was a notion which became deeply entrenched in the psyche of many Asians,
partly because of the overwhelming power of colonial dominance. Asians began to
believe—as their colonial masters wanted them to—that their cultures and
civilizations had become inert and static. They lacked drive and dynamism.
Indeed, their cultures and civilizations, so they were told, only served to keep
the people in shackles. Asians had to be liberated from their serfdom by Western
civilization.
What this suggests is that the colonial experience created a deep sense of
cultural inferiority in a lot of Asians (Muzaffar). This inferiority complex
became an obstacle to cultural and civilizational dialogue; for if one’s
civilization is bereft of any greatness, how can one take any pride in it? What
is the point of talking to others about one’s civilization if it is devoid of
noble values and outstanding accomplishments? If dialogue is about exchanging
ideas, how can intellectually impoverished civilizations engage in dialogue?
It is significant that while Asians were assailed with doubts about their
cultures and civilizations in the colonial epoch, they seemed to be a little
more certain about the strength and viability of their religions. This is one of
the reasons why in spite of the power and potency of colonial rule in Asia, only
a small minority, in relative terms, embraced Christianity—the Christianity
that came with Western dominance. Apart from the Philippines, no other Asian
country adopted Christianity on a national scale in the colonial period. Only
small percentages of Chinese, Indians, Indonesians, Vietnamese, Thais, and other
Asians became Christians. The vast majority chose to remain Hindu or Buddhist or
Muslim. In fact, very, very few Muslims in particular converted to Christianity
anywhere in Asia.
It is an equally remarkable fact of history that when Asians began to organize
and mobilize the masses to throw off the colonial yoke, many of them turned to
religion to provide them with the inspiration and impetus for their nationalist
struggle. The Arya Samaj and Brahmo Samaj of India, the Sarikat Islam of
Indonesia and the Young Men’s Buddhist Association of Burma would be some
examples. Religion, in other words, was for many Asians the most meaningful
conduit for articulating the quest for freedom, justice, identity, and dignity.
Does this indicate that within Asian civilizations, religions have a special
role? In the dialogue of civilizations, will the religious dimension emerge as
the most significant factor in a continent whose unique attribute is that it is
the birthplace of all the world’s religions? These are some of the questions
we will try to answer in the latter part of the essay. For now, we shall turn to
the third epoch.
