US President George W. Bush's decision to promote democracy in the Middle East as a cornerstone of his strategy in the "war against terrorism" came as a surprise to Americans and the rest of the world. Bush had not shown much interest in this subject or even in foreign policy in general before the 9/11 attacks.

Because this tack by Bush was so different from his previous record, it encouraged the belief — which soon spread around the world — that "neo-conservatives" had captured Bush's foreign policy. Traditional conservatives, like Bush's father, had no interest in such "idealistic" policies, which they viewed as unrealistic. In contrast, the younger Bush's new strategy was very much in tune with the kinds of approaches advocated by "neo-cons." For example, I had published a book in 1991 titled Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny, which argued that with the end of the Cold War, promotion of democracy should become the centerpiece of US foreign policy. And I am a "neo-con."

The logic of Bush's strategy began with his understanding that the "war against terrorism" could not be only military. The disturbing fact was that many young men in the Middle East were prepared to kill and sacrifice their lives in their hatred of America, the West, and Israel. Thousands had gone through Al-Qaeda's training camps. And even extreme killers like Osama bin Laden enjoyed some support (although never a majority) in Middle Eastern public opinion. This made Bush realize that he needed to attack the "root causes" of terrorism.

Some who used that phrase claimed that the "root cause" of terrorism was poverty. But Bush rejected that, seeing that most of the terrorists were not poor (Bin Laden was a spoiled child). Others said that the "root cause" was America's support for Israel. But if that was true, it was a strong reason not to change our policy, for we could not — nor should any state — allow our policies to be dictated by terrorist attacks.

Bush settled on the theory that the "root cause" of terrorism was the unique absence of democracy in the Middle East. This meant that people with grievances had no peaceful means to redress them. Moreover, democracy tends to teach people the arts of negotiation and compromise and the habit of settling disputes peacefully. A great deal of historical and social science research has demonstrated that democracies are more peaceful than countries that are ruled by autocrats. Bush made the guess — and it is only a guess, since there is no proof — that democracy would also make Middle Eastern countries less prone to give rise to terrorists.

This novel approach led to the speculation that neo-cons had taken over the administration. But there never were many neo-cons inside the administration, and I don't think we know how Bush came to adopt these ideas.

Whatever the process, it gave US foreign policy an odd spin in relation to US politics. Bush is a conservative supported by almost all conservative voters and opposed by almost all liberal voters, even hated by many of them. Many conservatives supported Bush's policy just because they supported Bush, even though such an idealistic policy was strange for conservatives. And many liberals opposed it just because they opposed Bush, even though they would have supported a similar policy if it were carried out by someone like Bill Clinton. I do not mention neo-cons at this point because neo-cons are only a group of intellectuals. In discussing the American electorate or the members of Congress, there is no identifiable neo-con bloc.

Therefore, while it is possible to describe the various strains of thought and argument that arose in response to Bush's democratization initiative, it is imprecise to describe one position as being liberal or another as conservative. To a degree, one can identify certain positions as being more typical of liberals or conservatives, but the lines between ideological camps are more blurry than usual.

The debate grew further complicated because it became enmeshed with the war in Iraq. Many wars have multiple reasons, and the US invasion of Iraq had two main ones. The first was Saddam's refusal to fulfill his obligation to prove that he had gotten rid of all of his weapons of mass destruction. It turns out that he probably did get rid of them and, as a result, many people — especially in the Middle East but also some Americans — believe that Bush and other US leaders were lying.

But the reason we all know now that there were no WMD in Iraq is because the US government announced that we had failed to find any. If the US had been lying, it would have been very easy to continue lying and to claim we had found WMD in Iraq. We could even have had the CIA plant some there and pretend that they were Iraqi. The simple fact is that America made a terrible mistake. You can call us idiots if you want. But — at least on this issue — it makes no sense to call us liars.

In addition to wishing to get rid of the threat that we believed Saddam posed with his weapons, we thought that in ousting Saddam we could create a newborn democracy in Iraq that would serve as a model for the region. This, we hoped, would jump-start our policy of spreading democracy.

Although the war in Iraq initially had rather wide support among Americans, that began to weaken as soon as the degree of Iraqi resistance became apparent. Some of the people opposed to the war in Iraq opposed the entire Bush policy, including democratization of the Middle East. Many of them believed that Bush's talk about democracy was just a smokescreen for the war. Others worried that it was Bush's intention to try to spread democracy to other countries in the region by means of more invasions, perhaps of Syria or Iran. I doubt that this was ever Bush's plan, but in any case, once the situation in Iraq became so difficult for the American forces, it became obvious that we were stretched too thin to consider such an ambitious project.

There has also been a group of liberals who have opposed the war but supported the idea of spreading democracy. They argue that an effective democratization policy would have to be carried out by peaceful means — diplomatic pressure, foreign aid, assistance to indigenous pro-democracy groups, broadcasting, and the like. These people have criticized Bush over the war because it has weakened America's credibility and also because his administration has not been very effective or creative in developing peaceful programs for promoting democracy. Even some Bush supporters or supporters of the war in Iraq have joined in criticizing the administration for not being active or effective enough in peaceful democracy promotion.

On the conservative side, there have also been some critics of the war in Iraq. Mostly, they have argued that Iraq was too far away to pose a threat to the US, that it was not a necessary target in the war against terrorism, and that it would inflame the peoples of the Middle East against the United States. More typical have been conservatives who supported that war but did not agree with the idea of democratization.

To their minds, it is naive to expect democracy to take root in a region that has had little of it and where the culture is very different from ours. They would have preferred that we knock out Saddam and then leave Iraq to its fate, confident that whatever came next would not be as bad as Saddam; or oversee the installation of a new Iraqi strongman who was prepared to cooperate with us.

Among those who challenge the entire idea of trying to spread democracy to the Middle East, there have been three main arguments. There are some who say that the Middle East is not ready for democracy. They say that the Middle East is too poor or too tribal or perhaps that there is something in the culture of Islam that is not conducive to democracy.

There are others who say that democracy may be possible in the Middle East but that it must come from within, and that it is pointless for the United States to try to be the agent of democratization. Then there is perhaps the most cynical school of thought, those who say that democracy may indeed come to the Middle East, but that if it does, it will bring bad results. They point to the recent victory of Hamas in Palestine, the strong showing of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and the previous electoral success of the Front of Islamic Salvation (FIS) in Algeria. They warn that democracy will lead to regimes more radical than those we have now.

Many Middle Easterners doubt that the United States is sincere about wanting democracy in their region, but I think they are wrong. When Bush makes speeches repudiating 60 years of US policy that put "stability" ahead of all other goals, he is doing something unusual. Presidents prefer to show that their policies are in keeping with those of their predecessors. Wrapping themselves in history gives them "cover." In saying that he is turning against a long tradition, Bush is going out on a limb. Moreover, he is repudiating the policies of his own father, among others. There is no reason for him to engage in this risky rhetoric if he is not sincere.

Skeptics say that the United States has supported authoritarian rulers in the past. But this is exactly what Bush says, too, and he criticizes it. Skeptics also say that we have not turned squarely against authoritarian regimes that are friendly, such as those in Egypt or Saudi Arabia. But this is not quite right. We have in fact put pressure on those regimes.

What is true is that the pressure, particularly in public, is not consistent. But this is diplomatic reality. We have other issues that are important to us in the Middle East: the Israel-Palestinian conflict, nuclear proliferation, energy, etc. Democracy will never be our only goal. The real question is whether democracy will be included in the mix of our main goals. Skeptics sometimes say that we only put pressure on regimes that are not friendly to us and go easy on our friends. But we have gone easy on Qaddafi, too, (who is certainly no friend) ever since he agreed to give up his nuclear weapons program. Non-proliferation is very important to us, so we have bitten our tongue. Such tradeoffs are regrettable but inevitable.

With Bush leaving office in two to three years, will the idea of promoting democracy in the Middle East disappear from US policy just as suddenly as it appeared? I do not think it will disappear at all. The first president to elevate human rights to a position of prominence in US foreign policy was Jimmy Carter in the 1970s. But Carter was an unsuccessful president who was defeated after one term by Ronald Reagan.

Carter's overall foreign policy was seen as weak. When Reagan came in, promising a tougher foreign policy, his first impulse was to jettison human rights as part of Carter's wimpishness. Although Reagan was popular, he ran into tremendous opposition on this subject, and soon he reversed himself and proclaimed the importance of human rights to his administration. Since then, human rights has been a permanent issue on the US agenda.

Right now, Bush is unpopular. The war in Iraq is unpopular. But I believe that the idea of spreading democracy to the Middle East by peaceful means is popular and will remain so. I expect it to become a permanent feature of US policy.