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President Bush speaks about the war in Iraq at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, December 14, 2005. (Reuters photo)
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Conventional
wisdom regarding Iraq in the halls of power in Washington is akin to
the “don’t ask, don’t tell” military policy towards gays in
the military.
Conservatives
in the White House and Congress have been staunchly avoiding
discussion of the intelligence failures (some say manipulated data)
that justified going to war in Iraq.
The
initial grounds for the invasion, regime change, and ensuing
occupation of the oil-rich country have now fallen apart.
US
soldiers welcomed as liberators—as dramatized by the estranged
Iraqi politician Ahmed Chalabi and the Iraqi National
Congress—never materialized except in the US proxy state in the
Kurdish region in the North.
The
sales pitch of the discovery of prohibited weapons of mass
destruction, the link between Al-Qaeda and the government of Saddam
Hussein, and the imminence of Iraq’s threat to the United States,
has also faltered.
Earlier
this month, US media uncovered that the key allegation—the
Saddam-bin Laden link—had been extracted from a purported Al-Qaeda
operative under torture.
Further
damaging the US image abroad as well as the Bush administration, is
the report that the operative not only recanted his connective
statement prior to the war, but that US intelligence community
members also considered the claim to be highly suspect.
Indeed,
US media is discussing the clear discrepancies in the intelligence
portfolio on Iraq.
But
conservative pundits have adopted three parallel argumentative
positions to buoy their credibility.
The
first is to hold steadfast and refuse to budge on the case for war.
This is exemplified by Vice-President Dick Cheney, who, until fall
2005, often hinted that Iraq and Al-Qaeda had established
operational links.
The
second is to have conservative columnists distract the rhetoric away
from the case for war to the consequence of the war.
This
is exemplified by the likes of columnists Stephen Hayes, Ann
Coulter, and Thomas Friedman, who point to pictures of ink-stained
fingers of Iraqi voters (during the elections of January 30) and
Saddam Hussein in detention as signs that the country is moving
forward.
However,
this image is punctuated by the unabated level of violence in the
country; last week, fighters seized most of Ramadi for several
hours, before melting into the countryside.
The promise of liberation has mutated since the Abu Ghraib torture debacle, the soaring US military death toll, and the popular disillusionment both in Iraq and in the US. |
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Ramadi
has been “liberated” by the US military from the hands of
“Islamic insurgents” four times in the past 18 months.
Fallujah
has also seen a resurge in violence; 14 US soldiers were killed in
and around the embittered city last week.
And
the US military is still unable to explain how Iranian-influenced
death squads were able to not only infiltrate Iraqi security forces
and carry out executions of Sunnis, but also to maintain torture
chambers in official sites.
The
third approach is billed as more forward-thinking, but is born of
the failures of the first two.
And
it may signal which way US strategy in Iraq is headed in 2006.
The
promise of liberation and instillation of democratic values in Iraq
is central to this approach. However, it has mutated since the Abu
Ghraib torture debacle, the soaring US military death toll, and the
popular disillusionment both in Iraq and in the US.
Rather
than speaking of Iraq as a model for democracy in the Middle East
(with a particular eye on Iran), in 2006, the White House will say
that Iraq is on the path to democracy.
This
changes the dynamics of the Iraq strategy and tells the US public
that the jury is still out on the efficacy of the Bush notion of
pre-emption in Iraq.
Rather
than say that Iraq is the Bush administration’s pivotal victory,
White House officials have been hinting that the problems in Iraq
may not be resolved until 2008 or 2009.
They
are no longer billing Bush as the greatest US presidential
visionary, but instead as a man of history, possibly extending the
debate on the success (or failure) of Iraq policy to 2025.
This
avoids the admission of guilt or failure and pits the debate for
future generations, who are likely not to care or not to remember.
The
second most significant change in the war rhetoric is the dependency
on Iraq’s security forces.
Senior
US military personnel have lamented the lack of progress in bringing
Iraqi security forces up to par, much to the chagrin of White House
officials who insist the latter are ready to assume responsibility
for policing the country.
Furthermore,
some senior US military personnel have admitted that the composition
of security forces falls along sectarian loyalties.
In
the siege of the northern town of Tal Afar, civilian residents
complained that the Iraqi military forces that were employed to
complement US troops comprised Kurds.
The
residents accused the Kurds of seeking to ethnically cleanse the
town, which, they say, Kurdish leaders have always eyed.
Further
south, Shiite factions within the security forces have been accused
of systematic ethnic cleansing of Sunnis.
In
recent weeks, reports have surged of the discovery of corpses of
Sunnis who had been bound, gagged, and executed.
The
Association of Muslim Scholars, a mostly Sunni religious group
thought to be sympathetic with the Iraqi resistance, has repeatedly
called on an international investigation into alleged crimes
committed by security forces.
It won’t be a victory that will be declared by US strategists but rather a “mission accomplished.” |
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In
Washington, despite the rosy picture of security training painted by
Bush and Cheney, the feeling is that the security forces are primed
for a feared civil war.
Fears
that the Iraqi army would disintegrate à la Yugoslavia in 1992 have
also recently been voiced in US media.
But
the most dramatic change has been how these forces are viewed by
policy makers. Tim Russert of Meet the Press, the on-air
bi-partisan political battleground, has started to ask “can the
Iraqis step up? Can the Iraqis come forward and take charge of their
own security?”
Cheney
told reporters on December 7 that US troops could leave once Iraqi
forces are ready to assume security responsibilities.
This
is a marked change from “we are there to help train the Iraqi
forces,” which has been reiterated by several White House
officials in the past year.
In
2006, we are likely to see an about-face. It will not be surprising
to hear that the Iraqis themselves will not seem to agree, or that
they are unwilling to take security into their own hands.
As
the calls for phased or total withdrawal increase in the United
States, military leaders will declare that they have fulfilled their
mission: They removed the dictator, set up the fundamentals needed
for democracy to sprout, and trained Iraqi forces to police and
defend their own nation.
Whether
these Iraqi forces withdraw into their sectarian borders will not be
a matter for US policy makers.
At
that point, it won’t be a victory that will be declared by US
strategists but rather a “mission accomplished.”
**
Alexander Gainem
is a freelance journalist who has written extensively on Middle East
issues.
