The optimism is also in evidence when Habib discusses November’s upcoming parliamentary elections. He believes the situation will be better this time around, for a host of domestic and international reasons, despite the fact that the 2000 parliamentary elections saw 5,000 Brotherhood members arrested before and during the voting. Regardless, the Brotherhood seeks to play a more influential role in the forthcoming elections by upping the number of its candidates standing for the People’s Assembly. But despite such ambitious planning, Habib is no less disillusioned by Egyptian politics.

"The government looks down on the Egyptian people. The ruling elite consider themselves above the law," Habib said. He quoted a minister as addressing the public, saying: "The law exists to be implemented upon you," [emphasis added]. He spoke of how the ruling elite controlled everything, designing and issuing as needed to further their own interests.

Habib leaving a polling station after voting in September's presidential elections (photo from www.ikhwanonline.com)

As one step towards reforming the status quo, Habib calls for amending the laws that govern the formation of political parties in Egypt. Until recently, the law dictated that establishing a political party required the approval of the Parties Committee, which consisted of government ministers and MPs, all of whom were members of the President Mubarak’s ruling National Democratic Party. However, recent amendments to the parties’ law have made altered the composition of the Committee somewhat, adding three "independent public figures" and three former judges to the panel.

Generally speaking, what Egypt needs, according to Habib, is for solid foundations to be laid, foundations for the building of a democratic, institutionalized state, a state built on a true separation of powers.

And yet, many people express concerns about the prospect of Islamists ascending to power through democratic means, and then turning against the very democracy that brought them to power, tearing down those same democratic foundations they had spoken so glowingly of. Habib’s is peeved. "Have they tried the Muslim Brotherhood? What are the guarantees that any other party has given?"

Critics of the Brotherhood often point to the fact that the Brotherhood's Supreme Guide is not popularly elected as evidence of an inherently anti-democratic nature. Habib dismisses the claim. "We wish the Supreme Guide could be popularly elected. We wish." But political conditions, Habib says, make that a practical impossibility. He points out that attempts to convene even the elected General Shura [Consultation] Council was met by a harsh government crackdown, with jail sentences being handed down to participants by a military tribunal. As such, the Brotherhood found themselves forced to choose a path Habib describes as "the lesser evil."

After much back and forth on Egyptian domestic politics, and an ill-timed interruption by a phone call from an insistent reporter who prodded the Deputy into an apoplectic tirade on corruption in provincial councils, the discussion tangibly shifted to the Brotherhood’s religious platform, the subject of much speculation but little actual investigation in the Western press.

For example: Shari`a law. The term is sufficient to generate near hysteria in the media. Habib’s response is careful and measured, explaining that Shari`a is much broader than the concept of hudud, or religiously prescribed penalties, that has so aroused the fears of many. "We have to distinguish between Shari`a as a general concept and the actual implementation of hudud. It is a part, yes, and an important part, but it is not the sum total of Shari`a. Shari`a is broader, more comprehensive." Shari`ah law’s aims, as described by Habib, are utopian, to say the least: the establishment of a society founded on freedom, justice, brotherhood, and equality before the law, a society where "the nation is the source of authority, people freely choose their rulers and representatives, and hold them accountable, and can impeach or remove them." Hitting closer to home, Habib expounds on a Shari`ah that allows for the freedom to establish political parties, and a free press; where there is no emergency law, but rather, the separation of powers.

Habib reiterates the Brotherhood’s perspective on the application of hudud punishments, that people cannot be judged according to the stringent requirements of Shari`ah until such time as society is deemed to be sufficiently, well, utopian. "We must first create a spiritual society. The citizen must be granted his full rights, psychological, mental, moral, material, to live as a human, with his rights and honor and humanity respected." A society where people’s needs, in terms of health, employment, education, etc, are provided for, and where corruption has been adequately reduced. It as at that point, when such a society exists, Habib states, that a transgression by a citizen must then be met with the deterrent punishments of Shari`ah.

And until that day, a theoretical state governed by the Brotherhood would function under the existing (secular) laws and penal codes?

"Certainly! Or life would be ruined!"

But what of those other famous stumbling blocks for Islamists, women’s and minority rights, under such a state?

Popular protests against the regime have been increasing (Reuters)

Habib restates the official brotherhood line, being that women have the right to work, to vote, to stand for parliamentary elections, to be government ministers… but not to fill the state’s top executive post, though Habib deftly glosses over this. "Knowledge, ability, and efficiency are not male monopolies. We have women [in the Brotherhood] who are more knowledgeable and more capable than most men. We must not deprive society of such generative abilities and innovative powers, which can help our country progress."

Indeed, the Brotherhood is fielding a number of female candidates in the upcoming parliamentary elections in November. But when asked a direct question of the percentage of females within the Brotherhood’s leadership cadres, Habib refused to be drawn on specifics, choosing instead to describe it as a "good" number. "We cannot overlook the situation under the Egyptian regime and its repressive security policies, and we don't want to expose our women, our daughters and sisters, particularly as the regime does not discriminate, and does not have the ethical standards to allow it to distinguish between men and women. For example, State Security Intelligence (SSI) can call a woman in for questioning… and as you can see, detentions, torture in SSI headquarters…" Habib trails off in mid-sentence. "We're not in a healthy environment," he states, recovering. "The [political] climate, unfortunately, is sick and corrupt, and we are protective of our daughters and our women."

As for Egypt’s Christian minority: "Society gives our brothers, the Copts, their full rights, and deals with them not as a minority, but as regular citizens, with all the rights of citizenship. They have our same rights and our same obligations. We don't look at them as a political faction or bloc, but as citizens, and therefore we can work with them in all areas." Copts, according to Habib, would face no "glass ceiling;" they can work their way up or be appointed to the highest positions, "As long as they are qualified, and as long as these positions are appropriate."

On a more controversial note, what of evangelists and Christians who wish to proselytize in a state ruled by the Brotherhood? Habib visibly hardens here—the only time during the whole interview. He is, to put it mildly, indignant at the very notion, and the rejection is unequivocal. "I'm sorry. Our creeds have to be respected." The foremost responsibility of a Muslim ruler, he points out, is the protection of the Shari`ah, and the state’s institutions are obliged to work towards that end throughout society.

On the subject of Egypt’s international relations under the Brotherhood’s government, Habib posits that the Brotherhood would deal with other states as equals. He speaks of the Islamic duty to cooperate in goodness, to "produce conventions and charters between states to implement justice, peace, and stability, and to achieve prosperity between nations." The jab at the US administration is not far coming. "But this is not what the US administration wants. It wants a global hegemony, and control over everything. It wants supremacy in every field over all nations." Habib contemptuously refers to this mindset as Darwinian, survival of the fittest. "And as such, we want to be strong. We want our country to be powerful, to be self-sufficient, so as not to have to reach out [for aid] to others, so that it can deal with the rest of the world on an equal footing."

There are no surprises in terms of relations with Israel. "It is an occupying power controlling Arab and Muslim land, and Islam has ruled that the people of any nation subjected to attack and occupation, its sons and daughters, must defend it." The issue, Habib emphasizes, is that Israel is an occupying power that engages in massacres, assassinations, settlement building, not to mention the construction of the separation wall.

An Islamic Egypt under the Muslim Brotherhood, according to Habib, would be a civilian state with an Islamic frame of reference, meaning that legislation passed must be in accordance with Islam. He notes that, legally, this is theoretically the current state of affairs, owing to article two of the Constitution, which identifies Islam as the source of all legislation. Realistically, however, "the regime does not wish to obey the constitution, or respect the law, or even implement judicial rulings."

"Knowledge, ability, and efficiency are not male monopolies."

In such a state, government would be freely and fairly elected by popular vote. Parties would be voted into office on the basis of a specific platform and program, which they would be obliged to implement during their term in office. Failure to do so would allow the people to remove said government from office. "We believe in democracy, and we affirm the principle of peaceful transition of power" as a central tenet for any such state, Habib states.

But what of political parties, especially those that espouse, for example, secular platforms? In such a state, with a true separation of powers and an independent judiciary, Habib maintains that any party can be founded on popular consent, and that, should the authorities have reservations about the party, deeming its program or practices to be a violation of the constitution or antithetical to the "values of the nation or the core traditions of society," then the issue must be referred to the Supreme Constitutional Court, which would decide on the matter. "We as an administrative authority would have nothing to do with this matter."

And what of the future of the Muslim Brotherhood, if it is ultimately granted the right to form a political party? That, according to Habib, is the subject of an ongoing debate within the Brotherhood. One view holds that the Brotherhood should then transform completely into a political party that incorporates all the activities currently performed by the Society. The other side argues in favor of preserving the structure of the group, and merely creating an affiliated political party. Both suggestions, however, are currently moot, due to "the atmosphere of political repression" prevalent in Egypt.

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** Azizuddin El-Kaissouni  is the editor of Muslim Affairs' Views & Analyses page. A graduate of the American University in Cairo. He holds a BA in Political Science with a specialization in International Law. You can reach him at a_elkaissouni@hotmail.com

Dina Abdel-Mageed is staff writer for the Muslim Affairs section of IslamOnline.net. A graduate of the American University in Cairo, she holds a BA in political science with a specialization in public and international law.

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