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Protestors
being beaten by Central Security Forces in Cairo
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In
an unprecedented level of unrest and civil activism in Egypt, thousands have been taking to the streets on a regular basis for the
past few months, demanding more political freedoms and an end to
President Mubarak’s 24-year rule. For the first time in the
country's modern history, Egyptians are publicly debating alternatives
to Mubarak’s incumbency, rejecting the government’s snail-paced
reform policies and calling for a more independent and efficient
foreign policy.
Egypt
has never witnessed direct, competitive presidential elections in its
recent history. Previous contests for the presidency took the form of
referendums with Mubarak's the only name on the ballot.
Despite
the February announcement that the government would finally allow
multi-candidate presidential elections to be held, Egypt’s ruling party recently set terms that effectively exclude
independent candidates and the regime’s political adversaries. For
their nomination to be accepted, candidates will need the approval of
250 members of the lower and upper houses of parliament and nationwide
local councils—institutions that are virtually monopolized by the
ruling party (“US Support”).
Popular
demands for reform have skyrocketed in the aftermath of the
constitutional amendment allowing candidates to run directly against
the Egyptian president. But Cairo
has also witnessed three bombing attacks in less than a month,
including one that took place in downtown Cairo, in a location facing the National Democratic Party’s (NDP)
headquarters and the Egyptian museum. Analysts have debated what looks
like a resurgence of Islamic militancy in Egypt after almost 8 years of calm. While some regard the attacks as
isolated incidents committed by misguided youth, others urged caution
at the potential rise of a new, more militant generation of Islamists,
angered by years of regime repression, poverty, and the unwillingness
of Egyptian authorities to oppose hegemonic US and Israeli policies in
the Middle East (Radi).
Nevertheless,
the bombings were generally condemned by Egyptian civil society, with
many members of the opposition warning against any attempt by the
government to manipulate the attacks to justify the continuation of
emergency laws and more political repression.
Interestingly,
some analysts credit this upsurge in popular activism in Egypt
to President Bush’s so-called “forward strategy for freedom” and
the “contagion effect” of the elections in Iraq
and Palestine. Foad Ajami, prominent Orientalist and Republican, has triumphantly
hailed the downfall of the “Arab edifice of power,” due to what he
sees as America’s current unwillingness to support regional
autocrats and its readiness to “gamble on the young, the new, and
the unknown” (Ajami). But contrary to those optimistic,
self-satisfying assertions, recent record has shown that despite
pro-democracy statements from the US
administration, the entrenched Arab regimes continue to enjoy US favor. One has only to note how President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali of
Tunisia—who presides over a repressive police state—has twice
managed to obtain a ludicrous electoral near-unanimity, and still
remains fully supported by the United States. Moreover, Saudi Crown
Prince Abdullah simply allowed partial municipal elections in his
country and still continues to be courteously received by George W.
Bush in his Texas ranch.
Popular
activism in Egypt is the result of the accumulation of decades of political
and economic injustices. |
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For
all intents and purposes, demands for reform in Egypt
should not be lumped together with recent elections in Iraq
and Palestine. In fact, one could safely argue that modern-day popular activism in
Egypt
is the result of the accumulation of decades of political and economic
injustices, and a pervasive feeling of indignation at Egypt’s shrinking regional and international influence. Egyptian popular
sentiment has been further inflamed by US hegemonic policies in the
Middle East and Israel’s continuing occupation of Arab land. Those calling for reform in
Egypt
today should not be seen as an extension of Bush’s designs for the
greater Middle East, but rather as part and parcel of a patriotic, homegrown opposition
movement that is against the twin evils of domestic dictatorship and
foreign occupation.
"Black
Hole States" Behind the Tensions
For
decades, Arab leaders have shown a remarkable ability to evade change
by demonstrating to their patrons in Washington
their usefulness in supporting US strategic objectives, and their
ability to maintain stability and calm in the Middle East
by forcefully pacifying their disgruntled citizens. In the process,
the regimes have become more responsive to the demands of the West, as
opposed to the desperate pleas of their people. The result has been
the decimation of civil society and an asphyxiating political climate
where reform is either denied altogether, postponed, or performed in a
tightly controlled and fitfully slow manner that does not
significantly alter the rules of the game.
The
recently published 2004 UN Arab Human Development Report contends that
Arab states have been transformed into what the report dubs “black
hole states in which rulers are granted unchallengeable powers so as
to convert the surrounding social environment into a setting in which
nothing moves and from which nothing escapes,” (“Lack of
Reform”). In many ways, political life in Egypt exhibits much of the same characteristics. Between April 2003 and
April 2004, the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR)
documented 15 cases of death by torture deaths in police stations. An
EOHR fact-finding mission to the northern Sinai town of al-Arish after
the Taba bombings in October 2004 reported the indiscriminate roundup
of 3,000 city residents (El-Ghobashy). Moreover, the streets of major
cities in Egypt have become permanent barracks for conscript-filled trucks of the
Central Security Forces, in a display of force designed to deter
opposition activists and potential protestors. Even the
government-appointed National Supreme Council for Human Rights (NSCHR)
published an annual report documenting routine torture methods
practiced by security forces, and calling for an end to the
24-year-old state of emergency and the immediate release of prisoners
who have completed their terms (“Egypt Group”).
Opposition
movements have also denounced Egypt’s increasing dependence on the United States
and the unexplained warmth in recent official Egyptian-Israeli
relations. After being opposed to the Iraq
war, the Egyptian government erratically changed course and hosted the
Iraq Summit held in the resort of Sharm el Sheikh, giving legitimacy
to the US-appointed Allawi government and rebuffing France’s attempt to secure a timetable for the withdrawal of US troops.
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The
increasingly prevalent Central Security cordons that litter Egypt
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The
most significant upgrading in Egyptian-Israeli relations came in late
May 2004, when Mubarak and Sharon agreed to set up political, security
and economic committees to upgrade all aspects of the countries’
bilateral relationship. The move was further augmented with the
conclusion of the biggest deal ever between the two countries: a
contract worth $2.5 billion for Egypt
to supply Israel with natural gas. Mubarak then stunned the world by asserting that
Sharon—reviled across the Arab world—is the Palestinians’
“best chance for peace.” The Egyptian president also affirmed his
country’s readiness to help keep the peace in Gaza after Israel’s
planned withdrawal and signed a protocol with Israel establishing
seven “Qualified Industrial Zones” (QIZs), where Egyptian goods
would gain free access to US markets only if 11.7% of the content
originated in Israel, thus giving the latter country de facto “veto
power” over Egyptian goods heading to the United States.
New
Forces for Change
The
Egyptian Movement for Change, better known as Kefaya (Arabic for
“enough”), is the name of the increasingly vocal political
movement denouncing the NDP’s political monopoly, calling for a
separation of powers, an end to corruption and nepotism, and rejecting
all attempts aimed at grooming Mubarak's son, Gamal, for office.
Kefaya’s founding document was presented in October 2004 by highly
respected ex-judge Tariq al-Bishri, who called upon Egyptians to
withdraw their “long-abused consent to be governed” and to engage
in civil disobedience (El-Ghobashy). The movement can be regarded as
an umbrella organization hosting a variety of Islamist, Socialist, and
Arab Nationalist parties. The movement’s website suggests that its
members are:
“Egyptian
citizens, who despite their different political affiliations and
backgrounds, see that the region is facing immense dangers manifested
in: the US
occupation of Iraq, Zionist aggression in Palestine, the restructuring of the region’s political landscape and the
undermining of its cultural heritage. The movements’ members see
that the reason for Egypt’s inability to face those impending threats is its despotic form of
government and the NDP’s political monopolization of power – a
feature which requires total political and constitutional reform.”
(“About Us”)
Kefaya’s
membership is replete with Egyptian activists and intellectuals, among
them many distinguished members of the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as
Abd al-Halim Qandil, editor of the fiery nationalist al-Arabi
newspaper. In November, Qandil was kidnapped, blindfolded, beaten,
stripped naked, tossed onto the Cairo-Suez highway and told by his
captors to be “more respectful of asyadak [his masters],”
(El-Ghobashy). The frequency of the movement’s anti-government
protests has increased since December, and the Muslim Brotherhood,
having long avoided direct clashes with security forces, has joined
with Kefaya and other more secular movements demanding reform (“Egypt’s Brotherhood”). The beginning of May witnessed an
intensification of Brotherhood-led protests across Egyptdespite thousands of the Islamist movement’s supporters being
detained in nationwide crackdowns.
Conclusions
The
streets have become permanent barracks for Central Security
Forces—a display of force to deter activists. |
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For
years, the Arab state system— Egypt being no exception—has suffered from leaders who rule unchecked by
countervailing institutions, effective parliaments, or independent
judiciaries (Ottaway). In Egypt, the ruling elite and their Western-educated business compatriots do
not seem to regard political freedoms, institutionalization, and
economic equity as urgent and legitimate concerns. For them, politics
involve their unchallenged accumulation of political and economic
influence, and the repackaging of failed policies with seemingly
attractive, yet ultimately fictitious, slogans.
While
the majority of Egyptians continue to long for freedom and
democracy—in principle—they have until recently failed to present
broad-based political organizations and follow through with systematic
political activity capable of acting as an effective counterweight to
the heavily entrenched regime. The long-awaited revival of civil
activism in Egypt is an encouraging phenomenon that will play itself out in the critical
months before September, when presidential elections are due to take
place. Egypt’s ruling NDP will undoubtedly seek to exploit the
remaining few months to intensify its pro-Mubarak propaganda campaign,
using all the usual tools that it has monopolized and manipulated over
the past quarter of a century.
Meanwhile,
opposition groups have come to realize that they do not have the same
access to the regime’s resources, and that the political playing
field is less than level. Hence, their strategy seems to be focused on
trying to win over as many segments of the Egyptian population as they
can by closing ranks, staging highly publicized demonstrations, and
constantly highlighting grievances against and abuses by the regime.
The
recent provisional decision by Egyptian judges to abstain from
monitoring the elections unless the government grants them full
oversight of the electoral process, and the seeming inability of the
government to guarantee electoral transparency, are both factors that
might play a role in enhancing the credibility of the opposition and
tarnishing the image of the regime. More seriously, conducting
presidential elections in the absence of judicial oversight could
violate the Egyptian constitution (“ Egypt Judges”).
Only
time will tell whether Egypt’s deadlocked political situation will
eventually give way to a more responsive, democratic system, or
regress into business as usual and a “authoritarianism in
disguise,” masked by only a few cosmetic changes.
Works
Cited:
*
Kareem M. Kamel is an
Egyptian analyst based in Cairo, Egypt . He has an MA in International Relations and is specialized in
security studies, decision-making, nuclear politics, and Middle East
politics. He is currently a PhD candidate at the American University
in London, and a teaching assistant to the Political Science Department at
the American University
in Cairo.
