An Acehnese worker gathers steel bars for resale from the ruins of damaged houses (Reuters)

“When human tragedy on such a vast scale takes place, the world tends to pull together – and so, it is to be hoped, will the divided communities of this region.”1 – Michael Vatikiotis, International Herald Tribune

The huge earthquake that struck the coasts of the Indian Ocean and the devastating tsunami waves that accompanied it were watershed events in the modern history of Southeast Asia. The earthquake was said to have been powerful enough to accelerate the earth’s rotation and alter the geography of some islands in the region.2

In Sri Lanka , for example, there are signs that the warring Tamil and Sinhalese are cooperating in relief distribution, and some analysts assume that the devastation of Phuket in southern Thailand may prompt the government to establish more equitable economic policies aimed at revitalizing the region’s local economy and fostering Muslim-Buddhist cooperation.3

Some analysts suggest that recent developments in the region indicate some change on the horizon. In Indonesia, where a separatist conflict between the government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) has raged for almost 30 years, both sides adopted an informal cease-fire—initially unilaterally adopted by GAM—to allow aid to reach affected regions. In addition, government officials met with the exiled leaders of the Acehnese rebel group in Finland in late January. And in Thailand , the landslide re-election of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has been hailed by some as a sign of a popular mandate for the Thai leader that would enable him to bring stability to the region after years of turmoil in the separatist Muslim areas of the south. Thaksin’s recent visit to the southern provinces and his promise of $700 million in aid, part of which is earmarked for the establishment of an Islamic University in Narathiwat,4 was interpreted as an attempt by the Thai leader to mollify the country’s minority Muslims after years of violent conflict.

But despite some largely symbolic developments and a rosy picture of a region in harmony after being struck by natural disasters, the structural factors that are at the core of most regional conflicts remain highly visible and still largely unaddressed by the governments of Southeast Asia. These include the flagrant inequalities between competing national, religious, and regional identities, economic disparities, unequal land distribution, and historical patterns of animosity derived from decades, if not centuries, of marginalization and subordination of local Muslims. In fact, the root causes of ethno-religious unrest and Muslim separatism in Southeast Asia stem from the same basic factors: insensitivity to local concerns, regional neglect, military repression, and forcible attempts to impose uniformity of language and social behavior on entire communities.5

Most cases of regional conflict represent a clash between the dominant group and its cultural values on the one hand, and the subordinate group with its religious-cultural identification on the other. Thus, the Thai Buddhist nationality is alien to the Malay minority in southern Thailand , and the Acehnese regard themselves as heirs to an important historical Islamic kingdom, and are resentful of the discrimination and rapaciousness of the Javanese central government in Indonesia .6 

Muslim separatism was legitimized by the unwillingness of many governments in the region to recognize the right of minority self-determination, fearing that a secessionist tide would challenge the shaky legitimacy of the post-colonial state in Southeast Asia .7 In the aftermath of September 11 and the Bali bombings in Indonesia, Southeast Asia has become vital to US interests, with many in Washington regarding the region as a breeding ground for allegedly Al-Qaeda- affiliated organizations, such as the Jemaah Islamiah (JI), Abu Sayyaf, Laskar Jihad, and the Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia (KMM), effectively transforming South East Asia into a “second front” in the US war against terrorism.8 The fact that locally-based Islamic groups fighting for secession have been lumped together with international jihad movements has further complicated chances for a negotiated settlement, as local grievances remain unaddressed and leaders continue to associate homegrown Islamic movements with Bush’s larger war on “terrorism” in order to gain international support.

In Thailand , the prime minister’s party (Thai Rak Thai – TRT) won 70% of the popular vote, securing 375-plus seats of the 500-seat parliament, allowing it to form the first single-party government in Thailand ’s history. Thaksin’s success was in part due to his success in raising Thailand ’s GDP by a total of 22.2% over the past four years. In fact, Thailand ’s overall economy has experienced the second fastest growth rate in East Asia after China .9 Nevertheless, given the persistence of the causal factors for conflict in the region, it is very unlikely that the upcoming months will see any improvement in the relationship between local Muslims and the Thai authorities.

The Thai government is pursuing what the prime minister has called a dual policy of “an iron fist and a velvet glove.”10 This involves pledges of nearly a billion dollars in development aid, coupled with the declaration of martial law and an increase in official military presence in the south. While Thaksin might have a popular mandate to govern, it is interesting to note that his party failed to win any of the eleven seats up for grabs in the predominantly Muslim provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat.11 This suggests that Thailand is becoming more polarized along ethnic and religious lines, as Muslims continue to resent being subjected to brutal treatment and economic deprivation—conditions magnified under Thaksin’s leadership.

Thailand ’s Muslims continue to live under martial law, and the Muslim provinces account for only 1.5% of Thailand ’s gross domestic product. Even today, the south has virtually no industry, the infrastructure is abysmal, and tourism is relatively underdeveloped, despite extensive natural beauty.12

Immediately after the election outcome was announced, Muslim separatists detonated a 100-kilogram bomb in the Muslim-dominated south. The attack was the latest in a series of bombings and killings that rocked the south in the past few weeks. The relationship between local Muslims and the Thai authorities has deteriorated sharply since last May, when security forces gunned down 108 Muslims, many of whom had taken refuge in a 16th century mosque. During the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, at least 78 more Muslims were crushed and suffocated to death in southern Thailand after being arrested and forced into overcrowded trucks by Thai forces.13

The Ramadan violence erupted when Muslims gathered to protest the arrest of six security volunteers accused of giving weapons to separatists. Thai police and military forces allege that they tried to disperse the crowd with gunshots, water cannons, and gas, but eyewitness accounts indicate that the protestors were fired upon with live ammunition. Some 1,300 protestors were ordered to strip off their shirts, then handcuffed behind their backs and told to lie flat on the ground.14 Thai troops then forced them into the packed trucks, causing the death of dozens of the unarmed protestors. While Thaksin expressed his initial regret for the loss of life, he rationalized his government’s brutality by claiming that “many weapons were found at the scene” (despite eyewitnesses and a military commander at the scene asserting that the protestors were unarmed).15 For his part, Traikwan Kraireuk, the Narathiwat military chief, was unapologetic, sarcastically commenting: “I used the velvet glove. If I used the iron fist, everyone would be dead.”16 

Aceh – An Uncertain Future

An injured Thai policeman after a bomb explosion in Muslim-dominated Yala province (Reuters)

The province of Aceh in Indonesia was closest to the epicenter of the earthquake and was the worst affected by its devastation. Almost 175,000 people in the province died and around 600,000 were made homeless as a result of the disaster.

The Acehnese maintain that their province was an independent sultanate, and hence should not have been incorporated into the Republic of Indonesia when Dutch colonial rule of the area ended in 1949.17 Hence, the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) began its struggle for independence from Indonesia in 1976. Human rights groups suggest that about 14,000 people, mostly Achenese civilians, have been killed since then. The Indonesian military has been accused of responsibility for most of those deaths, and as a result of years of military repression and economic exploitation, support for GAM has gradually increased over the years.18

In the past five years there have been several failed attempts to reconcile the warring parties. A ceasefire came into effect in December 2002 with the help of the Geneva-based Henry Dunant Center , but again negotiations failed. Aceh was brought under martial law on May 19, 2003 , and a major Indonesian military offensive was launched using the air force and the navy. In May 2004, martial law was revoked and the province was brought under a state of emergency for six months, extended on November 19, 2004 for another six months.19 However, a few days after the earthquake, Vice President Jusuf Kalla annulled the state of emergency and the rebels announced a unilateral cease-fire.

Many observers commented that the earthquake offered an opportunity for a negotiated settlement. The fact that reconstruction and aid distribution required cooperation between the combatants heightened prospects for peace in the troubled area. Both sides have since been brought together by the Crisis Management Initiative in Finland , and there were signs that the Indonesian government and GAM were discussing prospects of wide-ranging autonomy for the province. Some news reports indicated that the Acehnese maybe ready to drop their demand for independence in return for some degree of self-rule.20 In this light, one can expect that the upcoming months will be spent in intense negotiations on the details of a possible settlement. 

Nevertheless, the pitfalls are many and the devil, as they say, is still in the details. It remains to be seen what exactly is meant by “self-rule,” and what kind of concessions the Acehnese will demand in return for dropping their call for independence. Some reports indicate that the rebels may demand the withdrawal of Indonesian troops from the province, Acehnese control of all aspects of government (except defense), and international trials for Indonesian military officers accused of human rights abuses—none of which are likely to be acceptable to Indonesia.21

Moreover, there are some influential figures in Indonesia ’s political and military elite who see no point in offering the rebels any concessions, given what they see as the government’s military advantage and GAM’s weaker negotiating position. Indonesia ’s outgoing chief of staff, General Ryamizard Ryacudu, said that the military would not enter a ceasefire with the movement, and that the only way for “peace” was for the rebels to surrender.22 The Indonesian army chief General Endriartono Sutarto also said that the government would not hesitate to take military action if the peace talks fail.23

Conclusions

Causal factors of Muslim armed separatism continue to exist.

Islamic separatism in Southeast Asia is arguably one of the most endemic and pervasive features of modern-day conflict. Causal factors which initially precipitated Muslim armed separatism continue to exist and, as a result, prospects for resolution are still not hopeful.

In Thailand, the peaceful resolution of the conflict in the south seems remote, given the unbridled willingness on the part of the Thai leadership to resort to brute, indiscriminate force in every confrontation with local Muslims. The Thai leadership has also demonstrated its inability to appreciate the sources of Muslim discontent, displaying an exceptionally xenophobic attitude to many Muslim grievances. This has polarized local Muslim and Buddhist communities, expanding the margin of mutual distrust and rekindling age-old animosities, which in turn will likely lead to more polarization and militarization of the conflict in the future.

On the other hand, it is still too early to predict the outcome of the negotiations between the Acehnese and the Indonesian government. Perhaps the enormous devastation caused by the earthquake in Aceh province, coupled with international interest in seeing a peaceful resolution to the conflict may heighten the prospects for success. Yet one should not be overly optimistic: Conflict in the region has historically been protracted and consistently resistant to negotiated settlement. We should keep in mind political scientists Kegley and Wittkopf’s reminder that “making peace among rival factions that are struggling for power, driven by hatred, and poisoned by the inertia of prolonged killing that has become a way of life, is very difficult.”24

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Kareem M. Kamel is an Egyptian analyst based in Cairo, Egypt . He has an MA in International Relations and is specialized in security studies, decision-making, nuclear politics, and Middle East politics. He is currently a PhD candidate at the American University in London , and a teaching assistant to the Political Science Department at the  American University in  Cairo .

[1] Michael Vatikiotis, “After the Tsunami: Out of the Wreckage, a Chance for Peace,”  International Herald Tribune December 30th, 2004

[2] “Earthquake Redraws the Map,” BBC News December 31st, 2004

[3] Michael Vatikiotis, “After the Tsunami: Out of the Wreckage, a Chance for Peace,”  International Herald Tribune December 30th, 2004

[4] Arnab Neil Sengupta, “Thai PM Seeks Answers to Southern Discontent,” Aljazeera.net (English) February 15th, 2005

[5] Peter Chalk, “Separatism and Southeast Asia: The Islamic Factor in Southern Thailand, Mindanao , and Aceh,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 24 (July 2001) :  241-269

[6] Andrew Tan, “Armed Separatist Rebellion in Southeast Asia : Persistence, Prospects, and Implications,”   Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 23 (2000)

[7] Ibid.

[8] John Gershman, “Is Southeast Asia the Second Front?”  Foreign Affairs (July/August 2002)

[9] Michael Schuman and Baan Dongsaenuk, “The Common Touch,”  Time Asia February 7th, 2005

[10] Andrew Perrin, “ Thailand ’s Bloody Monday,” Time Asia November 8th, 2004

[11] Andrew Perrin, “Thaksin’s Real Challenge,” Time Asia

[12] Daniel Lovering, “Bloodshed in Thailand ’s Restive Muslim South Follows Decades-old Struggle,” Associated Press April 28th, 2004

[13] “Thai Muslims Suffocated in Custody,”  Aljazeera.net (English) October 26th, 2004

[14] Andrew Perrin, “ Thailand ’s Bloody Monday,” Time Asia November 8th, 2004

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid.

[17] C.S. Kuppuswamy, “ Indonesia : Aceh’s Future,”  South Asia Analysis Group January 28th, 2005

[18] “GAM Mulls Dropping Independence Demand,”  Laskamana.net February 23rd, 2005

[19] C.S. Kuppuswamy, “ Indonesia : Aceh’s Future,”  South Asia Analysis Group January 28th, 2005

[20] “Aceh Rebels May Settle for Autonomy,” Aljazeera.net February 22nd, 2005

[21] “Hardliners on Both Sides Threaten Aceh Settlement,”  Sydney Morning Herald February 24th, 2005

[22] Ibid.

[23] “GAM Mulls Dropping Independence Demand,”  Laskamana.net February 23rd, 2005

[24] Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, World Politics : Trends and Transformation (New York : Worth, 1999) : 369

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