Angry crowds mourned al-Hariri’s death

Throughout history the assassination of major political figures has led to the exacerbation of domestic and international tensions, and in some cases the initiation of large-scale conflict. Historically, the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand by Serbian extremists set in motion a series of unstoppable events that lead to the outbreak of one of history’s most devastating conflicts. Lebanese history is itself replete with violent incidents that inflamed domestic tensions and led to wider conflicts as each side tried to capitalize on the moment and seek to make political and sectarian gains. The Lebanese Civil War itself officially began on April 13, 1975, when unidentified gunmen opened fire at a congregation in front of a Christian Maronite church in a Beirut suburb. In apparent retaliation, members of the Christian Phalange Party ambushed a bus filled with Palestinians and shot the passengers. These events triggered an unstoppable cycle of revenge and retaliation that eventually lead to the death of almost 150,000 people and physical destruction estimated between $25 billion and $30 billion.³

As much as al-Hariri’s tragic death represents a watershed event for Lebanon, the country has had a long history of political assassinations in which almost every political faction experienced the death of at least one of its leaders. In addition, two other Prime Ministers – Riyad al-Solh and Rachid Karameh – were killed, as well as two elected presidents – Bashir Jumayil and Reneh Moawad. The killing of al-Hariri, as a high-profile Lebanese figure with multiple regional and international links, will no doubt stir domestic and international controversy. More seriously, his assassination will undoubtedly divide Lebanese sentiment and intensify domestic political bickering.

Immediately after al-Hariri was assassinated, influential Lebanese and Arab politicians, analysts, and decision makers engaged in a frenzy of unverifiable claims and counterclaims as to who was responsible. In the process, suspicion fell strongly on Syria or its Lebanese supporters. Opposition figures, such as Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt and Maronite leader Michael Aoun, saw the assassination as an attempt by the Syrian authorities to punish dissidents who called for the withdrawal of Syria’s 14,000 troops from Lebanon. Al-Hariri had recently joined the opposition in their calls for a Syrian withdrawal, and had resigned from his position as prime minister last October after President Emile Lahud had his term extended—a decision that was widely understood as being imposed by Syria.⁴ Some observers suggest that the assassination was meant to weaken the Lebanon’s anti-Syrian opposition and secure an electoral victory for Syria’s Lebanese allies in the upcoming elections.

Others questioned what tangible benefits Syria stood to gain from such a high-profile assassination, given that it would definitely create more problems for the Syrian regime at a time when it is constantly being pressured by the US for not cooperating enough on Iraq, and for its alleged support for Hizbullah and militant Palestinian factions. In fact, just a day after al-Hariri’s assassination, the United States recalled its ambassador to Syria for urgent consultation, in what many analysts believe is a sign of rapidly deteriorating US-Syrian relations. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said that the recent US step came in light of the US administration’s “profound outrage” at the assassination of al-Hariri.⁵ In addition, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice expressed her dismay at what the United States perceives as the Syrian government’s continued support for “terrorism” in Lebanon and Iraq, as well as Syria’s troop presence in Lebanon.⁶

Interestingly, Arab-Israeli Knesset member Azmi Beshara speculated that Israel might be responsible for the attack.⁷ His view might carry some merit if one notes that the assassination would benefit Israel by accentuating political polarization inside Lebanon, diverting public attention from the continued Israeli occupation of the Sheb’aa Farms and the Golan Heights, and setting in motion a series of events that would put more pressure on Syria to withdraw from Lebanon. It is notable that the highly-sophisticated method by which al-Hariri was assassinated resembled the assassination of former Phalange leader Eli Hobeika in May 2002. The latter was killed by a similar car bomb after he claimed that he possessed important documents that would further implicate Ariel Sharon for his involvement in the Sabra and Shatilla massacre. Additionally, several Palestinian and Hizbullah cadres were killed in recent years by similar car bomb attacks in Lebanon, allegedly staged by Israeli agents.

The assassination deeply shocked many Lebanese

Regardless of which group, state, or faction stood to benefit from al-Hariri’s assassination, the event must not be viewed as an isolated incident, but must be linked to both historical dynamics and current trends. Domestically, Lebanon’s fragile and highly fragmented political system does not only suffer from what analysts call the “sectarianism of the state,” but the country itself has been an ideal location for settling scores between various regional and international powers.

Since its creation, Lebanon has suffered from problems of national (dis)integration, sharpening ideological and sectarian contradictions, and supra-state political loyalties. The danger lies in the fact that domestic violence in Lebanon has usually been accompanied by regional and/or international intervention, with each confessional group seeking to recruit regional and international allies to its cause. In what appeared to be an orchestrated policy response to al-Hariri’s assassination, the United States, France, and Israel echoed the opinion of the Lebanese opposition, whereas the Lebanese government and pro-Syria factions inside Lebanon reflected the views of both Iran and Syria. The result has been more domestic polarization and the crippling of Lebanese institutions, as the latter seem, at least for the moment, unable to handle the domestic debacle which ensued.

On the international front, America’s self-declared “war on terrorism” and its more recent invasion of Iraq have set in motion a series of dynamics with enormous repercussions for both Syria and Iran. The occupation of Iraq has created a myriad of geo-strategic dilemmas for both regional powers, as they now find themselves sandwiched between two formidable foes: Israel and the United States. As a result, both Syria and Iran have formally announced the creation of a “united front” to confront possible US and Israeli threats.⁸

Last May, President Bush banned virtually all US exports to Syria, except for food and medicine, and barred flights between Syria and the United States, except for emergencies. Even though Syria was not officially designated as a member of the “axis of evil,” American officials have repeatedly talked about regime change in Syria, and criticize it constantly for its policy towards Iraq, its role in Lebanon, and its close ties with Iran—a member of the “axis of evil” and a staunch ally of Syria. Recently, US Secretary of State Rice called Syria one of several “outposts of tyranny” in the world.⁹ Interestingly, a Western diplomat suggested that the US condemnation of Syria’s possible role in the assassination of al-Hariri may also be a regarded as an attempt to rebuke Iran.¹⁰ Given US pressure on Iran to halt its nuclear program, and recent news of US spying missions in Iranian airspace, such an analysis carries considerable merit.

There is no doubt that al-Hariri’s assassination is one of the most consequential events in Lebanon’s post-civil war history. Al-Hariri was not only a prominent Sunni political figure who commanded enormous respect, he was also a major contributor to the 1989 Ta’if Accords that ended Lebanon’s civil war and laid the foundation for a durable power-sharing arrangement.¹¹ In fact, some sources hold that the slain leader used his personal wealth to finance the national reconciliation agreement. He was also credited with the reconstruction of Lebanon and the rebuilding of Beirut.

It is both ironic and sad that the assassination of a man generally regarded as a symbol of national unity and reconciliation is being exploited by competing players inside and outside Lebanon to sow the seeds of disunity and unrest. Only time will tell if Lebanon’s political factions and confessional groups will live up to the moment and call for national unity in this time of crisis, or if history will repeat itself and a new cycle of bloodshed in the Middle East will be unleashed.

Kareem M. Kamel is an Egyptian analyst based in Cairo, Egypt. He has an MA in International Relations and is specialized in security studies, decision- making, nuclear politics, Middle East politics and the politics of Islam. He is currently a teaching assistant to the Political Science Department at the American University in Cairo.

1- Cilina Nasser, “Grief-stricken Lebanese Point Fingers,” Al-Jazeera (English) February 15^th, 2005

2- “Arab World Reacts to the Killing of Al-Hariri,” Al-Jazeera (English) February 15^th, 2005

3- “The Civil War. 1975” The Lebanese-American Association

4- Christian Henderson, “Who killed Rafiq al-Hariri?” Al-Jazeera (English) February 14^th, 2005

5- Aluf Benn and Nathan Guttman, “Sources: Israel Satisfied By US Decision to Recall Syria Envoy,” February 16^th, 2005 Ha’aretz

6- “US Ties with Syria Worsen,” Al-Jazeera (English) February 16^th, 2005

7- Mohamed El Aly, “Reasons to Speculate an Israeli Role in Al-Hariri’s Assassination,” Al-Jazeera (Arabic)

8- “Iran, Syria to Form United Front,” Yahoo.com

9- Steven R. Weisman, “Blast Cited by US in anti-Syria Move,” International Herald Tribune February 16^th, 2005

10- Ibid.

11- “Profile: Rafiq al-Hariri,” Al-Jazeera (English) February 14^th, 2005

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