“I
did it especially for you.”1
– Hosni Mubarak to Ariel Sharon, commenting on the release
of convicted Israeli spy Azzam Azzam
“This
deal is the sign of the demeaning and dishonoring of Egypt and
Arabs by the Israelis.”2
– Diaa Eddin Daud, Nasserist Party Leader
 |
|
Convicted
Israeli spy Azzam, meeting with Israeli Premier Sharon
|
Egypt’s
surprise exchange of Azzam Azzam, a convicted Israeli spy, for
six Egyptian students arrested by Israel in August shed light on
the steadily improving relations between Egypt and Israel. The
prisoner exchange was not announced in advance, but Israeli
officials said that the details were worked out during a visit
to Israel by the Egyptian foreign minister, Ahmed Aboul Gheit,
and intelligence chief, Omar Suleiman.3
While
the parents of the freed Egyptians expressed their joy at the
release of their sons, they regarded the deal as an unfair one
for Egypt.4 Some of the
Egyptian opposition saw the deal as “part and parcel of an
ongoing series of Egyptian concessions to Israel and the US,”
arguing that there was no moral equivalence between Azzam, a
convicted Israeli spy, and the Egyptian students who were armed
only with knives and an air gun.5
Exacerbating this sentiment is the fact that, almost nine months
ago, Hizbullah got a much better deal, when a German-brokered
exchange lead to the release of 400 Palestinians, 30 Lebanese
detainees (including two high profile Hizbullah leaders), and
the bodies of 59 Lebanese, in return for the bodies of three
Israeli soldiers and an Israeli businessman captured by
Hizbullah.
The
recent prisoner exchange was not an isolated incident. It was
the final step in a series of Egyptian moves aimed at improving
relations with both Israel and its main patron, Washington. A
few days before the exchange, President Mubarak made an
unprecedented comment praising Sharon’s ability to bring
peace, and suggesting that the Israeli Prime Minister—loathed
across the Arab world—had much to offer the Palestinians.
“If the Palestinians do not manage to achieve progress in the
time of the current prime minister,” he said, “it will be
difficult to make any progress, because Sharon has the ability
to move along the peace process and find a solution if he wants
to.”6
The
release of Azzam is expected to be followed by the return of
Egypt’s ambassador to Tel Aviv, from where he had been
recalled in November 2000, in protest of Israel’s bloody
crackdown of the Palestinian uprising. The Egyptian government
has also agreed to the establishment of a three-way
Egyptian-Israeli-US Qualifying Industrial Zone (QIZ) that would
give goods made in Egypt preferred status in the US if there was
some Israeli contribution to the production process. Official
Egyptian criticism of Marwan Barghouti’s decision to run for
Palestinian presidential elections is a further sign of
improvement in Egyptian-Israeli relations. Some analysts suggest
that Barghouti’s candidacy is inconvenient for political
actors who do not see the upcoming Palestinian elections as an
exercise in democracy, but simply seek to use the elections to
bestow legitimacy on Mahmoud Abbas—the man both Washington and
Israel favor as a negotiating partner. Hence, by favoring
Mahmoud Abbas and distancing Marwan Barghouti, the Egyptian
leadership has further entrenched itself within the
American-Israeli camp.
The
Egyptian government wants an end to the Intifada because it
has inflamed popular passions in Egypt and threatens regime
stability. |
|
Recently,
Israeli newspaper, Ha’aretz, suggested that, during his
recent visit to several Middle Eastern capitals, Mubarak
attempted to persuade the ruler of Kuwait, Prince Jabber Ahmed
al-Sabah, to open negotiations with Israel for diplomatic ties.7
It also indicated that the Egyptian president tried to pressure
Syria into taking bolder steps that would convince Israel of
Damascus’ seriousness about renewing Syrian-Israeli peace
negotiations.
Currying
Favor with Washington and Tel Aviv
It
would appear that a significant restructuring of Egyptian
diplomacy, vis-à-vis its relationship with Washington and Tel
Aviv, has been taking place. The importance of this development
cannot be understated; Egypt’s strategic decisions greatly
influence regional policy, given its place as the largest and
most populous Arab state and the political center of the Arab
world. Egyptian diplomacy has historically often set the tone
for future regional developments. As such, it is important to
note the pattern of increasingly uninhibited Egyptian-Israeli
and Egyptian-American rapprochement, in which Egypt’s
traditional reservations have been withdrawn on almost all
issues.
In
the immediate aftermath of the American invasion of Iraq, Egypt
refused to deal with any American-appointed government,
stressing the need for the immediate withdrawal of US troops.
But despite the death of almost 100,000 Iraqi civilians as a
result of the US invasion and the recent destruction of the city
of Fallujah by US forces, the recent summit on Iraq held in the
Egyptian resort of Sharm el Sheikh granted the US-appointed
Allawi government and its security forces legitimacy, rebuffed
France’s attempt to secure a timetable for the withdrawal of
US troops, and condemned what it called “all acts of terrorism
in Iraq.”8 Additionally,
Egypt, under whose auspices the summit was held, went along with
the American demand to only host members of the Iraqi interim
government and not the Iraqi opposition.9
Official
Egyptian-Israeli ties had been warming several months before the
release of Azzam. In late May Mubarak and Sharon decided to
establish political, security and economic committees, mandated
to improve all aspects of the two countries’ bilateral
relationship. Both countries have also recently concluded a $2.5
billion agreement, whereby Egypt undertook to supply Israel with
natural gas for 15 years. President Mubarak has also affirmed
his willingness to assist in maintaining the peace in Gaza after
Israel’s planned withdrawal. He also agreed to increase
Egypt’s forces on the border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip,
crackdown on weapons smuggling from Sinai into Gaza, and send
Egyptian experts to train the Palestinian Authority’s security
forces. The Egyptian authorities fear that Hamas’s growing
power in the Gaza Strip could cause a spillover of Islamic
fundamentalist influence.
Regime
Survival
 |
|
Mubarak’s
policies are generating anger, evidenced in popular protests
|
While
Egypt has always had working relations with Israel, it had
always maintained a relative degree of independence, seeking to
shield itself from domestic criticism by at least trying to seem
evenhanded and balanced in its dealings with the Arab-Israeli
conflict. The Egyptian government has always argued that any
improvement in Egyptian-Israeli relations could only occur in
tandem with more Israeli efforts towards peacemaking. For
instance, Egypt always insisted that in order for the Egyptian
ambassador to return to Israel, the latter should withdraw to
its September 28, 2000 positions and end its siege of the
Palestinian presidential headquarters in Ramallah. But there are
suggestions that Cairo has withdrawn its conditions and that the
Egyptian ambassador will be sent back to Israel. One would have
anticipated that with the ongoing carnage in Iraq, constant US
threats against Iran and Syria, and Israel’s recent killing of
three Egyptian border police, Egypt would have taken a tougher
stance. But the exact opposite happened; the Egyptian government
has shown exceptional willingness to “reward” Israel and the
United States, hosting a US-inspired conference on Iraq,
encouraging Arab steps towards normalizing relations with Israel
without any tangible reciprocal steps, and accepting a prisoner
swap that many in Egypt regarded as a sell-out. The question is:
What could have prompted the Egyptian government to seek closer
relations with Israel at such a critical juncture for the
region, when Israel continues to demonstrate intransigence and
hostility?
Decision-making
in the Arab world is often marred by personalized politics,
ad-hoc policymaking, and the lack of institutionalized
decision-making. All this makes it increasingly difficult to
find clear behavioral patterns or explain sudden shifts in
stances vis-à-vis major policy issues. In fact, decision-making
in the Arab world involves an authoritative decision-maker who
can act alone, with little or no consultation with other people
or institutions except for a small group of subordinate advisors
who are entirely dependent on the decision-maker for the
continuance of their present position.10
Moreover, these advisors have no independent power base and no
role that permits them access to a regular source of information
on foreign affairs other than through the decision-maker they
serve.11 Given that most
Arab regimes do not operate based upon a clearly outlined
strategic doctrine of national interest, the most likely reason
for Mubarak’s behavior is his personal quest for political
survival. In fact, most Arab leaders have successfully evaded
demands for change and democratization by demonstrating to their
patrons in Washington how useful they can be in the “war on
terrorism,” and by showing their ability to maintain stability
and calm in the Middle East.
The
most likely reason for Mubarak’s behavior is his personal
quest for political survival. |
|
|
Moreover,
many Arab leaders have benefited from their accumulated
experience of political survival and are aware that the
re-election of George W. Bush would most likely mean that moves
aimed at improving relations with Israel would be looked upon
favorably by the neoconservative hawks controlling the upper
echelons of decision-making in Washington for the next four
years. This would explain why Egyptian moves aimed at gaining
favor in Washington and Tel Aviv were accelerated in the
immediate aftermath of the reelection of George W. Bush. The
release of Azzam Azzam was the key to winning further Israeli
support and securing a position as a major player in the
“peace process.”
The
Egyptian government is fully aware that its role in any
US-inspired “peace process” is primarily to be as helpful as
possible, without taking any unilateral initiatives that depart
in any way from the narrow parameters set by Washington and Tel
Aviv.12 In other words,
the limits of the Egyptian role in the Middle East are defined
by the United States and Israel, and not by the Egyptian
leadership.
Egypt
is also interested in playing a more active role in re-arranging
Palestinian domestic affairs to its favor, now that Arafat is
dead and whatever reservations he had are gone. The Egyptian
endorsement of Mahmoud Abbas as the new leader of the
Palestinians came after the latter gave certain hints that he
would seek to abandon the Intifada, restructure Palestinian
security forces, and resume negotiations with Israel. The
Egyptian government wishes to see an end to the Intifada because
it has inflamed popular passions in Egypt for more than four
years and has been a threat to regime stability and a security
concern. The recent attacks carried out in Sinai against Israeli
tourists are a case in point.
Pre-emptive
Concessions
The
last few months have witnessed a noticeable thaw in the “cold
peace” between Egypt and Israel. Stronger Egyptian-Israeli
ties reach beyond the recent prisoner exchange and include an
upgrading in all aspects of their bilateral relationship. This
has prompted many Israeli commentators to note that “the
security cooperation, the political coordination and the close
relations formed between heads of the different security
apparatuses, have turned the state of affairs between the
countries to the best it has been since the initial
“honeymoon,” immediately after the signing of the 1979 peace
accord.”13
Unfortunately,
by assuming that gestures of goodwill and multiple concessions
will somehow persuade Israel to withdraw from occupied
territories, the Egyptian leadership has once again shown its
tendency to miscalculate. If Arab relations with Israel are
normalized and the Intifada is brought to an end without Israel
taking any significant reciprocal steps, what future bargaining
chips would the Arabs be left with?
In
addition, one must note that US support and Israel’s good
graces have not turned Egypt into a haven for foreign investment
or produced an economic miracle. Unemployment continues to
plague Egyptian youth, and any economic benefits have not
noticeable trickled down to Egypt’s lower and middle classes.
In fact, one analyst noted that US aid to Egypt is based on a
tacit bargain in which “American officials help Egyptian
officials to get rich, and Egyptian officials help their
American counterparts to validate their reputations.”14
By
accommodating Israeli and American demands over the past two
decades, Egypt has turned itself from a historically
largely-independent player in regional affairs, a champion of
Arab nationalist causes, and an influential strategic
heavyweight, to a simple mediator with a role narrowly
structured by Washington and defined by Tel Aviv. From the Oslo
Accords to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to the
multiple peace and security summits in Aqaba and Sharm el
Sheikh, Arab leaders have demonstrated an astonishing ability to
make new concessions on every occasion. But that suggests that
one day there will be no more concessions – when there is
nothing left to concede.
Kareem M. Kamel is an Egyptian analyst based in Cairo,
Egypt. He has an MA in International Relations and is
specialized in security studies, decision- making, nuclear
politics, Middle East politics and the politics of Islam. He
is currently a teaching assistant to the Political Science
Department at the American University in Cairo.
