The current uprising poses a grave challenge to the fledgling Allawi-led interim government, which has yet to establish popular legitimacy or provide a solution to Iraq ’s burgeoning problems. In recent weeks, Allawi has shown himself capable of using excessive violence – as Saddam had – to quell any domestic challenge to his authority. The consistent use of military power (as opposed to peaceful containment or constructive engagement) against domestic challengers by the new Iraqi government and its US benefactors is the result of their common perception that increasingly large areas of Iraq are steadily being lost to the insurgents. In fact, US forces have de facto “abdicated power in Fallujah, been chased out of Ramadi and Samarra, and are struggling to maintain control of Baqubah, Tikrit and Mosul.”^[6] In fact, the tactical agreements reached with the insurgents over the past few months in Fallujah, Najaf, and elsewhere in Iraq reflect a recognition by the US that the insurgencies are not carried out by bandits or isolated remnants of the old regime, and are too deeply rooted in the Iraqi population to be defeated militarily.^[7]

Nevertheless, the ongoing US-Allawi campaign against the Mahdi Army is intended not only to quell Al-Sadr’s uprising, but also to send a message to other insurgents that their activities will not be tolerated by the new Iraqi government. This explains why US airplanes have been simultaneously attacking both Najaf and Fallujah – hotbeds of both Shiite and Sunni resistance respectively.

The impasse that Allawi currently finds himself in was illustrated during the UN-sponsored three-day national conference to select a national assembly, when angry protesters and delegates threatened to withdraw, demanding an end to US attacks on Najaf and the Imam Ali Mosque. As Allawi flexed his muscles in Najaf, the conference building, located in central Baghdad, was hit by several mortar rounds, even though the conference was held in siege-like conditions in the heavily fortified Green Zone, and a curfew had been imposed in surrounding areas.^[8] If anything, recent events illustrated the extent to which Allawi’s interim government is domestically isolated and dependent upon Washington for its continued existence.

The Iraqi dilemma is further compounded by the fact that the Allawi government is incapable of providing security or services to the Iraqi people, at a time when Moqtada Al-Sadr has been able to skillfully present himself as the defender of the unemployed, poverty-stricken masses, who suffer under the heavy hand of a puppet government supported by an alien power.

Quietist Sistani vs. Militant Activist Al-Sadr

American warplanes bomb Najaf, Al-Sadr’s stronghold

In many ways, Al-Sadr’s uprising is a manifestation of the Iraqis’ quest for an end to the occupation and their desire to rid their country of a US-proxy government. But the conflict is also part and parcel of a larger domestic Shiite struggle for power and legitimacy amidst chaos. The two main trends vying for power among Iraq ’s Shiites are the “quietist” school lead by Grand Ayatollah Sayed Ali al-Sistani, and a “militant-activist” school lead by Moqtada Al-Sadr. Al-Sadr’s recent actions can be understood as a challenge to the quietist ayatollahs for their apparent collaboration with the occupation through their notable silence throughout the crisis.

In recent months, Al-Sadr has experienced a marked growth in his status among mainstream Iraqis. His skillful manipulation of Arab media and his fiery sermons demanding Iraqi freedom and independence have boosted the young cleric’s standing, leading to his emergence as Iraq’s only recognizable national symbol of defiance against the massive US military presence that remains in Iraq despite the alleged “hand-over of sovereignty.”

Al-Sadr has shown himself to be a shrewd politician, capable of channeling the anger of millions of impoverished and disenfranchised Iraqis. A poll conducted by Iraq’s Center for Research and Strategic Studies in Baghdad last spring indicated that Al-Sadr was second only to Iraq’s venerated Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani in public support.^[9] Allawi, who was not yet prime minister, trailed far behind in the poll.

Al-Sadr commands a great deal of respect due to his family’s revered status among Iraq ’s Shiite community. His father, Grand Ayatollah Mohamed Sadiq Al-Sadr, was an iconic symbol of Shiite resistance, and eventually martyrdom, when he was killed by Iraqi secret services in February 1999, along with two of Al-Sadr’s elder brothers. The elder Al-Sadr, who constantly criticized Saddam Hussein in every Friday sermon, was killed for his defiance of the Iraqi dictator. Baathist authorities prohibited mourners from taking part in his funeral, and government forces used automatic weapons and armored vehicles to break up demonstrations. Mohamed Al-Sadr’s popularity was made apparent with Saddam’s ouster, when a Shiite slum of 2 million was renamed Sadr City by clerics living there. Al-Sadr’s uncle, Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Mohamed Baqir Al-Sadr, was also executed by Iraqi authorities in April 1980 for his explicit support for Iran ’s Ayatollah Khomeini.

The courage of Al-Sadr’s father and uncle has thus conferred considerable legitimacy on him as the surviving son of a heroic family.^[10] Al-Sadr is also known to be currently raising the six children of his slain brothers, further adding to his appeal among the Shiites.^[11] By constantly highlighting his readiness to die, Al-Sadr is emphasizing his family’s long history of confrontation and playing upon the deepest cultural aspects of the Shiite sect of Islam. Shiites have always looked to the martyrdom of Al-Husayn, Prophet Mohamed’s grandson who died fighting the vastly superior forces of the tyrannical Ummayid Caliph Yazid, as the ultimate manifestation of victimization and sacrifice in the quest for justice.

With every confrontation, Al-Sadr has incrementally increased his power base in Iraq through successful brinksmanship and a remarkable ability to challenge the occupation and its stooges and yet live to fight another day. By holing up inside the Imam Ali Mosque and promising to fight until the last drop of his blood, Al-Sadr has put himself in what many analyst believe is a classic “win-win scenario.”^[12] If US and Iraqi forces decide to conduct a final bloody assault on the Imam Ali Mosque, popular passions will be inflamed, and would likely spark off a wholesale Shiite uprising in response. If Al-Sadr is killed while fighting in that Shiite holy site, he will immediately become a martyr, drawing thousands of Shiites to his cause. Alternatively, if American and Iraqi forces pull back from a final assault on Najaf and seek another truce with him, he will be seen as a popular hero who stood up to the mightiest power on earth

Conclusions

Almost a year and a half after the removal of Saddam, Iraq is nowhere closer to freedom or democracy. It is increasingly perceived by ordinary Iraqis and Muslims around the world as an artificial creation of the Bush administration. This is due to the fact that Iraq is facing an unparalleled situation where occupying powers tirelessly speak about “sovereignty” and a “transfer of power” while they maintain more than 150,000 foreign troops on Iraqi soil.

Among Washington’s justifications for the continuing presence of foreign troops in Iraq and its constant targeting of insurgents is the need to stabilize the country.^[13] US planners and decision makers, however, fail to recognize that the continued presence of foreign troops is the major cause for instability in Iraq . More seriously, the presence of US troops in both Iraq and Afghanistan is a major threat to Iran – a US-designated “axis of evil” state whose nuclear program has been the cause of much antagonism from the Bush administration. Some analysts suggest that Iran has shown signs of increasing its support for Shiite insurgents in Najaf, in an attempt to counterbalance threats to its national security.^[14] Recently, Hazem Shalan al-Khuzaei, Iraq ’s interim defense minister in the US-appointed cabinet, accused Iran of being Iraq ’s “No.1 enemy.” If tensions remain high in the region, the fighting in Iraq could turn into an even bloodier proxy war involving the United States , Syria , and Iran.

Over two decades ago, while Shiite fundamentalism emanating from Iran was considered the biggest threat to Western civilization, hundreds of Sunni Muslim “radicals” were being armed by the United States to wage jihad against the Soviet Union . The operating assumption at the time was that the Wahhabi brand of Sunni radicalism was innately conservative and therefore a natural ally of the US against the radical Shiites.^[15] After September 11, the operating assumption was that the US should work to build bridges with the Shiites, since they could serve as a significant bulwark against Sunni “radicals” influenced by the Wahhabi-Hanbali school of thought.^[16] But for all intents and purposes, the US military campaign in Iraq against both Sunnis and Shiites has antagonized members of both sects and united insurgents across Iraq against a common enemy.

Kareem M. Kamel is an Egyptian freelance writer based in Cairo, Egypt. He has an MA in International Relations and is specialized in security studies, decision- making, nuclear politics, Middle East politics and the politics of Islam. He is currently assistant to the Political Science Department at the American University in Cairo.

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[1] “Moqtada Al-Sadr,”  Wikipedia

[2] Johanna McGeary, “The Lessons of Najaf”  Time.com  August 22^nd, 2004  

[3] “US Atrocity in Najaf,”  World Socialist Website  August 13^th, 2004

[4] Ibid.

[5] “Moqtada Al-Sadr,”  Wikipedia

[6] Johanna McGeary, “The Lessons of Najaf”  Time.com  August 22^nd, 2004  

[7] Tony Karon, “Letting Go of Iraq ,”  Time.com   June 4^th, 2004

[8] Peter Symonds, “Fighting in Najaf Exposes an Unpopular, Isolated Iraqi Regime,”  World Socialist Website

[9] Tyler Marshall and Henry Chu, “Steadfast in Defiance, Cleric Gains Stature With Iraq Masses,”  LA Times  August 18^th, 2004

[10] W. Andrew Terrill, “The United States and Iraq’s Shi’ite Clergy: Partners or Adversaries?,” Strategic Studies Institute February 2004  

[11] Ibid.

[12] Scott Baldauff, “Sadr Plays to Power of Martyrdom,”  Christian Science Monitor August 12^th, 2004

[13] Colonel Daniel Smith, “Into the Valley: The Occupation Faces a Major Challenge in Najaf,”  Common Dreams  August 19^th, 2004

[14] Barbara Slavin, “ Iran Can See an Opportunity Across Border,”  USA Today August 17^th, 2004

[15] Tony Karon, “The Shi’ites the U.S. Thinks it Knows,”  Time.com   March 11^th, 2004

[16] Yitzhak Nakash, “The Shi’ites and the Future of Iraq ,”  Foreign Affairs 82 (July/August 2003)

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