The
subsequent Islamization of Pattani replaced many elements of the
Hindu-Buddhist culture, and the Muslim religious elite came to
dominate the kingdom’s sociopolitical system. However, the Muslim
dynasty was abolished in 1786 when Pattani was conquered by the
Kingdom of Siam. Under Siamese rule, Muslim provinces were governed
by Siamese-appointed bureaucrats working under a centralized
administrative structure. Muslim rebellions in opposition to
Siam’s administrative “reforms” were suppressed. The
subsequent Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909 guaranteed Siam’s
undisputed control over Pattani, following which the Siamese
government took various measures aimed at weakening the Islamic
identity of the Pattanese to develop a mono-ethnic, Buddhist, Thai
state.12
Under
Siamese rule, the local governors of the Muslim-majority provinces
were replaced by Thai rulers. In addition, an act was passed in 1921
forcing Muslims to attend Siamese schools to receive a secular
education. As a result, Islamic schools were closed and the power of
Muslim scholars was greatly undermined.
During
World War II, the Thai military regime of Pibul Songkhram initiated
a series of policies aimed at the forcible assimilation of Muslims.
The wearing of western-style trousers was made compulsory for men,
and Muslims were prevented from adopting Muslim names or using the
Malay dialect. In addition, Shari’ah law was set aside in favor of
the Thai Buddhist laws of marriage and inheritance.13
Such
policies generated a great deal of resentment among the Muslim
population of Thailand. Consequently, Haji Sulong, the president of
the Islamic Religious Council, submitted a seven-point list of
demands to the Thai government, calling for an end to the
government’s discriminatory policies. The Thai government
responded by arresting Haji Sulong and his associates and charging
them with treason.
Muslims
constitute 10% of the population of Thailand.
|
|
By
the end of World War II the Thai state had militarily subdued the
Pattani separatist movement.14 In the initial post-war period, the
government tried to adopt a more conciliatory stance towards Muslims
in the south. But centuries of marginalization and suppression at
the hands of Thai officials, state penetration of Muslim civil
society and the absence of Pattanese political participation
contributed to mutual antagonism between both sides. This antagonism
erupted on April 28, 1948, in a pivotal event known as the Dusun
Nyiur incident - a violent clash between Thai police and Pattanese
Muslims that left an estimated 1,100 Muslims and 30 policemen killed
and set the stage for the rise of more militant Muslim separatist
groups.15
The
Dynamics of Muslim Separatism
Modern
Islamic insurgent movements in southern Thailand, the southern
Philippines and Aceh arguably represent the most visible signs of
armed separatism in Southeast Asia today. The roots of
ethno-religious unrest in each of these regions stem from the same
basic factors: insensitivity to local concerns, regional neglect,
military repression and forcible attempts to impose uniformity of
language and social behavior on entire communities.16
Armed
separatist movements in Southeast Asia represent a serious,
pervasive and notably persistent phenomenon. This is evident in the
phenomenon’s duration and severity, as well as its resistance to
negotiated settlements. For example, the war in Mindanao between
Muslim separatists and the Philippines government has been ongoing
for decades, causing some 100,000 casualties and creating over
500,000 refugees. More importantly, in all cases of separatism, one
can detect the clash between the dominant group and its cultural
values and the subordinate one with its own religious-cultural
identification. National identity is invariably defined in terms of
“the dominant group’s values and culture, with other groups on
the periphery tending to be left out.”17
 |
|
Heavily armed Thai forces at Krue Se
mosque
|
The
Pattanese rebellion in southern Thailand in the post-World War II
period is the case of a Muslim Malay minority, with its distinct
culture, traditions, history and language, trying to break free from
the vestiges of a dominant Buddhist Thai culture. The heavy-handed
and often insensitive attempts by central authorities to impose
Thai-Buddhist culture on the Muslims have resulted in Pattanese
resentment and a fear of losing their own identity to the Thai,
perceived as foreigners or intruders.18 Additionally, the
underdeveloped nature of southern Thailand relative to the rest of
the country has contributed greatly to Muslim feelings of
deprivation and marginalization. In fact, Muslim provinces account
for only 1.5% of Thailand’s gross domestic product. The south has
virtually no industry, the infrastructure is abysmal and tourism is
underdeveloped despite extensive natural beauty.19
Two
principal militant groups remain active in southern Thailand: PULO
and New PULO. Both organizations operate independently and have been
largely unwilling to coordinate their activities due to differences
in their strategic outlooks. However, the two groups managed to
coordinate a series of attacks (codenamed “Falling Leaves”)
aimed at killing state workers, government officials, law
enforcement personnel and attacking symbols of Thai Buddhist
repression. Between August 1997 and January 1998, no less than 33
separate attacks were carried out as part of this shared effort,
resulting in nine deaths, several dozen injuries, and considerable
economic damage.
Muslims
were prevented from adopting Muslim names or using the Malay
dialect.
|
|
PULO
is the largest and most prominent of the Malay Muslim groups in
southern Thailand, operating since the 1960s. The group was
established in 1968 by Kabir Abdul Rahman - an Islamic scholar
disillusioned by the ineffectuality of the established Malay
opposition in Pattani. His group brought together “a younger, more
militant generation of Thai Muslims many of whom had been
radicalized while studying overseas - becoming an active insurgency
with the politicization of Malay students in the mid- to late
1970s.”20
PULO’s
insurgent activities are carried out by the movement’s armed wing,
the Pattani United Liberation Army (PULA), which directs the
majority of its attacks against Thai government buildings and
cultural and educational facilities in the south. New PULO emerged
as a dissident faction of PULO in 1995. The group has pursued the
goal of Pattanese self-autonomy, albeit “through less dramatic but
more consistent actions than its parent organization.”21
Conclusions
The
most recent episode of carnage against Muslims in Pattani will
doubtless have significant internal repercussions. The Thai
government has thus far failed to realize that heavy-handed
security-based approaches end up radicalizing oppressed communities
and increasing popular support for resistance groups. The US
invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq and the continuing presence of
foreign troops in many Muslim societies have already worked to
radicalize the Muslim community in Thailand and increase their
awareness of global Muslim grievances.
This
increased awareness contributed to the Pattanese perception that
Thai oppression against them is part and parcel of a global campaign
aimed at suppressing Muslims worldwide.22 Last year, reports indicated
that the US was seeking to establish a military base in Thailand to
help government forces combat Muslim separatists.23 If the US
eventually takes an active role in suppressing Muslims in the south,
the global confrontation between Muslims and the US will definitely
widen. Moreover, the crackdown on Pattanese Muslims may also have an
impact throughout Southeast Asia due to the multiple ideological and
logistical linkages between Muslim separatists operating in the
region.
Given
recent US war crimes in Iraq and America’s insistence on
militarily confronting Islamist groups throughout the world,
Al-Qaeda’s ideology will definitely become more prevalent among
oppressed Muslims worldwide. As Jason Burke noted in a recent Foreign
Policy article: “al-Qaeda is more lethal as an ideology than
as an organization. ‘al-Qaedaism’ will continue to attract
supporters in the years to come - whether Osama Bin Laden is around
to lead them or not.”24
Kareem M. Kamel
is an Egyptian freelance writer based in Cairo, Egypt. He has an MA
in International Relations and is specialized in security studies,
decision- making, nuclear politics, Middle East politics and the
politics of Islam. He is currently assistant to the Political
Science Department at the American University in Cairo.
[1]
Richard C. Paddock, “Thai Rebels at Mosque Knew Their Fate,
Witnesses Say,” Los Angeles Times April 30th,
2004 : A3
[2]
John Gershman, “Is Southeast Asia the Second Front?”
Foreign Affairs 81(July/August 2002)
[3]
Ibid.
[4]
“More than 100 dead in Thai Clashes,”
Al-Jazeera (English) April
28th, 2004
[5]
Richard C. Paddock, “Thai Rebels at Mosque Knew Their Fate,
Witnesses Say,” Los Angeles Times April 30th,
2004 : A3
[6]
Andrew Lam, “Thailand’s Rebellious Muslims: Is Bangkok Next?” Pacific
News Service April 28th, 2004
[7]
“Thai Separatists Warn Foreigners,”
Al-Jazeera (English) April 29th, 2004
[8]
Shaheen Chughtai, “Thailand’s Troubled Muslim South,”
Al-Jazeera (English) April 28th, 2004
[9]
Syed Serajul Islam, “The Islamic Independence Movements in Pattani
of Thailand and Mindanao of the Philippines,”
Asian Survey 38 (May 1982) : 441-456
[10]
Andrew D.W. Forbes, “Thailand’s Muslim Minorities: Assimilation,
Secession, or Coexistence?”
Asian Survey 22 (November 1982) : 1056-1073
[11]
Syed Serajul Islam, “The Islamic Independence Movements in Pattani
of Thailand and Mindanao of the Philippines,”
Asian Survey 38 (May 1982) : 441-456
[12]
Ibid.
[13]
Andrew D.W. Forbes, “Thailand’s Muslim Minorities: Assimilation,
Secession, or Coexistence?”
Asian Survey 22 (November 1982) : 1056-1073
[14]
Syed Serajul Islam, “The Islamic Independence Movements in Pattani
of Thailand and Mindanao of the Philippines,”
Asian Survey 38 (May 1982) : 441-456
[15]
Ibid.
[16]
Peter Chalk, “Separatism and Southeast Asia : The Islamic Factor
in Southern Thailand, Mindanao, and Aceh,”
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 24 (July 2001) :
241-269
[17]
Andrew Tan, “Armed Muslim Separatist Rebellion in Southeast Asia:
Persistence, Prospects, and Implications,”
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 23 (October-December
2000)
[18]
Ibid.
[19]
Daniel Lovering, “Bloodshed in Thailand’s Restive Muslim South
Follows Decades-old Struggle,” Associated Press April 28th,
2004
[20]
Peter Chalk, “Separatism and Southeast Asia : The Islamic Factor
in Southern Thailand, Mindanao, and Aceh,”
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 24 (July 2001) :
241-269
[21]
Ibid.
[22]
“More Thai Muslims Turn To Religion Due To Worldwide
Persecution,” BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific. Originally
entitled “Muslims Turn to Arab Studies for Comfort,” published
by Thai newspaper, The Nation. March 11th, 2004
[23]
“US
Seeking Military Base in Thailand: Report”
Newindpress.com June 10th, 2003
[24]
Jason Burke, “Think
Again: Al-Qaeda,”
Foreign Policy (May/June 2004)
