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Iran’s
Nuclear Ambitions
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The
Bushehr nuclear power plant of Iran |
Iran’s
recent decision to halt all United Nations inspections of its
nuclear sites for the next month emphasizes Tehran’s struggle to
preserve its ambitious nuclear research program despite complaints
from the United States. As Iran continues down the nuclear path, it
is increasingly clear that Tehran is attempting to avoid the
political ramifications implicit in the advancement of its nuclear
research program, while carefully maneuvering itself into a position
where it would have the option of developing nuclear weapons should
the time or the need present themselves.
The
reasons as to why the leadership in Tehran would be interested in
developing nuclear weapons could not be clearer. Emplaced in a
region of much geostrategic instability and sandwiched between two
countries currently occupied by the United States, Tehran is facing
a series of threats to its interests. If the country wishes to
preserve its current internal political structure and maintain its
territorial integrity, it is necessary for it to build up its
defenses where it would be capable of engaging in warfare with other
Middle Eastern or Central Asian states. In addition, it is important
for it to have a strong enough deterrent to prevent outside powers,
such as the United States, from attempting to manipulate the country
for their own benefit.
Iran
is progressing on building up its defenses lest border conflicts
occur. Iran’s trade relationship with Russia has brought the
Persian country massive supplies of military equipment, such as
MiG-29 fighter aircraft, Su-24 fighter bombers, T-72 tanks and Kilo
class submarines. Furthermore, Tehran has recently successfully
tested its nuclear-capable Shahab-3 missile, capable of striking
targets throughout the region.
The
second critical aspect of Iran’s defense is its ability to deter
outside powers such as the United States, a global power that is
unprecedented in its military might. Thus, purchasing military
hardware from the Russian Federation is not enough; the US’ latest
weapon designs would render much of this equipment obsolete. The
amount of money that the United States spends on its military also
far exceeds Iranian spending. The one weapon that would greatly
increase the risks of attacking Iran would be nuclear warheads.
By
becoming nuclear-armed, states afford themselves the ultimate wild
card: the ability to bring unacceptable levels of loss to the
invading army or to belligerent countries’ interests. If Iran were
to acquire nuclear weapons, it would be able to hit targets
throughout the Middle East, including US troop concentrations in
Iraq and Afghanistan. While an attack of this sort by a
nuclear-armed state would be highly unlikely - indeed, the only
instance in which nuclear weapons have ever been used occurred
almost sixty years ago - it is a possibility, and the fallout from
that possibility is so extreme that it becomes an excellent
deterrent in a state’s defensive arsenal.
If
Iran acquires nuclear weapons, it can hit US troop
concentrations in Iraq and Afghanistan. |
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Having
a nuclear deterrent would, additionally, help Tehran deal with
Israel. Israel has acted as an important balancing power in the
Middle East, usually colluding with Washington to prevent any state
in the region from becoming a regional hegemon. With the tremendous
influx of state-of-the-art US-built weapons provided to Israel,
coupled with that country’s nuclear weapon deterrent, Tel Aviv
wields significant power in a region where it is one of the smallest
countries in size.
Israel’s
foreign policy, with respect to its preservation of this balance of
power, was best demonstrated during its 1981 attack on Iraq’s
Osirak nuclear reactor. At that time, the French were assisting Iraq
in its pursuit of nuclear energy. Before the Osirak reactor was
loaded with nuclear fuel (which would make an attack environmentally
risky) Israel launched a surprise air attack and partially destroyed
it - an act that demonstrated Israel’s military superiority and
also preserved its nuclear monopoly in the region.
These
geostrategic threats clearly demonstrate why Tehran has been
unwilling to compromise on its quest to control the nuclear fuel
cycle. Iran’s commitment to controlling this cycle - which
includes uranium enrichment, a process necessary to create fuel for
nuclear power plants but that can also be used to create nuclear
weapons - can be seen in the tough public statements repeatedly made
by Tehran. Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi recently argued
that it is Iran’s “legitimate right to enrich uranium.”
Referring
to Iran’s decision to halt its uranium enrichment program
temporarily, Kharrazi said, “We suspended uranium enrichment
voluntarily and temporarily. Later, when our relations with the IAEA
return to normal, we will definitely resume enrichment.” Indeed,
according to Hassan Rohani, the secretary of Iran’s Supreme
Council for National Security, the only reason that Iran complied
with the demands of the United Nations to halt its uranium
enrichment program was because otherwise Iran “would face the same
fate as Iraq.”
Therefore,
Iran cooperated with the United Nations while at the same time it
worked toward a way to resume its nuclear program, including uranium
enrichment. Rohani argued, “We want to be recognized as a member
of the nuclear club; that means Iran be recognized as a country
having the nuclear fuel cycle, and enriching uranium. This is very
difficult for the world to accept.” He continued, outlining
Iran’s agenda, “We have two goals ahead of us that we must
achieve. One is closing Iran’s nuclear dossier with the
[International Atomic Energy Agency] and bringing the board of
governors to take it out of their agenda, and the other is to have
Iran recognized globally as a nuclear country.”
Thus,
it will be revealing to monitor how well Iran is able to maneuver
around US attempts at preventing the country from proceeding down
the nuclear route. Because outwardly admitting its desire for
nuclear weapons would mean a heavy political blow to Tehran, the
development of these weapons must be done in secret. Moreover, it is
mostly the lead-up period to the development of nuclear arms that
causes the biggest controversy. Historically, once a state actually
tests its first nuclear weapon and quickly provides the world with
assurances that such weapons would only be used as a deterrent,
there is little that the world can do to reinstate the old status
quo. There is no doubt that this political truth is on the minds of
Tehran’s current leaders.
Erich
Marquardt is an analyst with the Power and Interest News
Report, located on the web at www.pinr.com
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