In
recent years, Iran has stood by idly as the United States has
projected its influence into the Middle East. At the end of 2001, the
Bush administration launched a military invasion of Afghanistan.
Afghanistan has now become an outpost for US forces, giving Washington
the ability to influence political events throughout Central Asia and
the Middle East. Then, in March of 2003, the Bush administration
overthrew Saddam Hussein’s Ba’thist government in Baghdad and
established a large-scale US occupation in the strategically
significant state.
The
US invasion of Iraq demonstrated to the world that the Bush
administration was prepared to risk the political, economic and
military fallout connected with a large-scale invasion of a Middle
Eastern country. The symbolism of Washington effectively executing a
policy of “regime change” in one member of its “axis of evil”
proved to Tehran that the United States was a serious threat.
A
nuclear-armed Iran would reduce US foreign policy leverage in
the Middle East and Central Asia. |
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In
addition to the United States, Iran also has concerns over the state
of Israel, a country that has military dominance in the Middle East
and has shown that it will forcefully limit the growing power of rival
Middle Eastern states. This commitment was best displayed by Tel
Aviv’s attack on Baghdad’s Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981. Tehran,
which does not want to accept any outside restraints on its power,
realizes that by acquiring nuclear weapons it will be better able to
achieve its foreign policy interests.
Washington
is justifiably concerned over Tehran’s covert activities. The Bush
administration has tried to get the UN Security Council to place
sanctions on Tehran for failing to comply with its obligations under
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. For Washington, it would become
a foreign policy dilemma if Tehran were to acquire nuclear weapons; a
nuclear-armed Iran would greatly reduce Washington’s foreign policy
leverage in shaping developments in the Middle East and Central Asia.
Indeed,
Washington officials have admitted as much. In September, State
Department official Paula DeSutter said, “The impact of a
nuclear-armed Iran in an already volatile region cannot be
underestimated. As President Bush had made clear, that cannot be
allowed to happen.” Tel Aviv has issued similar proclamations;
Israeli Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz recently warned that “under no
circumstances would Israel be able to abide by nuclear weapons in
Iranian possession.”
“Under
no circumstances would Israel be able to abide by nuclear
weapons in Iranian possession.”
- Shaul Mofaz |
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Unfortunately
for Washington and Israel, other powerful states do not share their
geopolitical interests. The European Union, for instance, has
important diplomatic and economic ties with Tehran; the bloc is
Iran’s biggest trading partner. This relationship explains why the
UK, France and Germany sent their foreign ministers to help negotiate
Iran’s decision to comply with the IAEA. Rather than join the US in
referring Iran’s transgressions to the UN Security Council, the
three states promised Tehran that if it complied with IAEA demands,
the EU would be willing to actually assist Iran’s nuclear research
program.
Tehran
applauded the EU’s decision. Hassan Rowhani, secretary of Iran’s
Supreme National Security Council, confrontationally exclaimed: “The
United States did not achieve a single one of its objectives
concerning Iran’s nuclear activities.”
Russia
does not share Washington’s interests in weakening Iran, either.
Moscow has been the integral force behind Tehran’s nuclear
ambitions. Russian engineers are building the Iranian nuclear reactor
at Bushehr. Moscow is also Iran’s major military supplier; in the
past decade, it has provided Tehran with MiG-29 fighter aircraft,
Su-24 fighter bombers, T-72 tanks, and Kilo class attack submarines.
Moscow
doesn’t want the US heavily involved in the Middle East and Central
Asia anymore than Tehran does. Since the September 11 attacks,
Washington has been increasing its influence all across Russia’s
southern borders, establishing military bases in former Soviet
republics. Moscow has found itself having to compete with Washington
in areas often considered part of Russia’s backyard. These diverging
strategic interests between the two superpowers explain Moscow’s
support for Iran’s nuclear research program.
The
differing interests between regionally significant states will make it
tough for any form of international consensus on Iran to form. As long
as Tehran proceeds carefully and works with the European Union and
Russia, it will come closer to acquiring the technology and resources
needed to develop nuclear weapons. Because a nuclear-armed Iran would
seriously threaten US and Israeli interests in the region, it will be
vital to watch the countermeasures to this program devised in
Washington and Tel Aviv.
