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"Forgive
Me Government for I Have Sinned"
Egypt’s
Gamaa Islamiya on Sept 11’s Second Anniversary
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Karam
Zohdi’s apology for Sadat’s assassination sent shockwaves throughout
militant cadres. |
Sadat
is a “martyr,” now they say. Copts and tourists are civilians who should not
have been targeted, they add. Terror is wrong and Muslim youth should not join
al-Qaeda, they also stress. Meet Egypt’s Gamaa Islamiya in its new form. Once
the country’s worst security nightmare before its leaders renounced violence
in 1997, the group is desperately trying to reassure the state of its new
moderate line. Some wonder, however, if it is too moderate that some members are
unable to recognize their group anymore—which brings to the minds of some
analysts the word “split.”
Gamaa’s
51-year-old leader Karam Zohdi—who has been in prison since 1981 over his role
in President Anwar Sadat’s killing—sent shockwaves last July when
interviewed by the London-based Asharq Al-Awsat. Asked what he would have done
if time went back, Zohdi replied: “I would have intervened to prevent his
murder… Sadat, may God bless his soul with mercy, is a martyr along with
everyone who died in that fight.”
From
killing the country’s former president in 1981 to blessing his soul in 2003,
Egypt’s largest militant group
has indeed traveled a long way.
Gamaa
leaders launched a unilateral ceasefire initiative in July 1997, at a time when
the group’s infrastructure outside prisons had been crippled by security
blows. Its insurgency by then had claimed the lives of more than 1,000 people,
mostly police officers, militants, and, on several occasions, Copts, tourists
and secular intellectuals.
The
group’s command, Shura Council, followed their announcement by producing four
revisionist studies, moragaat. The government, it turned out, was not
“infidel” after all, and violence was renounced.
Initially
the group’s calls fell on deaf ears. The regime distrusted the Gamaa,
especially when one of its units slaughtered 58 tourists and four Egyptians in
November 1997 in Luxor, marking the only (though catastrophic) case where the
group breached the ceasefire. Later, the regime came to endorse the initiative
following Sept 11 attacks. Egypt, observers then concluded, was keen at setting
a model for the West on how to fight terror, and drive away accusations that the
country was a breeding ground for radicalism.
They
have become media celebrities with their routine denunciation of
terror. |
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The
revisions were widely publicized in June 2002, when authorities allowed the
editor of state-owned weekly Al Mussawar to interview Gamaa leaders inside
jails. Since then, they have become media celebrities with their routine
denunciation of terror. More importantly, recent crackdowns on Muslim militants
did not target Gamaa sympathizers, whose “good conduct” earned them even
praise from the country’s interior minister.
“Nearly
1,000 members of Gamaa Islamiya have been released over a period of time [three
years] in line with clear guidelines and their commitment to rejecting
violence,” Major General Habib al-Adly, Egypt’s minister of interior, told Al
Mussawar last week. “All those who have been freed are living normally
among the people and clearly state their rejection of violence and their total
commitment to the initiative declared by the Gamaa leadership,” the minister
added. Rights groups put the figure of Islamists in prisons at 15,000 persons.
While
the minister is pleased, yesterday’s comrades in arms from other groups remain
furious. London-based alleged jihadis, like Yasser al-Sirri and Hani al-Sebai,
have labeled the Gamaa’s moves as a sellout.
The
group is touching cornerstones of the jihadi legacy. |
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“These
comments are coming from those who are not Gamaa Islamiya’s sons,” said
lawyer Montasser al-Zayat in reply. Zayat is a former Gamaa member who acted as
a de facto spokesman on launching the initiative. “They [jihadis] are
commenting on an internal issue. The Gamaa did not force anyone to join its
violence in the first place, so no one should instruct the Gamaa now on how to
handle the initiative.”
But
the Gamaa’s revisions are not solely its “internal” business anymore. The
group is touching cornerstones of the jihadi legacy. Though he refused to
comment on Zohdi’s recent statements regarding Sadat’s “martyrdom,”
Zayat admits that the interview and condemning al-Qaeda have led militants from
other groups to feel the Gamaa is stepping on their toes.
The
Gamaa’s moves have already drawn a crescendo of criticism from London-based
radical clerics, including: Abu Hamza al-Masri, the Saudi-born dissident
Mohammed al-Massari, and earlier Abu Baseer, a Syrian exile who enjoys
prominence among jihadis.
Pundits
who have been closely monitoring the Gamaa’s development, like Mohamed Salah
of Al Hayat, say the exiles’ criticism is unlikely to have an impact on the
group. “They will not listen to them,” said Salah. “Coming under external
attack could even give more legitimacy to the Gamaa’s leadership (among its
members).”
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Khaled Islamboli, Sadat’s assassin, on trial |
Judging
by the records, the group’s history is almost void of splits that marred its
brethren in the Jihad. Its centralized organizational structure bears striking
resemblance to those of leftist parties, points out Diaa Rashwan, a researcher
on Islamism at Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, a
Cairo-based think tank. The group’s base-cadres have been known for their
ultra-loyalty to the leadership, which has been able to maintain a strong chain
of command, even inside prison. The Luxor massacre, he added, was unlikely an
act of disobedience. Disruption in the chain of command, resulting from the
killing of middle ranking operatives, meant severed communications between the
leaders in prisons and the isolated Qena Unit that carried out the attack.
“The word on ceasefire could not reach the unit on time,” Rashwan assumed.
The
government itself seems to be betting on the group’s internal discipline to
guarantee a consensus on the renunciation of violence. Authorities allowed the
incarcerated Gamaa leaders to tour prisons in a bid to win their followers over
to the new line.
“I
was indeed astonished [to see] the Gamaa leaders having such immense power and
influence on its members who have been in jails for a long time,” wrote Makram
Ahmad of Al Mussawar, recalling a dialogue conference he attended where four
Shura Council leaders addressed 500 of their supporters, whom they haven’t
seen for years. Organizational hierarchy was emphasized even when it came to the
conference setting. The four Gamaa leaders were in the front platform. The 18
imprisoned provincial emirs were seated behind them, facing the crowd. The
generals and colonels were addressing their foot soldiers saying the war was
over, and hardly anyone seemed to disagree then.
Having
a strong structure is definitely an asset for the leadership if it wants to
proceed with ideological changes. But Zohdi, suggests Rashwan, is not handling
the media in the best possible way. The noise each interview brings, though may
not immediately cause a split, can embarrass the Gamaa in such a critical
period.
The
increasing contacts with the media world was said to have infuriated Aboud al-Zomor,
another leader in the Shura Council, although he sanctioned the revisions. Both
Salah and Zayat denied reports that Zomor left the group.
“Zomor
would have definitely preferred to have the revisions going in silence, and
publicized only when the leaders were out of jail,” Rashwan suggested.
Abandoning
the militant legacy could not have happened in a more critical time. |
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The
fact that Gamaa leaders revised their views in prison cells may prove to be
initiative’s Achilles’ heels. Other Islamists already attacked its
credibility saying it was the product of security pressures, while Asharq Al-Awsat
ran several unconfirmed reports over the last year on muted murmurings about a
split inside prisons.
Abandoning
the militant legacy could not have happened in a more critical time. “The
Gamaa has always enjoyed a strong structure,” Zayat confidently said. After a
silent pause he added: “But sometimes the sea tide goes against the ship.”
The tide is nothing but the anger largely felt in the Muslim World, triggered by
events in Palestine, Iraq and President Bush’s ongoing “war on terror.”
“The
Gamaa’s leadership is trying to steer the wheel towards moderation, while the
global Islamist scene is going through radicalization,” said Rashwan. “It
should be no surprise that the transition would create some sort of turbulence
inside the group. The new ideas have not been swallowed up completely yet.”
Ideas
take time to absorb, but signs of the new breed of unorganized freelance jihadis
could mean there is not much space to maneuver. Since last January, and on a
nearly monthly basis, security has been announcing crackdowns on “jihadis,”
“takfiris” and “Qutbists” – ready-made categories, as analysts like
Salah and Rashwan believe – to try to qualify the new militant groups. Most of
the suspects have no political records, as their lawyers repeatedly announced.
Wouldn’t
resurgence in militant politics spill over to the Gamaa Islamiya? “Not to this
generation which leads the Gamaa, at least,” replied Zayat. “Maybe the
coming generations. Maybe.”
The
young cadres didn’t come in close contact with the middle or old
generations. |
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Rashwan
agrees. The old leadership and its loyal middle ranks, have been exhausted by
years of incarcerations, and could clearly see that violence was not leading
anywhere. On the contrary, the young cadres, more zealots by age, didn’t come
in close contact with the middle (let alone old) generation. They did not go
through the prison experience, as they were likely detained for short periods
but released for their then organizational unimportance.
A
split led by radical disillusioned youth, if it happens, will be the first major
incident in the Gamaa’s history, but can be very similar to other groups’
experiences.
“Such
[splinter] movements are usually motivated by youth, inside or outside
prison,” explained Zayat. “They seek an elder figure inside prison, who
would share their views. They’ll take him as a figurehead to gain legitimacy
or guidance, and would cluster their group around him. This is just what
happened in the case of Sayyed Qutb. It’s possible it may occur again.”
Gamaa
leaders, including the moderates, are aware of the possible risk. Asked by
Asharq Al-Awsat back in March 2002 on whether other violent groups were likely
to appear, Salah Hashem, the group's moderate original founder, said: “I hope no other groups would appear and drag us
to the cycle of violence, from which no one benefits but our enemies… The
Egyptian regime has to realize that, and help the Gamaa Islamiya to go out of
this period. We should be given the chance to practice daawa (preaching) so as
to achieve stability.”
Hossam
el-Hamalawy is an Egyptian
freelance journalist and writer based in
Cairo
. He contributes to several publications including the
Cairo
times and
Middle East
Times. His main fields of interest are militant Islam, social movements, and
human rights in
Egypt
. You can reach him at hhamalawy77@hotmail.com
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