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An
Earthquake in the Middle East
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“You know I had a drinking problem. Right now I should be in a bar
in Texas, not the Oval Office. There is only one reason that I am in
the Oval Office and not in a bar. I found faith. I found God.”1
– George W. Bush
*
“Every time we do something you tell me the Americans will do this
and will do that. I want to tell you something very clear; don’t
worry about American pressure on Israel [because] we, the Jewish
people control America, and the Americans know it.”2
- Ariel Sharon
A
new occupied Palestine is in the making. |
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The
decision by the US and its allies to withdraw a UN Security Council
resolution authorizing war after failing to win sufficient support
to pass it, and President Bush’s final ultimatum to Saddam Hussein
and his sons to leave their country within 48 hours, marked the end
of diplomacy and a new chapter in the history of regional and
international relations.3 For the
first time in its history the US was engaged in a war in pursuance
of a doctrine under which the US claims its right to attack nations
that have not attacked it, but who might, who could, who would, if
it does not strike first. In other words, it is “a war fought in
the subjunctive, based on a string of ‘ifs’.”4
Despite
the similar American ambitions in both the 1991 and 2003 Gulf Wars,
manifested in the US desire to secure oil reserves and restructure
the region on more favorable terms, there are many striking
differences between both wars.
The
1991 Gulf War was when the US took the lead in applying the UN's
collective security principle, leading a broad and diverse coalition
forged on the principle of protecting the sovereignty of a nation
that had been invaded by its neighbor.
The
2003 Gulf War signals an end to the collective security principle
and qualifies as a unilateral preemptive attack rather than a
response to any specific aggression – it is being launched without
UN authorization and over an unprecedented degree of opposition from
world public opinion and traditional allies. More importantly, the
new war threatens to bring a colonial mandate to a major Arab state5
– a new occupied Palestine, albeit a much larger one, in the
making.
The
Perils of War – The Afghan Experience Revisited
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Afghani
women visiting their dead in the cemetery |
The
World Health Organization (WHO) had estimated that 100,000 Iraqis
would be wounded and another 400,000 hit by disease after the
bombing of water and sewage facilities and the disruption of food
supplies. Although Iraq’s population, at 26 million, is almost the
same as Afghanistan’s, UN agencies say the effect of war in Iraq
could be much worse. Afghanistan is relatively rural and its people
have long traditions of coping mechanisms, whereas Iraq’s
population is highly urbanized with some 16 million depending on a
monthly “food basket” of basic goods supplied free by the Iraqi
government.
In
Afghanistan it is calculated that US bombing directly killed about
5,000 civilians and up to 20,000 others through the disruption of
drought relief and the bombing’s other indirect effects. It is
estimated that bombing in Iraq would probably produce similar
proportions of direct and indirect fatalities.6
Other reports suggest that roughly 10,000 Iraqi civilians will be
directly killed by US-UK bombing – more than three times greater
than those killed in the attacks of September 11th.7
After
wars, US troops remained for:
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57 years in Germany and Japan
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50 years in Korea
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5 years in Bosnia
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11 years in Saudi Arabia |
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Economists
predict that the economic costs of war would range between $100
billion and $1.9 trillion if the occupation drags on and US troops
never seem to come home. One only has to note that US troops
remained in Germany and Japan for more than 57 years after the end
of World War II, in Korea for 50 years after the end of the Korean
War, in Bosnia for 5 years after the end of the Yugoslav civil war,
and in Saudi Arabia 11 years after the end of the Second Gulf War.8
If
the presence of 10,000 US soldiers in Afghanistan is generating
resistance with hundreds of shooting and bombing incidents against
US troops, one can only speculate what the presence of more than
250,000 US soldiers would do in Iraq.9
The perception of the US as an occupying force in Iraq, its
unequivocal support for Israel and the daily images of civilian
casualties in Iraq and Palestine, is definitely bound to fuel Al-Qa’eda’s
cause. Another possibility is that a paramilitary movement would
develop from within Iraq itself aimed at fighting US occupation and
a possible US-imposed client regime.10
Afghanistan
was supposed to be the model for democratization and nation-building
that the US adopted when it went to war against Al-Qa’eda.
Statements from senior US officials were fraught with phrases such
as the “liberation of Afghanistan,” “the creation of
representative national institutions,” “human rights” and
“women’s rights.” Ironically, it seems that with the new focus
on Iraq, “Afghanistan has already dropped off the radar screen”
as Senator Joseph Bilden said in a meeting of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee that was addressed by Afghani President, Hamid
Karzai.
US
soldiers frequently open fire at hungry Afghani civilians to
scare them off. |
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According
to a UN report, women’s education was only slightly expanded in
Kabul with few women regaining their professional positions.
However, in all other cities and rural areas, women were afraid to
take new jobs and hardly any girls’ schools have been opened since
the fall of the Taliban. Other reports indicate that Afghanistan has
now become the world’s number one producer of opium and that
sexual molestation of children is on the rise. Very little has been
done to alleviate poverty in Afghanistan as US soldiers scuffle
everyday with hungry Afghans who show up to collect scraps of food
from the Baghram Air Base garbage dump. US soldiers frequently open
fire at hungry civilians to scare them off (sometimes using dogs)
and destroy the homes of locals when conducting house searches.11
In
terms of the prospects for stability in Iraq, one can only note that
the interim government of Afghanistan experienced the assassination
of a cabinet minister, a vice-president and at least two attempts on
the life of Hamid Karzai himself (known to be protected by 200
American soldiers).12 Last
month, when Hamid Karzai paid a visit to Washington to ask for
further aid, not a single question was asked to him by reporters,
and Bush’s 2003 budget plan did not even ask Congress for money
the US pledged this year for Afghanistan’s reconstruction.13
The
Middle East – The Day After
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With
the fall of Baghdad, a US Marine covers the face of Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein’s statue with the US flag in what
many observers considered a highly symbolic scene. |
The
US war on Iraq is a very precarious operation in which success is as
fearful as the prospect of failure. The “rubble of victory” will
now involve the economic burden of occupation, dealing with
competing ethnic and religious factions, and an outraged Islamic
world witnessing the first direct occupation of a major Arab country
in almost 50 years. The end of 24 years of Saddam’s centralized
order will definitely ignite sectarian struggles as multiple groups
with conflicting interests seek to fill in the power vacuum. Some
predict that the hundreds of thousands of US troops will, in effect,
become just another faction in that country’s violent politics.14
Neighboring countries would be drawn into a civil war to support one
of several Iraqi factions struggling for power.15
The result would be domestic anarchy and more regional instability
as a protracted civil conflict rages and mass refugee flows would
ensue.
The
Bush administration is characterized by the presence of a determined
and increasingly influential core of activist conservative foreign
policy ideologues promoting a doctrine of unabashed American empire
and advocating the preemptive projection of power to prevent the
emergence of any military challenges to American dominance.16
Grand designs on the Middle East and the idea of US unilateralism in
foreign affairs are not the product of today, but rather part of a
wider effort that sought to establish the 21st century as the
“American Century.”17
Shortly
after the 1991 Gulf War ended, Dick Cheney asked Paul Wolfowitz to
overhaul the Pentagon’s basic strategic-planning document, known
as the Defense Planning Guide, in which he called for the use of all
means necessary to prevent any challenges to the US by means of
preemptive action – most notably against Iraq and North Korea. For
pro-Israeli neo-conservatives, the issue of multilateralism in
international affairs or UN approval before military action is
insignificant. In 1998, Wolfowitz joined other neoconservatives in
signing a letter to Clinton arguing that “American policy cannot
continue to be crippled by a misguided insistence on unanimity in
the UN Security Council.” The signatories further argued that the
“the removal of Saddam Hussein and his regime from power…needs
to become the aim of American foreign policy.”18
Out of the 18 signatories of that letter, eight now hold senior
positions in the Bush administration.
The
US war on Iraq is Israel’s war by proxy. |
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The
radical transformation of the Middle East being considered by the
Bush administration involves the greatest prospect for change since
the notorious 1916 Sykes-Picot Treaty in which victorious Britain
and France carved up the Ottoman-ruled region. Now that the US has
overthrown Saddam Hussein, it will use its victory to redraw the map
of the Middle East, put it under permanent US control and establish
unrivalled control of its oil reserves. Washington’s most powerful
lobbies – for oil and Israel – are urging the US to seize Middle
East oil and crush any regional states that might challenge
Israel’s nuclear monopoly or regional dominance.19
In
many ways, the US war on Iraq is Israel’s war by proxy. In fact,
Israel is an important behind-the-scenes player in this war. US
military planners had pledged that Western Iraq, though to hold Scud
missile launchers that could reach Israel, would be one of the first
targets for US troops.
US
forces have been receiving insights on urban warfare from
the Israeli military. |
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US
officials had arranged to give Israeli military leaders access to
part of the Pentagon’s classified communications network so they
could monitor the war in real time.20
In return, US forces have been receiving insights on urban warfare
in an Arab context from the Israeli military. Close to 1,000 US
soldiers were sent to Israel for joint maneuvers at the beginning of
the year and others were sent to a mock Arab town in the Negev
desert to draw on Israeli experience in using bulldozers to demolish
homes and clear streets. Pentagon strategists have repeatedly
watched videos of Israel’s bloody military assault on Jenin and
have focused on learning Israeli tactics of blowing holes in houses
to facilitate house-to-house troop movements.21
Also, the US used Israeli-manufactured drones to reveal sensitive
information behind Iraqi front lines.
Iran
and Syria might be the next targets for the Likud-minded US
administration.
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On
the strategic front, Iran and Syria are the primary victims of a US
presence in Iraq, as they might be the next targets for the Likud-minded
US administration. It is no coincidence that in recent days, Bush
administration figures have repeatedly warned Syria and Iran – the
two remaining threats to Israel – of unpleasant consequences
should they not follow what Washington deems “acceptable patterns
of behavior.”22
Iran’s
strategic lifeline is already cut off given the presence of US
troops on all sides: the Gulf, Iraq and Afghanistan. Short of direct
military action, the US could work to encourage an uprising against
Iran’s Islamic regime, replacing it either with a royalist
government or one drawn from US-based Iranian exiles.23
Israel then would be able to pressure Syria to dismantle Hizbullah
and impose upon it a settlement that could lead to the withdrawal of
Syrian troops from Lebanon.24
Given the US threat of “regime change,” Syria would not be in a
position to resist Israeli troops in the Golan and American troops
in Iraq. The threat of an Israeli attack on Hizbullah forces that
involves an attack on Syrian troops in Southern Lebanon opens up the
prospect for an escalation of the conflict into a direct
Israeli-Syrian confrontation.25
In
addition, war on the Iraqi front would affect the internal cohesion
of the Syrian society, which presupposes the quiescence of the
Kurdish minority. The fragility of the Syrian economy is a factor
which will be adversely affected if the Iraqi oil and trade were to
be cut off. In such chaotic circumstances, Israel might seek to end
the “Palestinian problem,” once and for all, by implementing a
long-awaited plan, euphemistically called “transfer” by the
Israelis. Other ambitious designs on the region involve partitioning
Saudi Arabia and making the oil-rich Eastern province an American
protectorate.
Oil
– The Ultimate Prize
The
known reserves of oil in Iraq are greater than they were a
decade ago.
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All
of this must be put in the context of world oil trends where two
features are relevant. The first is that global oil demand will grow
1.6% annually through 2030, or increase to 120 million barrels of
oil a day (mb/d) from the current 75 (mb/d). By that time, the US
Department of Energy estimates that 53% of US petroleum supplies are
expected to come from OPEC, including 26% from the Persian Gulf
alone.26 The most promising area
for oil prospecting is the Persian Gulf region, and the oil that
appears available there is of a relatively high quality, is easily
recoverable so that production costs are low and is close to major
sea-lanes.27 The known reserves
of oil in Saudi Arabia and Iraq are both greater than they were a
decade ago in spite of substantial annual production from both
states – the discovery of new reserves is actually exceeding
production, in marked contrast to the situation in the United States
where domestic oil production will fall 12% over the next 20 years.28
Secondly,
new oil fields being discovered and developed outside the Middle
East tend to be small, expensive to develop, of relatively lower
quality and require high transportation costs.29
Within this outlook there lies the belief that the US occupation of
Iraq will ensure that other states in the region will acquiesce to
US interests in the face of this determination. Thus the region will
be made safe for the West in general and the United States in
particular. More importantly, there is a chance that another 100
billion barrels of oil lie undiscovered in Iraq’s western desert
and some estimates predict that Iraq’s oil wealth may well rival
that of Saudi Arabia. Hence, controlling Iraqi oil reserves would
enable the US to not only secure its increasing demands of oil, but
have a say in oil quantities going to China, which is expected to
double its imports by 2030, and the European Union, expected to
import 92% of its oil by the same time.30
Conclusions
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Israeli supremacy
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Fighting Islamism
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Oil
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The
regional fallout from the war on Iraq amounts to nothing less than a
political earthquake in the Middle East – a region already
suffering from years of bloodshed and warfare. The lines drawn in
the Middle East by old imperial European powers are now being
redrawn by the world’s newest imperial power, the United States.31
There is no doubt that the US has no intentions in establishing
democracy in the region or launching a war that would eventually
“win the peace.” The goals are the same: Israel’s supremacy,
oil, and fighting the rising tide of Islamism – the only language
of opposition in the region to America’s reign of terror. The
gruesome reality of US ambitions was understood by average Iraqis
who welcomed US troops with AK-47 rounds rather than with flowers.
Unfortunately, in their enthusiasm to topple Saddam, the hawks in
the US administration erred miserably when they based their
assumptions on unverified testimonies from Iraqi defectors who, in
turn, belittled the impact of the average Iraqi’s sense of loyalty
to his/her homeland when faced with invasion by infidel troops.32
The
US has mounted many coups in the Middle East to topple regimes in
Egypt, Iran and Iraq itself. It has used the second Gulf War to gain
permanent bases in the region. In Lebanon, it once shelled an Arab
capital and landed several hundred marines. But never has it
launched a full-scale invasion to overthrow a ruler in a major
country. Even in Latin America and the Caribbean, US interventions
were against weak opponents in small states.33
The scale of American forces involved in this invasion amounts to
nothing less than a repeat of the Mongol invasion of Baghdad in
1258, which led to the destruction of the glorious Arab Abbasid
Caliphate by the barbaric Mongol Hordes.34
Will history repeat itself? The moment of truth will come, sooner
rather than later.
Kareem
M. Kamel is an Egyptian freelance writer based in Cairo,
Egypt. He has an MA in International Relations and is
specialized in security studies, decision-making, nuclear
politics, Middle East politics and the politics of Islam. He is
currently assistant to the Political Science Department at the
American University in Cairo.
1-
Jack Beatty, “In
the Name of God,” The Atlantic Online March 5th,
2003
2-
Samuel Francis, “World
War IV,” Chronicles December 2002
3-
Tony Karon, “Bush Writes His Own History,” Time.com
March 17th, 2003
4-
Jack Beatty, “In
the Name of God,” The Atlantic Online March 5th,
2003
5-
Tony Karon, “Bush Writes His Own History,” Time.com
March 17th, 2003
6-
Jonathan Steele, “Counting the Dead,” Guardian January 29th,
2003
7-
Paul Rogers, “Iraq:
Consequences,” Oxford Research Group: Briefing Paper October
2002
8-
Jack Beatty, “The
Road Better Not Taken,” The Atlantic Online February 5th,
2003
9-
Zvi Bar’el, “Flaws in the Afghan Model,” Ha’aretz March
20th, 2003
10-
Paul Rogers, “Iraq:
Consequences,” Oxford Research Group: Briefing Paper October
2002
11-
Zvi Bar’el, “Flaws in the Afghan Model,” Ha’aretz
March 20th, 2003
12-
Paul Rogers, “Iraq:
Consequences,” Oxford Research Group: Briefing Paper
October 2002
13-
Johanna McGeary, “Looking Beyond Saddam,” Time.com
March 2nd, 2003
14-
Scott Macleod, “What the Arab Silence Means,” Time.com
March 18th, 2003
15-
Ali Ansari, et al. “Iraq:
The Regional Fallout,” The Royal Institute of International
Affairs: Briefing Paper 2 February 2003
16-
Tony Karon, “Bush Writes His Own History,” Time.com
March 17th, 2003
17-
Paul Rogers, “Political Violence and the Global Order,” in Ken
Booth and Tim Dunne, eds. Worlds in Collision: Terror and the
Future of Global Order (Palgrave: New York, 2002): 220.
18-
Michael Elliot and James Carney, “First Stop, Iraq,” Time.com
March 23rd, 2003
19-
Eric Margolis, “Bush’s Mideast Plan: Divide and Conquer,” Toronto
Sun December 8th, 2002
20-
Carla Anne Robbins and Karby Leggett, “How
the US Plans to Keep Israel on Iraq War Sidelines,” Wall
Street Journal March 3rd, 2003
21-
Chris McGreal, “Send
in the Bulldozers: What Israel Told Marines About Urban Battles,”
The Guardian April 2nd, 2003
22-
Leader, “Wider
Still and Wider: American Tactics are Helping Saddam,” The
Guardian April 2nd, 2003
23-
Eric Margolis, “Bush’s Mideast Plan: Divide and Conquer,” Toronto
Sun December 8th, 2002
24-
“There’s
a Catch for Israel if the US Strikes Iraq: Report” IslamOnline.net
August 30th, 2002
25-
Ali Ansari, et al. “Iraq:
The Regional Fallout,” The Royal Institute of International
Affairs: Briefing Paper 2 February 2003
26-
Mark Schoeff Jr., “Middle
East Oil Resources,” Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS) March 17th, 2003
27-
Paul Rogers, “Iraq:
Consequences,” Oxford Research Group: Briefing Paper
October 2002
28-
Michael Renner, “Post-Saddam
Iraq: Linchpin of a New Oil Order,” Foreign Policy in Focus
January 2003
29-
Mark Schoeff Jr., “Middle
East Oil Resources,” Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS) March 17th, 2003
30-
Michael Renner, “Post-Saddam
Iraq: Linchpin of a New Oil Order,” Foreign Policy in Focus
January 2003
31-
Eric Margolis, “Bush’s Mideast Plan: Divide and Conquer,” Toronto
Sun December 8th, 2002
32-
Dilip Hero, “Why
2003 is not 1991,” The Guardian April 1st,
2003
33-
Jonathan Steele, “Read
the Small Print: The US Wants to Privatize Iraq’s Oil,” The
Guardian March 31st, 2003
34-
Husain Haqqani, “The
American Mongols,” Foreign Policy Online Special
Preview of the May/June 2003 issue
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