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The Arab official system suffers from a serious fault. It is precisely this fault that is leading others calmly to try and swallow us up bit by bit, realizing that the different parties to this system do not appreciate the importance of agreeing to a common vision and adopting a hardened and strong stance that is able to say “No” to others. It is precisely this that has allowed Washington – the capital of the new global empire – to offer strong support to the Zionist entity in its war against the Palestinians, and is now allowing it to pick on Iraq… Can the Arab nation simply say “no”, just as North Korea – the current symbol of defiance against the US – is saying so ably?¹ - Al-‘Azab al-Tayyib al-Tahir/al-Rayah Newspaper

From the Franco-African Summit in Paris to the Non-Aligned Movement Summit in Kuala Lumpur, and from the Arab Summit in Sharm El Sheikh to the Islamic Summit in Doha, successive summits have been held in more than one place and under more than one banner, with only one topic in mind: the impending war on Iraq and ways for a peaceful resolution of the US-Iraqi crisis. Meanwhile, President Bush spelled out his “grand vision” for Iraq: a brutalized land remade by war in the American colors of democracy, prosperity and peace.

Bush’s promise extended to the entire Middle East, where “the dramatic and inspiring example of Iraq’s liberation would set a new stage for Middle Eastern peace” and “show the power of freedom to transform that vital region by bringing hope and progress into the lives of millions.” Behind the rosy talk about positive transformation and a messianic “domino effect” spearheaded by a US invasion of Iraq, one has to only note how Afghanistan was forgotten after it was “liberated” – the fact that Bush’s 2003 budget did not even ask Congress for money the US had pledged this year for Afghanistan’s reconstruction.²

Many reports indicated that the US planned to hit Iraq with ten times as many bombs in the opening days of the air campaign as in the 1991 Gulf War.³ Other reports pointed to US plans for an open-ended occupation of Iraq that involves a US civilian administration backed by hundreds of thousands of troops to provide security and keep Iraq’s rival ethnic, religious, and tribal factions in check.⁴ General Tommy Franks would have total control of the country while some Iraqi Americans (most of whom hardly speak Arabic) would be placed as advisors in vital Iraqi ministries to handle day-to-day activities and report to Franks.⁵

In an alarming step, Bush administration officials are seriously considering proposals that the US tap into Iraq’s oil to help pay the cost of a military occupation which is estimated to cost between $12 billion to $48 billion, lasting for nearly two years or more.⁶

Meanwhile, Israel urged the US to begin a war on Iraq in order to send a powerful signal to Damascus and Tehran. Israeli Defense Minister, Shaul Mofaz, told members of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations that after Iraq, the United States should generate political, economic and diplomatic pressure on Iran, since Israel has a “great interest in shaping the Middle East the day after the war.”⁷

Despite all the signals indicating that the Middle East was headed towards an impending disaster with the devastation of the current Arab system for generations to come, it was clear from the start that the simple idea of having an Arab summit would represent a major challenge to the official Arab system – already in disagreement as to what form the summit would take and when it would be held.

Between the positions that called for an emergency Arab summit and those that saw no point in holding it in the first place, a simple and logical conclusion followed: The advocates of both positions were unconcerned with the grave dangers that threatened the region.⁸

The aura of confusion and disagreement was exemplified by the shifting position of President Mubarak, whose country was to host the Arab Summit in Sharm El Sheikh. Initially, President Mubarak declared that the Arabs cannot prevent or postpone the next war on Iraq, and that therefore there is no point in holding an emergency, or even ordinary, Arab summit.⁹

Later on, however, President Mubarak called for an emergency Arab summit at the Arab League’s headquarters in Cairo. While the summit achieved verbal consensus concerning the idea of rejecting an attack on Iraq, it ended with serious divisions among Arab ranks as to how that would be achieved. The Gulf position, represented by the Emirates delegation, was very vocal in its call for Saddam Hussein to step down. Sheikh Zayed’s letter said that the “entire Iraqi leadership must step down and leave Iraq with all the appropriate advantages within two weeks of adopting this Arab initiative.” It called upon the Arab League and the United Nations to govern Iraq until it could return to “its normal situation according to the will of the brotherly Iraqi people.” The Egyptian and Jordanian positions did not issue such calls, but called upon Iraq to abide by international resolutions in order to avoid war. Privately, however, Arab diplomats said the idea of getting Saddam to step down has been under informal discussion.¹⁰

In contrast, Syrian President Bashar Assad openly accused the US of seeking to secure Iraq’s oil and redraw the region’s map and destroy Iraq’s infrastructure. Assad commented: “We are all targeted… we are all in danger.”¹¹ Syria felt that war can only be averted if the Arabs deny the United States the use of their territory to stage an assault on Iraq. What caught the most attention was the exchange of heated comments between Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi and Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz. Gaddafi charged that the Kingdom had announced its readiness to “strike an alliance with the devil” to defend the Kingdom after Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Crown Prince Abdullah interrupted his statement saying: “You are a liar and your grave awaits you.” ¹²

Can Arab leaders fulfill their people’s expectations in a time like this?

Despite facing a common threat, why are Arab leaders always divided and incompetent? What is the reason behind Arab disagreement? Can the official Arab system ever overcome its differences or is it always doomed to failure? Can Arab leaders be expected to fulfill their people’s expectations at such a critical historical juncture?

Due to structural deficiencies and compounded problems that plagued the official Arab system for decades, it is highly unlikely that it would ever be able to face up to challenges. The Arab world is reaping the results of years of ad-hoc policies, internal fragility, lack of a strategic doctrine, and the total absence of institutionalized decision-making. Decisions are always made in an ad-hoc fashion and are subject to the whims and idiosyncrasies of individual Arab leaders.

Even Arab differences are not the result of clear-cut conflict of national interest, but rather the diverging personal perceptions of ailing leaders. More specifically, the decision-making structure in most Arab states involves an authoritative decision-maker acting alone, with little or no consultation with other people or institutions except for a small group of subordinate advisors entirely dependent on him for the continuance of their present position. These advisors have no independent power base and no role that permits them to regularly obtain information on foreign affairs different from the decision-maker they serve.¹³

“National security” in the Arab world means the physical survival of a regime.

In a state-centric world, the principal goals of every state should be the preservation of territorial integrity and physical security. On the contrary, in the Arab context, “national security” usually refers to the physical survival of a regime. Given the absence of institutions to solve disputes and the lack of regime legitimacy, the Arab political order often becomes a zero-sum contest between regimes and elites often supported and manipulated by the West on one hand, and general society and popular sentiment on the other. As a result, the unitary concept of “national interest” itself loses much significance in the Arab political lexicon, due to the conflicting dichotomy between regime interests, the security of tenure of existing authorities, and societal interests, the collective interests of the community.¹⁴

“National interest” is either “regime interest” or “societal interest.”

The Arab predicament was historically compounded by the carving up of the Arab parts of the Ottoman Empire after World War I by Western powers and the forced establishment of a Jewish homeland in the heart of the Middle East. This led to the creation of arbitrary state entities with total disregard to the sensitivities of the region’s inhabitants. It created a dilemma between the individual securities of the Arab states and those of the Arab community or the Ummah as a whole. Hence, the tension between Arab elites upholding the state-centric logic and the majority of the citizens rejecting the Western imposed order and calling for the supremacy of the Ummah and its communal interests.

Nothing could be more indicative of the failure of the Arab system to deal with crises, than the official Arab reaction to the events of September 11^th and its aftermath. Rather than using this event to highlight Muslim suffering and the need to readdress Muslim sensitivities across the globe, the reaction of Arab leaders was hesitant, naïve, and simplistic as they all scoured to condemn “terrorism.” Surprisingly, Arab leaders helped rationalize the US backlash by immediately accepting the blame even before any concrete evidence was produced linking Arabs to the event in the first place. This automatically put Arabs on the defensive as the list of US demands grew bigger every day and Arab compliance was requested, and granted, on every occasion.

“We don’t blame the United States.”

Unlike Turkey, which indicated that it would support a war on Iraq only if the US provided it with $30 billion in financial aid,¹⁵ Arab support came for free all the time. Israel continued to kill and persecute Palestinians everyday, yet Arab leaders failed on every occasion to put any sort of pressure on their ally, the US, to force Israel to accept any kind of resolution. Once again, Arab leaders were on the slippery slope of never-ending concessions to their patron and supporter, the United States.

The wording of the statement issued by the Organization of Islamic States, which met at Doha, Qatar in October 2001, was indicative of the extent of Arab leaders’ support for the US. In perhaps the closest expression of outright support for the US, the spokesman for the conference, the Qatar foreign minister, Sheikh Hamad bin Jasim bin Jabir al-Thani, said the raids into Afghanistan were understandable: “We don't blame the United States, because what happened in the United States is a big tragedy… Six thousand people were killed in one day, and they were killed by terrorist action.” Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal of Saudi Arabia told reporters that Muslim states wanted to help “eradicate terrorism, which harms the Islamic world and Islamic causes and has never served the Palestinian cause.”¹⁶ Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Maher said at a gathering at the American University in Cairo that “Egypt stands in solidarity with the United States in the fight against terrorism.”¹⁷

For the first time since the Intifada began, Palestinian policemen shot down their own people with live ammunition.¹⁸ The confrontation started when Palestinians rallied in the thousands to support Osama bin Laden and denounce the US attacks on Afghanistan. Yasir Arafat, fearing he would lose the sympathy of President George W. Bush, ordered a crackdown. Three Palestinians were dead and more than 50 were injured in clashes.¹⁹ Most Gulf States allowed their territory to become a launch pad for attacks on Afghanistan, and almost all Arab states shared intelligence with the United States.

Conclusions

The weakest reaction to US hegemonic designs is from the Arab regimes.

As the US prepares for war on Iraq and threatens a radical transformation in the region, international anti-war public opinion grows stronger everyday. France, Russia and China are working hard to counterbalance increasing American belligerency in order to save their prestige and their position in the world hierarchy of power – a position which would be greatly undermined if the US launches a war on Iraq without UN consent.

Yet no other region is as much threatened by the proposed attack on Iraq as the Arab world is. No other nation will face direct political, economic and social transformation by an invading Western power. No other nation will be forced to hand over its resources to a foreign power or allow its territory to be redrawn by a president who talks openly about restructuring “the future of the Muslim world.”²⁰ Ironically, the weakest response to US hegemonic designs came from the official Arab system. If all of the above does not constitute a threat and a wake up call to the now defunct official Arab system, what does?

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Kareem M. Kamel is an Egyptian freelance writer based in Cairo, Egypt. He has an MA in International Relations and is specialized in security studies, decision-making, nuclear politics, Middle East politics and the politics of Islam. He is currently assistant to the Political Science Department at the American University in Cairo.

1- Al-‘Azab al-Tayyib al-Tahir, “What do the Arabs Want?” Al-Rayah but quoted from Mideast Mirror February 25^th, 2003

2- Johanna McGeary, “Looking Beyond Saddam,” Time.com March 2^nd, 2003

3- Robert Burns, “US Plans Heavy Bombing Campaign in Iraq,” Associated Press March 5^th, 2003

4- Robin Wright, “Hussein’s Successor Might Be the US,” LA Times February 28^th, 2003

5- Johanna McGeary, “Looking Beyond Saddam,” Time.com March 2^nd, 2003

6- Knut Royce, “Plan: Tap Iraq’s Oil,” Newsday January 10^th,2003

7- James Bennet, “Israel Says War on Iraq Would Benefit the Region,” New York Times February 27^th, 2003

8- Sati’e Noureddin, “Summitry and the Arab Predicament,” from As-Safir but quoted from Mideast Mirror February 27^th, 2003.

9- Abdelbari Atwan, “Mubarak Changes His Mind,” al-Quds al-Arabi, quoted from Mideast Mirror, “The Arab Political System Fails…. Again,” February 18^th, 2003

10- “Saddam Urged to Step Down At Arab Summit,” Associated Press March 1^st, 2003

11- “Summit Shows Sharp Divisions on Iraq,” Associated Press March 1^st, 2003

12- Bilal Abdul-Kareem, “Internal Strife and Old Rhetoric at the Arab League’s Summit,” Jihad Unspun March 3^rd, 2003

13- Charles F. Hermann, “Decision Structure and Process Influences on Foreign Policy,” in Maurice East, Stephen Salmore, and Charles Hermann, eds. Why Nations Act: Theoretical Perspectives for Foreign Policy Studies (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1978): 80

14- Bahgat Korany, Rex Brynen, and Paul Noble, “The Analysis of National Security in the Arab Context: Restating the State of the Art,” in The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993): 9.

15- Tony Karon, “Is Saddam a Menace or a Nuisance,” Time.com February 19^th, 2003

16- Kifner, John. “56 Islamic Nations Avoid Condemning U.S. Attacks, but Warn on Civilian Casualties,” New York Times October 11, 2001

17- MacFarquhar, Neil. “Anger Smolders in the Streets, Arab Governments Temper Remarks,” New York Times October 9, 2001

18- Fisher, Ian. “Arafat's Policemen Kill Two Protesters Against U.S. Strike,” New York Times October 9, 2001

19- “Clash of Palestinians, Police Turns Fatal,” The Arizona Republic October 9, 2001: A7

20- Johanna McGeary, “Looking Beyond Saddam,” Time.com March 2^nd, 2003

The articles posted on this page reflect solely the opinions of the authors.

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