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Iraq Now, North Korea Later
Strategic Incoherence or Rational Thinking?
Why
is Washington leading the world toward war in the Middle East,
where Saddam is appearing to allow weapons inspectors free rein,
while playing down the threat from the already armed and
uncooperative Kim? If nuclear, biological and chemical weapons
are the greatest threats facing mankind – and Bush ‘will not
wait on events while dangers gather’, as he declared a year
ago – why now send a new message that North Korea can wait?1
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Richarde Wolffe, et al., Newsweek
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North Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear facility |
As
the world continues to watch the massive military buildup of US
forces in the Gulf, North Korea’s startling confession that it
was developing nuclear weapons and was willing to respond to any
US attack by unleashing a “sea of fire” caught strategic
experts off guard. International media has been inundated with
commentary contrasting the approaches the Bush administration is
taking towards eliminating weapons of mass destruction in Baghdad
and Pyongyang.2
While
both Iraq and North Korea are members of President Bush’s “axis
of evil,” the US administration’s approach towards Iraq
emphasized muscular options: either unfettered access to weapons
sites and full compliance to US dictates or forceful regime change
involving full scale invasion. In contrast, from the very beginning,
a diplomatically-oriented strategy was taken towards North Korea.3
These
inconsistent policies have prompted many to point out the irony of
advocating military action against Iraq, which has not yet proven
its possession of weapons of mass destruction, and diplomacy towards
North Korea, which already boasts possessing or developing them.
Before
the current crisis erupted, US-North Korean relations were
officially guided by the so-called 1994 Agreed
Framework Deal signed between President Bill Clinton and
Korean President Kim Jong Il, in which Washington promised to
provide North Korea with heavy fuel oil and food aid as well as help
build nuclear energy plants in exchange for Pyongyang’s promise to
shut down its nuclear weapons program.4
The
new North Korean posture began in December 12th, 2002, when it
announced it would restart a shuttered nuclear reactor at Yongbyon,
the one covered by the terms of 1994 agreement. North Korea is
believed to possess one or two nuclear weapons and probably has
enough fuel at the Yongbyon reactor to produce about five to six
nuclear weapons by the end of the year.5 In late December, North
Korea expelled representatives of the International Atomic Energy
Agency who were monitoring the Yongbyon facility and threatened to
restart its plutonium-based nuclear program. Kim Jong Il seemed
prepared to renounce the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, or NPT,
which his country had signed in 1985.
North
Korea’s Motivation
Projecting
power through uncertainty
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One
of the points of strength in North Korean diplomacy is its ability
to project power through uncertainty. The aura of mystery and
unpredictability that shrouds the North Korean leadership and its
intentions keeps the world guessing as to what the true motives of
that country really are.6 This makes its opponents reluctant to
provoke it as they are unsure of the possible consequences.
It
is difficult to precisely discern the exact motivation behind North
Korea’s recent moves. What is certain, however, is that North
Korea has been alarmed by the Bush administration’s “axis of
evil” rhetoric, its continuous threats against Iraq, and the new
US doctrine of preemption.7 Its nuclear admission could be
intended as a response to a hard-line shift in US policy and a
warning to the US against preemptive action.8
It
could also be a way in which North Korea would be able to extract
economic aid and other political concessions on more favorable terms
from the United States through some sort of negotiated compromise.
North Korea tends to take an extreme stance before entering talks,
so that any slight concession is seized by its opponents as a sign
of progress.9 It employed the same type of nuclear brinkmanship
in 1994 when it forced the Clinton administration to negotiate face
to face and sign the Agreed Framework. Even Madeleine Albright
eventually went to Pyongyang for talks with Kim.
International
and Regional Dimensions
The
US-North Korea interplay masks competition between the US
and China.
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The
cohesiveness of any regional system is a very important factor in
assessing the chances of success for an intrusive actor like the US.
In contrast to a fragmented Middle East, where most Arab regimes
lack a strategic doctrine, compete amongst themselves to gain US
favor, and face very little organized opposition to their
activities, the regional environment in East Asia is vastly
different and clearly not in favor of the US. This has made the
simple task of intensifying political and economic pressure on North
Korea, let alone war, all the more difficult for the Bush
administration. Russia and China have vowed not to assist the US in
any confrontational stance against North Korea. Russia, which
already sells military equipment to North Korea, suggested that
“attempts to isolate North Korea can only lead to a new escalation
of tension.”10 Another Security Council member, China, now
provides North Korea with food, energy supplies and aid. The Chinese
fear a refugee crisis on their borders should the situation in North
Korea deteriorate.11
From
a strategic perspective, North Korea’s defiance and continued
existence protect China from a Korean Peninsula wholly controlled by
the US.12 China is aware that one of the critical US objectives
in Asia is to prevent the rise of a hegemonic center of power
(either one dominant state or a combination of states acting in
unison) capable of dominating the Asian land mass.13 Under such
circumstances, the relative power position of the US in
international politics would decline and America’s global
economic, political, and military reach would be impeded.14
A
defiant North Korea allied with China poses a strategic threat to
American assets in Asia and, by extension, to US global hegemony,
should the balance of power between the US and China tilt to the
latter’s favor. Hence, the interplay between the US and North
Korea masks a more hideous competition for regional, and possibly
global, dominance between the US and China.
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South Koreans protest US policy outside US embassy in Seoul. |
Recent
history has shown how difficult it is for the US to maintain
regional support for action in North Korea. In 1994, when the North
refused to comply with international inspection of its nuclear
facilities, the United States sought to impose sanctions on it. But
the sanctions were resisted, not only by China (which would have
vetoed any attempt to impose them through the UN Security Council),
but also by Japan, which was reluctant to curb remittances to the
North from Koreans in Japan and argued that such a coercive strategy
was premature.15
Even
in this current crisis, South Korea – a major US ally – played
down US containment efforts, suggesting that engagement and dialogue
were “the best means to address issues with the north.”16
Both North and South Korea have been engaged in normalization
activities and efforts for the past two years aimed at unifying the
peninsula under the so-called “sunshine” policy. Any US attempt
to intervene militarily in the affairs of the peninsula are largely
cast in a negative light by local Koreans.
Anti-US
protests in South Korea have therefore drawn thousands to
candlelight vigils, and many students attacked US bases with
firebombs.17 South Korean President elect – Roh Moo Hyun –
who made the immoral conduct of US troops a major theme in his
campaign, spoke at one rally beneath a banner that read “Yankee Go
Home.”18 Coffee shops, restaurants, and bars have banned
American GIs from entering with signs branding them as
“murderers.” This happened after two US soldiers charged with
negligent homicide in the deaths of two Korean high school girls
were acquitted in a military court.19 According to a recent poll
by the Korea Times, many respondents viewed US troops as a source of
tension on the Korean peninsula.20 The young voters who elected
Roh do not see American troops as saviors, but rather as an
occupying force and believe peace with the north could easily come
about, if only Washington would stop meddling.21
The
Military/Strategic Dimension
North
Korea can mobilize a force three times the size Iraq can.
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The
US administration has currently ruled out the use of military force
against North Korea due to the latter’s military being much
stronger than that of Iraq and hence exerting a deterrent effect on
the US. Strategic experts estimate that North Korea can mobilize a
force three times the size Iraq can.22 Unclassified US
intelligence reports state that North Korea has mass produced
chemical weapons, including mustard, phosgene, sarin, and nerve
gases.23 It is believed to have thousands of bombs, artillery
shells, and multiple rocket launcher warheads that are chemically
armed, and able to attack Seoul and much of South Korea’s
industrial base.24
Pyongyang
commands an army of 1.1 million soldiers and 4.7 million reserves in
addition to hundreds of short range SCUD ballistic missiles capable
of delivering chemical and biological payloads to South Korea.25
Some 37,000 US troops are stationed south of the border that divides
the Korean Peninsula, making them “potential sitting ducks” if
the North launched an attack.26
The
Iraqi military currently has one-third of its Gulf War II
strength.
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North
Korea also has three longer-range missiles already developed or in
their final stages: The No-Dong (1,000 km range), Taepo Dong (1,500
km-plus range [can bypass US and Japanese air defenses]) and the
Taepo Dong 2 (4,000-6,000 km range – [can reach Guam or Alaska]).27 North Korean war games and exercises emphasize
infiltration and sophisticated covert attacks such that “no other
force in the world is better organized for covert and asymmetrical
warfare.”28 It has a unique force structure of some 88,000
men in its Special Purpose Forces Command, including an 8 battalion
special reconnaissance force, 5 airborne brigades, 2 amphibious
brigades, 6 sniper brigades, 9 light infantry brigades, and 17
reconnaissance battalions.29
In
contrast, Iraqi military power has been isolated and is hemmed into
the middle of that country. It cannot easily attack US troops or US
allies in the region since it has been facing constant US and UK
combat air patrols flying from nearby bases for more than a decade,
enforcing no-fly zones over its northern and southern areas.30 In
addition, the Iraqi military currently has about one-third of its
Gulf War II strength, with almost 389,000 troops compared to some
950,000 in 1991.31 Moreover, most of its biological and chemical
weapons were destroyed after the War.32
Conclusions
More
countries realize the effectiveness of the nuclear
bargaining chip in dealing with superpowers.
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The
current crisis illustrated the inability of the Bush doctrine, with
its emphasis on preemption and constant reliance on military power,
to deal with all types of threats wherever they may be. While the
choice to use diplomacy with North Korea and force with Iraq is
generally guided by rational strategic concerns due to multiple
geostrategic differences in each case, the current crisis showed the
incoherence of the Bush doctrine and its shortcomings. It also
showed the failure of the US-led nonproliferation regime to address
the security interests of many new or would be proliferators, since
countries are beginning to realize that nuclear weapons are much
needed guarantors of security and effective bargaining chips in
dealing with superpowers. Hence, the benefits from acquiring nuclear
weapons for many developing countries like India, Pakistan, and now,
North Korea, seem to outweigh the costs.
International
politics is often about timing and trigger points for action.33 North Korea managed to choose the proper timing for
action amidst a US administration that is divided among itself and
faces an unfinished war in Afghanistan and a crisis in Iraq.34
North Korean behavior also exposed the limits of US military power
when faced with a determined nuclear armed adversary and a regional
and international setting not in its favor. Despite being one of the
world’s poorest and most isolated countries, North Korea has
vividly illustrated that power is not an absolute concept and a
smaller state can challenge a superpower, if it knows how and when
to use its limited capabilities and exploit the regional and
international setting to its favor – another lesson for the Arab
and Muslim world.
Kareem M. Kamel is an Egyptian freelance writer
based in Cairo, Egypt. He has an MA in International Relations
and is specialized in security studies, decision-making,
nuclear politics, Middle East politics and the politics of
Islam. He is currently assistant to the Political Science
Department at the American University in Cairo.
[34]
Steven R.Weisman, “News Analysis: White House Split Over North
Korea,” The New York Times January 13th, 2003.
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