|
North
Korea’s Death Wish?
|
|
|
A
North Korean soldier at the border village of Panmunjom
|
As
the world watched the US sharpen its rhetoric against Iraq, US
officials, in October 2002, said Pyongyang admitted to a State
Department envoy that it had been pursuing another nuclear arms
program based on enriched uranium.
Since
then, the world has been witnessing a flurry of hostile messages
between Washington and Pyongyang, dubbed part of Bush’s famous
“axis of evil,” along with Iraq, and Iran. One, however, cannot
help but be surprised, to say the least, at North Korea’s suicidal
attitude.
After
their surprise announcement, the US cried foul and suspended a 1994
deal to give fuel to the energy-starved state, in return for the
latter’s quitting their quest for nuclear weapons. However,
Pyongyang reacted defiantly, to put it mildly, and took a series of
rapid steps, in one direction, towards full escalation with the only
superpower.
Digging
the reasons behind North Korea’s apparent defiance, observers and
analysts came up with some theories that may shed light on the
stance of a poor country, under isolation for more than four decades
now.
Fear
The
first theory, according to some observers, focuses on the fears that
North Korea has developed since June 2002, when Bush declared his
famous “axis of evil” term, followed by the “pre-emptive
strike” policy. According to holders of the theory of fear,
Pyongyang, watching the US’ uncontrolled threats against Iraq,
massing up troops to invade Baghdad, came to the conclusion that
they were the next prey.
Putting
into consideration the hostile nature of the Bush administration,
following 9/11 attacks, North Korea had to find a way out of what
appeared to be a military standoff in the making. Therefore, and
instead of waiting for the inevitable to come, Pyongyang chose to
resort to the cliff-hanger policy, at a time they deemed
appropriate; as Washington and the whole world were looking at one
direction: Baghdad.
According
to the “fear” observers, North Korea, once it started the
standoff and came across a tough American diplomatic campaign,
became sure that there is no turning back now. Therefore, seeking a
nuclear weapon, to hide behind in any future settlement seemed the
best option available. Once they have nukes, the Americans will
think twice, to say the least, before pulling the trigger.
In
light of this conclusion, explaining the fast pace of developments
can be an easy job; expelling the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) experts, removing the monitoring equipment from its nuclear
facilities, moves described by the Americans as “dangerous,
unprecedented, irresponsible and unilateral actions that exacerbate
its long-standing non-compliance.”
Moreover,
press reports, leaked by North Korea two weeks ago, said Pyongyang
needed only 30 days to actually produce nukes. Some analysts
dismissed the reports as “exaggerations,” while others viewed
them as a way to get the Americans to “sit and talk now.”
Anyway,
almost 10 weeks into the crisis now, every party is trying to
convince North Korea, via diplomacy (unlike the case in Iraq), to
comply with the international community’s resolutions, and give up
their nuclear aspirations.
No
Catch
|
|
|
In the streets of Pyongyang |
Other
observers have another theory that could, however, be linked to the
theory of fear; namely that North Korea actually has no catch for
the US to “mass up troops and fight a war.” Unlike oil-rich
Iraq, North Korea has no resources to cover up for the high price of
a strike. So the only motive for the Americans to push hard for a
military showdown, according to such observers, could be scoring an
easy and quick victory.
However,
that, too, is highly doubtful. There is even a slim chance that the
North Korea actually possesses nukes. Pyongyang, for sure, is aware
of such odds.
Holders
of such a theory go even further to say that North Korea is the
party that is trying to blackmail Washington, making use of the
current global circumstances. Pyongyang is the party looking for a
catch; at least to sign a non-aggression pact, along with a higher
share of energy.
Diplomacy
as a One & Only Option
Having
touched briefly on the development of the crisis, reasons or fears
behind North Korea’s defiance, it is only logic to look at the
other side of the crisis, before drawing conclusions, or trying to
visualize how the crisis may be wrapped.
Immediately
after North Korea’s confession, in October 2002, the US froze its
talks with Pyongyang, and also froze fuel shipments, in line with
the 1994 deal, to the fuel-starved state. However, it was very clear
that Washington’s stance is restricted to “diplomacy only.”
Even
when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, on December 23, issued a
clear threat to Pyongyang, bragging that “the US can handle two
conflicts at one time,” all other senior officials in Washington
were quick to assert one message; “war for Iraq, diplomacy for
North Korea.” Then Bush made it clear and declared the crisis with
Pyongyang is not “a military showdown, but a diplomatic
stand-off.”
This
is a clear contradiction, to say the least. Bush has two enemies;
both fall within his “axis of evil,” both are rogue states, both
are accused of a “bad human rights record and bad governance,”
both are accused of seeking mass destruction weapons. However, one
of them denies the possession of any banned weapons, opens its
borders and sites to what some call “humiliating inspections,”
and even defies the US Intelligence Agency (CIA) to come up with any
evidence to the opposite.
The
other enemy, on the other hand, voluntarily admits seeking nuclear
weapons in the past, then dismisses IAEA experts and removes
monitoring equipment, and declares it is about to actually possess
nukes.
Sound
logic dictates that diplomacy should be employed with the first
party (that happens to be Iraq), while military is the only option
for the second (North Korea). The US does the opposite.
In
trying to explain such contradiction, some observers say that
Washington could never be pushed into a nuclear confrontation, thus
economic and diplomatic sanctions are the only options available.
Others, however, come up with other reasons to explain the bizarre
situation.
Washington
wants to finish the job in the Gulf area first and then focus on
North Korea, to make sure whether Pyongyang has actually produced
any lethal nukes. However, all the signs, so far, indicate that
Washington is not likely to change course in handling the Pyongyang
crisis.
The
question remains: how could such a standoff be contained?
Most
analysts believe that North Korea will keep its defiance, forcing
the United States to eventually blink first. A compromise is seen
possible, as long as the US is defied by a state that realized
before it was too late that the current US administration listens
only to the logic of power, even though it talks too much about
democracy, freedom, and human rights.
By
deciding to preserve its right to survive, North Korea may have just
proven to the whole world, Arabs in particular, that there is always
a way, for the poor, to survive in a world governed by the logic of
power.
Khaled
Mamdouh is an editor and staff writer in the News Desk of
IslamOnline. He is also a radio announcer, journalist and translator
for several Arabic magazines
|
