|
Iran: Democracy Deepens
By Omer bin Abdullah
12/06/2001
President Mohammad Khatami of Iran, hailing his crushing victory as one for a just model of society based on religion and morality alongside democracy and freedom, has pledged to "deepen democracy".
With just under 77% of the vote - even higher than in his landslide victory 4 years ago - Khatami returns to office with a clear and strong mandate to promote his "reformist" agenda. The Iranian constitution, however, gives considerable power to religious authorities by allowing Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, to control the armed forces and appoint the judiciary chief, the head of the state broadcasting monopoly, and other non-elected offices.
The turnout of voters was about 10% lower than in the previous presidential election, with roughly 1 million voters staying away. Some observers allocate this to disappointment at the slow pace of change during Khatami's first term. Khatami's nearest rival - one of nine mostly independent conservatives - was Ahmad Tavakoli, who only received about 16% of the vote.
If Khatami had come back with a reduced mandate, his conservative critics would have claimed that his popularity had dwindled and that he should be taken even less seriously.
But the Iranian people, once again, appear to have signaled in unmistakable terms their earnest desire for change. Some of the reformist groups openly backing Khatami declared that by voting, the public would be choosing which incarnation of the Islamic republic it wants; be it the "sovereignty of the people, in keeping with our Islamic values and culture" as advocated by Khatami and his supporters, or the more austere and autocratic vision of hard-liners, who believe that democracy should be kept within tight limits.
The vote is an endorsement of Khatami's reformist plans. But it may provoke a conservative backlash in the short term. The impression that hard-core right-wingers have apparently accepted their unpopularity at the polls is illustrated by the fact that they did not field a serious candidate.
The Iranian constitution of 1979 contains many contradictions on what constitutes the rule of God and rights of citizens. The document gives unparalleled power to the supreme leader, who is seen by the conservatives as God's representative on Earth and, therefore, above all branches of power: the judicial, the presidential and the parliamentary.
Yet, he is appointed by a group of some 90 scholars who are directly elected by the people. The supreme leader, in theory, can be sacked; but in practice, he does not seem to be accountable to anyone. And the constitution also provides room for the president, elected every four years and technically the head of state.
The rivalry between liberals and conservatives in Iran is not a power struggle, but it is an unusual and uneasy form of power sharing. Both camps are united in their commitment to the Islamic system. What divides them is how they think that system should work and, above all, how democratic it should be - how much freedom should be accorded to the media, to women, to the young. Currently, a conservative judiciary balances the reformist-dominated parliament (Majlis).
Many in Iran want to see change in society, politics, and foreign relations. They are dissatisfied with the controls of the revolutionary regime and want to improve relations with Iran's neighbors and the West. There are others who oppose such changes and believe that Iran should continue along the lines of the past two decades since the Islamic Revolution.
Khatami's approach is intellectual. Iran, however, cannot afford another four years of indecision and compromise. And in order to circumvent this, Khatami will have to press his mandate in order to confront the problems Iran faces.
The first obstacle is economic in nature. The Iranian economy is stagnating, inflation remains high, and unemployment is widespread. Unless decisive action is taken to reform the economy, and to create favorable legal and political conditions for investment by Iranian and foreign investors, this stagnation will continue.
The second is relations between the state authority and civic society. The revolutionary regime, like any dictator, believing that it knows what is best for the people, continues to control society with an oppressive rhetoric about cultural aggression and foreign plots. The free press has been destroyed, women are subjected to discrimination, and the universities are threatened. Ironically, the people are still allowed to vote, but they see non-elected officials thwarting their choices. This does not bode well for a democratic future, and both groups need to search for a viable solution.
There can be no doubt that the landslide victory of reformist cleric Khatami four years ago was welcomed in Western countries, especially in Europe, and, in a more subdued way, in the United States.
There are plenty of former oilmen in the senior ranks of the new U.S. administration - including President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney. Oil and business interests are expected to push the policymakers towards closer ties with Tehran.
However, the administration has now adopted a different stance. There has been a reinvigoration of the term "rogue state" - which the Clinton administration actually dropped. The State Department's annual report on terrorism said that Iran was the greatest perpetrator of state-sponsored terrorism in the world because of its support for Hezbollah in Lebanon. National missile defense is one of the cornerstones of Bush foreign policy - and Bush told the New York Times that the reason such a defense program is necessary is that it is needed to protect the U.S. from being blackmailed by countries like Iran.
However, another side to the issue is that Iran is an active participant on the anti-Taliban front, other countries of whom include the U.S., India, Russia, Tel Aviv, and even China. The U.S. may have its "commitment" to enforce the "peace process" in Occupied Palestine, but it also has an interest in stopping the Taliban. And Iran is also aware that the U.S. is keeping Iraq under its gun, checking the growth of a nation that has the potential to challenge Iran in the region.
The U.S. is not expected to lift economic sanctions against Iran anytime soon, and the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), expected to lapse in August, will be renewed. The U.S. will continue to use them as a stick to pressure hard-line elements in Iran, and the sanctions may eventually help Khatami accomplish some of his goals.
And as Americans continue their criticism of Iran, blinded by U.S. conservatives dictating policies towards the country, and Zionist interests group, with their demagogic policies on Palestine translating into ire towards all supporters of the Palestinian cause, the U.S. cannot be expected to make rational policy decisions when policy direction is dictated not by national interests, but by Zionist ones.
|
