Reaction of common Iraqis forced the invaders to reconsider their plans

By Asif Farooqi, IOL Correspondent 

AMMAN, March 31 (IslamOnline.net) - Wrong U.S. perception about the common Iraqi reaction to the invasion, un-availability of a northern front to the invading forces and rising morale of the Iraqi forces are being counted by retired Arab military strategists among a set of reasons which forced the U.S. and allied military leaders to rethink their war strategy, resulting in new and delayed time line for an end to the military action.

"When a military plan looses some factors which are at the very heart of it, they have to think again and they have to make a major alteration to that plan. Any military plan is adjustable to small changes but if it suffers from a major change, it means the planning is not good," said the former commander of the Jordanian War College, Major General Abdul Jalil.

He was among several retired senior Arab generals interviewed by the agency to know what the senior military leaders- who have experience of serving in this area think of the war in Iraq.

Heart Of The Plan

Almost unanimity of the view was found among these general at least on one point. The U.S. army went in to Iraq with some poor intelligence and analysis work on the supposed support they were told to get from the Iraqi public.

Another factor outlined particularly by General Jalil was the unavailability of a "northern front" to the invading forces.

This was at the very heart of the initial military plan but as the Turks backed out of their earlier “commitment” of allowing U.S. forces to advance to the northern Iraq through the Turkish territory, the coalition forces were left with no choice but to make big changes in their original war strategy, he added.

U.S.-led forces was supposed to push as many as 60,000 elite troops into northern Iraq from Turkey. And this according to General Jalil, was the "heart of the plan".

Now that front not available to the coalition forces, general Jalil who also served in the Jordanian army as chief of Operations, said for this reason the coalition had to bring in fresh forces in as big number as 120,000.

"Practically it is very difficult to maintain a supply line as long as the coalition forces now have between Umm Qasr to the outskirt of Baghdad. If they were to put up good fight around and inside Baghdad, they would have to have a more secure supply line at a close location" General Jalil said.

Another "illusion" the coalition forces were out in was the support
from the Iraqi public which never came forth as was told to them
would be.

"Iraqi people did not welcome these invading soldiers as
the coalition forces were expecting. In fact they (civilians) fought
the invaders and gave them a tough time" said Lt Gen Musa Al Adwan,
former commander of the brigade of the Jordanian Special Forces.

"It was a big mistake on the part of coalition forces to perceive that the
Iraqi civilian would welcome them in the cities and towns of Iraq. This misleading piece of intelligence and analysis brought disaster for the invading forces as far as their war planning is concerned," general Musa said.

He was of the view that in anticipation of a local support, the coalition military planner were thinking of taking the towns of Umm Qasr and Basra in the very initial days of war but that did not happen.

"In my view, the U.S. military wanted to move their military base from Kuwait to Basra as soon as in the first week of war so that they can go ahead with more force and determination" general Jalil said while agreeing to the point that it couldn't have worse for any military to go into an enemy country with the expectation in mind that they were going into a friendly country.

General Jalil said the U.S. met the fate of German forces which invaded Ukraine in 1941 in the hope that the local population would welcome the Germans against the Russian tyrants. "After more than half a century history is repeating itself" general Jalil added.

According to general Jalil even he was surprised by the strength of resistance put up by the Iraqi troops in the battle field. "I am sure Iraqi commanders and Saddam  Hussein may also be surprised the way the war is going so far" former commandant of the war college said.

According to general Musa, the first seven days of the war were very crucial and the way the Iraqis fought in Umm Qasr it raised the morale of the Iraqi troops to highest levels. "This morale is perhaps the toughest enemy coalition forces be faced with while fighting in Iraq" general Musa said.

How long the war could long. No one is sure but one thing becomes clear after talking to the military experts it won't be as short as originally planned.

"I think it would be two months before coalition forces would be able to achieve any of their goals" general Musa was of the opinion.

"It is a simple calculation. The coalition forces spent 6 days to secure Umm Qasr which is a village and hundred times weaker than Baghdad" general Jalil said. "How long should Baghdad take to fall" he asked.

General Musa thinks that the US forces were misguided to engage the enemy in smaller towns in the south. "I think while their prime target is Saddam Hussein and his regime and their mission is to get Saddam their strategy should have been to arrive Baghdad as shortly as possible".

General Musa said by engaging enemy in smaller towns in the south coalition forces would be spending a lot of time fighting there which would result in causalities on both sides. "Thus I believe any allied mission if they take a long time they will loose the international support and opinion would change in Iraq and Saddam would have opportunity to gather people around him" he said.

General Jalil praised the Iraqi war strategy which he said was fast turning into "active defense". "This is the best defense against a more powerful enemy" general Jalil said and added that movement of smaller units towards the enemy frontlines was a signal that Saddam not only was moving his army in smaller numbers but was moving them in the direction of the frontline which would raise the morale of his troops and have negative psychological impact on the enemy forces.

"Their strategy is different from 91 wars. This time around Saddam and his commanders have selected to fight in smaller units in a round in the cities and not in the deserts as he did in the last was and lost many soldiers" general Musa said. He explained that city by city, the coalition forces would have to defeat Iraqis at every front and it will take very long when they can finally reach Baghdad" he said.