The
northern English county of Yorkshire shows many
faces to the world. It is the proud home of the
scholar Alcuin, the Brontë sisters, artist David
Hockney, playwright Alan Bennett, sculptor Henry
Moore, and musicians Waterson and Carthy. It is a
beautiful land of green valleys, moors, and dales
as well as handsome towns and cities. It is no
stranger to conflicts over class (such as the epic
coal miners’ strike of 1984-85) and religion
(the “Rushdie affair” of 1989 began in
Bradford), and even to serial murder. But few
would have predicted that Yorkshire might also be
home to a cell of extremist murderers: three of
the group who planted bombs in London underground
trains and buses on 7 July 2005, killing at least
fifty-one people as well as themselves in the
process.
Since
the explosions, news has slowly been filtering out
about who the bombers were, their backgrounds,
families and lifestyles. It is now beyond any
reasonable doubt that young British men with
apparently normal family lives and careers did
indeed perpetrate the attacks.
But
it can seem that the more we know, the less we
understand. Can British people with normal lives
and education (even to university level) become so
disaffected in this liberal democracy, where
religion is practiced freely, that they proceed to
kill themselves and their compatriots in the name
of religion? And, more widely, what is happening
to this generation of British Muslims?
The
answer to the first question is straightforward.
It is possible for this to happen. The
events of Thursday 7 July show that the men who
carried out these attacks acted systematically –
hiring a car, traveling to London, fanning out and
detonating their lethal bombs – as part of a
well-planned and cold-blooded operation.
The
answer to the second question, a core part of the explanation
for these events, is far harder to reach. It is
also essential, for although these attacks are
being blamed on specific sectors of the Muslim
community in Britain – the minority loyal to
al-Qaeda – the community as a whole feels their
repercussions. If further attacks are to be
prevented, if a spreading backlash of anti-Muslim
attacks on people and mosques is to be averted,
understanding of the context and motives of the 7
July events is essential.
Two
aspects of the reality of Muslims in west
Yorkshire seem especially important in building
such understanding: segregation and leadership.
The
Community Gap
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The Deobandi sect preaches a puritan form of Islam, including segregation of the sexes and abstention from any form of participation in politics. |
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Islam
is a religion characterized by rich debates and
differences of opinion on many theological points.
This has led to many transnational sects: not just
the major Shi’a and Sunni groups,
but sub-sects within them like the Sunni
Deobandi and Barelwi and the Shi’a
Ismaili. These sub-sects often have large
international followings, including mosques
dedicated to preaching their particular style of
Islam.
The
apparently senior figure among the London bombers,
Mohammad Sidique Khan, came from the west
Yorkshire town of Dewsbury, fifteen miles
(twenty-five kilometres) south of Leeds. It is
interesting to note that Dewsbury – after the
northern Indian city of Deoband itself – houses
the international headquarters of the Deobandi
sect.
This
Dar-al-Alum (“centre for learning”)
occupies a large mosque in the heart of West
Yorkshire, in the Dewsbury-Batley conurbation. The
Deobandi are a large sect preaching a puritan form
of Islam, including segregation of the sexes and
abstention from any form of participation in
politics. The basic rationale for these attitudes
is that legislative authority belongs only to God;
thus, for men to sanction their own governance
even in the smallest capacity would be
anti-Islamic.
The
preferred Deobandi method of interacting with
society is through propagation. The sect runs a
network of mosques – locally, nationally and
internationally – which host visiting
delegations from the Dewsbury mosque. At the local
level, Deobandi membership consists predominantly
of people of Gujarati Indian origin, as well as
Pakistanis and growing numbers of new converts
from among the Afro-Caribbean and white British
population.
A
fascinating anomaly about Dewsbury is that in the
British general election of May 2005, the voters
of the town elected a charismatic young Muslim of
Pakistani origin, Shahid Malik, as their Labour
member of parliament. This was despite the fact
that Malik was denied the specific endorsement of
any local mosque (a fact perhaps hinted at in the
first words of his acceptance speech at the count:
“All praises to Allah, the most gracious and
kind. Yes I am a Muslim, and yes I am here”).
In
the context of the long process of post-colonial
immigration, many Muslim immigrants to Britain
have sought refuge in communities similar to the
ones in their countries of origin. The origins of
most people in west Yorkshire’s Muslim community
lie in the Chach and Mirpur districts of Pakistan
and the Gujurat region of India.
This
coalescing tendency, combined with the
segregationist nature of the Muslim community in
west Yorkshire, make for a high degree of social
separation between communities; local schools
often have high concentrations of either Muslim
children or white children, and second and third
generation Muslims can reach university age
without integrating into the wider British society
in any meaningful way. For many individuals, this
can lead to an awkward and isolated existence at
university or in the early stages of adult life.
Such isolated individuals are easily susceptible
to the most extreme elements of Islamists who
provide a strong sense of fraternity.
The
Generation Gap
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The first generation of local Muslim leaders, predominantly migrant workers, were little concerned with politics. |
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If
this segregation is the first inherent feature of
the Muslim community in west Yorkshire, the second
major factor affecting the current generation of
British Muslims is the quality and style of its
leadership.
The
first generation of local Muslim leaders,
predominantly migrant workers, were little
concerned with politics. They concentrated on
building mosques, establishing burial facilities
and halal food outlets. Today, they are
being replaced by a new generation of
well-educated young men aware of their
transnational religious identity and significance.
This new breed of young Muslim leader is generally
trained to a graduate or postgraduate level, and
its members are well versed in lobbying
techniques.
1997
was a critical year for British Muslims in this
respect. Many of their biggest national groups
underwent convulsive changes in leadership. The
Young Muslims (YM) split with its mother
organization, the UK Islamic Mission (Ukim); new
groups committed to parliamentary lobbying, such
as the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) and the
Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) were set
up.
The
MCB is an umbrella organization representing most
of the smaller mainstream Muslim organizations in
Britain. It has enjoyed much perceived success in
foreign-policy discussions and areas related to
domestic legislation affecting Muslims. Through
relentless, highly publicized campaigns led by its
general-secretary Sir Iqbal Sacranie, the MCB is
fast becoming the representative voice of British
Muslims. It has been foremost in condemning the 7
July attacks.
But
this very influence has helped create both a sense
of unease and great polarization within the
British Muslim community, now 1.6 million strong.
The MCB is finding natural partners with other
traditionally moderate groups such as Ukim and the
IHRC. But other groups, like the Muslim
Association of Britain (MAB), see the very
“success” of the mainstream organizations as
evidence of their compromising, over-accommodating
attitude to the government and authorities.
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Whereas the moderate groups are becoming better at gaining access to policy-makers, the extreme groups are becoming better at gaining access to young Muslims. |
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Meanwhile,
groups like Hizb-ut Tahrir and Muhajiroun have won
a small but significant reach within young members
of Britain’s Muslim community by preaching a
militant, extreme message. They have also been
experiencing a turnover of leadership, involving
celebration of their own, more macabre kind of
political progress. Some Muslims use the term
“hijacking” to characterise the phenomenon of
a cycle of relatively young leaders in a local
area, each proclaiming a more violent
anti-establishment message than his predecessor.
There
is thus a dangerous bifurcation opening up in
British Muslim politics, involving two different
models of “success” and influence. Whereas the
moderate groups are becoming better at gaining
access to policy-makers, the extreme groups are
becoming better at gaining access to young Muslims
in search of certainty, fellowship, meaning and
direction in life, and a cause.
So
what is happening to this younger generation of
Muslims that leads a few of its members to embrace
violence? I would say that the problem lies with
the opportunist new leaders of some of the
smallest Muslim groups. These groups use isolated
individuals to promote their own agenda of hate,
violence and bigotry. These tactics are now being
used on the streets of west Yorkshire as openly as
on the streets of Iraq. In the current world
political climate this led to the terrible events
of 7 July.
The
Muslim community in Britain is at a pivotal stage
in its development. After 7 July 2005 in London,
it has reached the “end of the beginning”.
*
This article was originally published on www.opendemocracy.com.
**Mohammed Sajid
is a PhD student at the Centre for European Studies, University of Bradford, Yorkshire, England.