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Across the River: Palestinians in Jordan

May 9, 2005

Zarqa refugee camp, Jordan
© The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)

Click to enlarge photo


Click here to view a photo gallery on Palestinians in Syria and Jordan refugee camps.


If you cross the bridge from the west bank to the east bank of the Jordan River, then the chances are that a Palestinian will be driving the taxi you get into on the other side. Check into a tourist hotel in Amman, and probably most of the staff will be from Palestine. Whether they call themselves Palestinians, Palestinian-Jordanians, Jordanians of Palestinian origin, or just plain Jordanians, between 50 and 70 percent of today’s Jordanian population ended up there because of the Israeli occupation of their grandparents’ homeland.

The majority of Palestinians in Jordan today have known no other life. Even Queen Rania, a symbol of the Jordanian regime, has her origins in Tulkarm in central Palestine. Representing the major economic, cultural, and labor force in Jordan, Palestinians live mainly in the urban areas of the capital, Amman, and other large cities such as Zarka and Irbid. Aside from the cities, there are also a significant number of Palestinian refugees living in rural villages along the east bank of the Jordan Valley, just across the border from the Palestine they were forced to flee. The rest of the population, Jordanians with roots in the British mandate territory of Transjordan (sometimes called East Bankers) largely maintain a rural life, apart from some important wealthy urban communities in the cities.

The majority of refugees are Muslim. Only 20 percent of registered refugees live in the ten internationally coordinated UNRWA refugee camps, four established after the 1948 occupation, and six established after the later occupation of 1967. Another 20 percent live in four locally organized camps, as well as many other informal camps.

History

From the start, as in every host country, the authorities were overwhelmed with the influx of refugees. Palestinians found themselves living in appalling conditions, sheltering wherever they could in public gardens or buildings, without tents or food rations. By the end of July 1948, some Jordanian cities, with no previous preparation, were sheltering up to 80,000 refugees.1


50-70% of the Jordanian population is of Palestinian origin.


By 1950, UNRWA had been established to cater for the needs of refugees on both banks of the Jordan, and the Jordanian regime officially annexed the West Bank. In 1954, a law was passed which enabled Palestinian refugees to become Jordanian citizens, having the same rights and responsibilities as Jordanians born in the West Bank (1954 Nationality Law No. 6). Taking Jordanian citizenship was essential for Palestinians who needed to obtain basic rights to movement, employment, residency, and education. Even registration of births and deaths could not be done unless a Palestinian had accepted Jordanian citizenship.

It is certainly true that Jordanians of Palestinian origin and those of Transjordanian origin share a common British colonial history and had artificial borders imposed (see Land Under the British Mandate) upon them after the breakup of the Ottoman Empire. In the past, it could be said that people of northern Jordan and northern Palestine had more in common with each other than they did with the people in the south of their respective countries. Bedouin communities have moved across the river for generations, highlighting the colonial nature of borders.

Culturally, as part of the wider Arab East, Palestinians have more in common with Jordanians than with other parts of the Arab world. Another uniting factor is that the overwhelming majority of Jordanian citizens are Muslims. Modern Jordan is made up of two large communities, but the majority see themselves as one nation, despite the tensions.

Exclusion and Discrimination


Any Palestinian who took up residence in  Jordan after February 16, 1954 does not have automatic right to citizenship.


Nevertheless, despite the regime rhetoric of equality, many Palestinians in Jordan feel like second-class citizens, or they are not actually allowed to take citizenship at all. Any Palestinian who took up residence in Jordan after February 16, 1954, does not have an automatic right to citizenship. An estimated 70,000–80,000 Gazans fled to Jordan following the 1967 war, but were not given citizenship. They are not entitled to the rights of citizens and must travel on their Egyptian-issued papers, which is not necessarily a simple process (see Egypt). To return to Jordan after traveling or working abroad requires a re-entry visa, and this is becoming increasingly hard to get.

In 1983, the Jordanian government created a dual system: yellow cards for those with full residency and full citizenship, for those who left the West Bank for the “East Bank” before June 1 of that year; and green cards providing a renewable two-year Jordanian “passport” and no right of residency, for those who left after that date. Green-card holders can only visit Jordan for up to a month at a time. Those with green cards cannot work in governmental offices or banks.

After 1988, when King Hussein (father of current King Abdullah) decided to withdraw from the West Bank, passports of West Bank residents became temporary passports with reduced support. Passports would not automatically be replaced, leaving West Bankers in an increasingly vulnerable position, as the Palestinian Authority is not yet recognized internationally as a state, a necessary requisite for issuing full passports allowing travel abroad. Israeli occupation makes this situation worse.

Although all citizens should have the same right to work, Palestinians report discrimination and bias in both the public and private workplace. Palestinians are heavily underrepresented in the civil service, the military, and the political system. Those who are able to reach higher echelons have no space to criticize and seek change within the regime. The question of Palestinian “loyalty” to the state is constantly brought up in public debate, perpetuating discrimination and suspicion against Palestinian Jordanians.

Social Friction

The expulsion of the burgeoning Palestinian national movement to Beirut in Black September 1970, and the ruthless suppression of Palestinian dissension marked a turning point in Palestinian-Jordanian relations. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, every Palestinian was seen as a potential threat to the state, and it was not until the economic crisis affecting the whole country in the late 1980s that the communities began to move closer together again.

In the wake of the foundation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the defeat of Jordan in 1967, and the clashes of September 1970, which led to the expulsion of Palestinian fighters from Jordan, socio-geographic distinctions between the Palestinians and the Transjordanians became embedded in the socio-political structures. Palestinians were excluded en masse from Jordanian officer corps and police, as well as political decision-making. Since then, the old and new East-Jordanian political elite has dominated the state’s political, military, and security apparatus.

Despite the fact that many Palestinians were living in squalid camps or low-income neighborhoods, many native Jordanians believed that Palestinians had a better life than they did. Seeing urban Palestinians living in wealthy areas of Amman, they forgot the squalor of the camps that many Palestinians continued to live in. This urban-rural tension contributed to a continued separation and persistent prejudice between the two communities. Another factor maintaining separate identities and divisions was the 1948-1967 Jordanian administration of the West Bank. While Palestinians moved to and lived on the east bank of the Jordan, native Jordanians did not move to or integrate on the west bank.

It is not possible here to enter into complex and important details about the development of divisions in Jordanian society; for such information, readers should consult the sources mentioned below. At this point, it is enough to say that society was split along ideological and political issues, not just on straightforward identity issues. The tensions in the 1970s emerged from a split in society between the conservative Jordanian regime and Palestinian support of pan-Arab, pro-Nasser views. On an individual level, however, some Palestinians worked with the Jordanian regime: the head of Jordanian intelligence during Jordanian army clashes with PLO in 1970 was Palestinian, while other Jordanians—most famously, Naif Hawatmeh, Jordanian leader of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine—worked alongside the Palestinians.

Camp Identity


The survival of the UNRWA camp system has played a major role in protecting Palestinian identity in Jordan.


The survival of the UNRWA camp system has played a major role in keeping Palestinian identity alive in Jordan. Refugees at UNRWA schools studied, under Palestinian teachers, a curriculum shaped by Palestinian national aspirations. The camps have played a central role in protecting a distinct Palestinian identity; although at no point in time have more than 25 percent of the Palestinians in Jordan lived in refugee camps.

Camps provide the focus and base for political activities, demonstrations around contemporary events, or annual events such as Jerusalem Day. Even though the majority of Palestinians no longer live in the camps, these distinct geographic neighborhoods are the home of social and cultural life focused on Palestine, such as the headquarters of village societies and family leagues. The fact that in some camps today, over 15 percent of residents are not Palestinians, but low-income foreign and guest workers—Egyptian and South Asian workers, Iraqi immigrants, and local gypsies—has not changed the political symbolism of the camps. The camps remain a signifier of the Nakba and the ongoing injustice in Palestine. While many Palestinians are settled as part of Jordanian society and in practice would not move back west of the river, this does not in any way dilute their determination to have their right to return recognized.

Resources:

  • Al Aza’r, Khaled, Arab Protection for the Palestinian Refugees: Investigation of Practice and Foundations for Development, (Bethlehem: Badil, 2004) Paper produced for Badil Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights Expert Forum, Cairo, 2004. Published on Badil Web site.

  • Badil  Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, Survey of Palestinian Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons 2002, (Bethlehem:  Badil  Resource Center, 2003).

  • Brand, Laurie, “Palestinians and Jordanians: A Crisis of Identity,” Journal of Palestine Studies, 24(4), 46-61.

  • Farah, Randa, “Reconstruction of Palestinian Identities in al-Baq’a Camp” in Bocco, Riccardo, Blandine Detremau & Jean Hannoyer (eds.) Palestine, Palestiniens: Territoire National, Espaces Communautaires, (Beirut: Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches sur le Moyen-Orient Contemporain, 1997).

  • Al-Hamarneh, Ala, “The Palestinian Refugee Camps in Jordan: Between National Identity and Socio-Economic Integration,”  Holy Land Studies Vol 2, No. 2, March 2004.  

  • Shlaim, A, Collusion Across the Jordan: King Abdullah, The Zionist Movement and the Partition of  Jordan, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988).


External links last accessed January 10, 2005.

1- The authorities at the time were not prepared to take accurate and precise figures. Zionist propaganda has taken advantage of this disorganization by consistently downplaying the number of refugees, and suggesting it was in equal measure to those Arab Jews who became refugees from Arab countries during the period.

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