|
Across
the River: Palestinians in Jordan
May
9, 2005
If
you cross the bridge from the west bank to the east bank of the Jordan
River, then the chances are that a Palestinian will be driving the taxi
you get into on the other side. Check into a tourist hotel in Amman, and
probably most of the staff will be from Palestine. Whether they call
themselves Palestinians, Palestinian-Jordanians, Jordanians of
Palestinian origin, or just plain Jordanians, between 50 and 70 percent
of today’s Jordanian population ended up there because of the Israeli
occupation of their grandparents’ homeland.
The
majority of Palestinians in Jordan today have known no other life. Even
Queen Rania, a symbol of the Jordanian regime, has her origins in
Tulkarm in central Palestine. Representing the major economic, cultural,
and labor force in Jordan, Palestinians live mainly in the urban areas
of the capital, Amman, and other large cities such as Zarka and Irbid.
Aside from the cities, there are also a significant number of
Palestinian refugees living in rural villages along the east bank of the
Jordan Valley, just across the border from the Palestine they were
forced to flee. The rest of the population, Jordanians with roots in the
British mandate territory of Transjordan (sometimes called East Bankers)
largely maintain a rural life, apart from some important wealthy urban
communities in the cities.
The
majority of refugees are Muslim. Only 20 percent of registered refugees
live in the ten internationally coordinated UNRWA refugee camps, four
established after the 1948 occupation, and six established after the
later occupation of 1967. Another 20 percent live in four locally
organized camps, as well as many other informal camps.
History
From
the start, as in every host country, the authorities were overwhelmed
with the influx of refugees. Palestinians found themselves living in
appalling conditions, sheltering wherever they could in public gardens
or buildings, without tents or food rations. By the end of July 1948,
some Jordanian cities, with no previous preparation, were sheltering up
to 80,000 refugees.1
50-70%
of the Jordanian population is of Palestinian origin. |
|
By
1950, UNRWA had been established to cater for the needs of refugees on
both banks of the Jordan, and the Jordanian regime officially annexed
the West Bank. In 1954, a law was passed which enabled Palestinian
refugees to become Jordanian citizens, having the same rights and
responsibilities as Jordanians born in the West Bank (1954 Nationality
Law No. 6). Taking Jordanian citizenship was essential for Palestinians
who needed to obtain basic rights to movement, employment, residency,
and education. Even registration of births and deaths could not be done
unless a Palestinian had accepted Jordanian citizenship.
It
is certainly true that Jordanians of Palestinian origin and those of
Transjordanian origin share a common British colonial history and had
artificial borders imposed (see Land
Under the British Mandate) upon them after the breakup of the
Ottoman Empire. In the past, it could be said that people of northern
Jordan and northern Palestine had more in common with each other than
they did with the people in the south of their respective countries.
Bedouin communities have moved across the river for generations,
highlighting the colonial nature of borders.
Culturally,
as part of the wider Arab East, Palestinians have more in common with
Jordanians than with other parts of the Arab world. Another uniting
factor is that the overwhelming majority of Jordanian citizens are
Muslims. Modern Jordan is made up of two large communities, but the
majority see themselves as one nation, despite the tensions.
Exclusion
and Discrimination
Any
Palestinian who took up residence in Jordan after February 16,
1954 does not have automatic right to citizenship. |
|
Nevertheless,
despite the regime rhetoric of equality, many Palestinians in Jordan
feel like second-class citizens, or they are not actually allowed to
take citizenship at all. Any Palestinian who took up residence in Jordan
after February 16, 1954, does not have an automatic right to
citizenship. An estimated 70,000–80,000 Gazans fled to Jordan
following the 1967 war, but were not given citizenship. They are not
entitled to the rights of citizens and must travel on their
Egyptian-issued papers, which is not necessarily a simple process (see Egypt). To return to Jordan after traveling or working abroad requires a
re-entry visa, and this is becoming increasingly hard to get.
In
1983, the Jordanian government created a dual system: yellow cards for
those with full residency and full citizenship, for those who left the
West Bank for the “East Bank” before June 1 of that year; and green
cards providing a renewable two-year Jordanian “passport” and no
right of residency, for those who left after that date. Green-card
holders can only visit Jordan for up to a month at a time. Those with
green cards cannot work in governmental offices or banks.
After
1988, when King Hussein (father of current King Abdullah) decided to
withdraw from the West Bank, passports of West Bank residents became
temporary passports with reduced support. Passports would not
automatically be replaced, leaving West Bankers in an increasingly
vulnerable position, as the Palestinian Authority is not yet recognized
internationally as a state, a necessary requisite for issuing full
passports allowing travel abroad. Israeli occupation makes this
situation worse.
Although
all citizens should have the same right to work, Palestinians report
discrimination and bias in both the public and private workplace.
Palestinians are heavily underrepresented in the civil service, the
military, and the political system. Those who are able to reach higher
echelons have no space to criticize and seek change within the regime.
The question of Palestinian “loyalty” to the state is constantly
brought up in public debate, perpetuating discrimination and suspicion
against Palestinian Jordanians.
Social
Friction
The
expulsion of the burgeoning Palestinian national movement to Beirut in
Black September 1970, and the ruthless suppression of Palestinian
dissension marked a turning point in Palestinian-Jordanian relations.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, every Palestinian was seen as a
potential threat to the state, and it was not until the economic crisis
affecting the whole country in the late 1980s that the communities began
to move closer together again.
In
the wake of the foundation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization
(PLO), the defeat of Jordan in 1967, and the clashes of September 1970,
which led to the expulsion of Palestinian fighters from Jordan,
socio-geographic distinctions between the Palestinians and the
Transjordanians became embedded in the socio-political structures.
Palestinians were excluded en masse from Jordanian officer corps and
police, as well as political decision-making. Since then, the old and
new East-Jordanian political elite has dominated the state’s
political, military, and security apparatus.
Despite
the fact that many Palestinians were living in squalid camps or
low-income neighborhoods, many native Jordanians believed that
Palestinians had a better life than they did. Seeing urban Palestinians
living in wealthy areas of Amman, they forgot the squalor of the camps
that many Palestinians continued to live in. This urban-rural tension
contributed to a continued separation and persistent prejudice between
the two communities. Another factor maintaining separate identities and
divisions was the 1948-1967 Jordanian administration of the West Bank.
While Palestinians moved to and lived on the east bank of the Jordan,
native Jordanians did not move to or integrate on the west bank.
It
is not possible here to enter into complex and important details about
the development of divisions in Jordanian society; for such information,
readers should consult the sources mentioned below. At this point, it is
enough to say that society was split along ideological and political
issues, not just on straightforward identity issues. The tensions in the
1970s emerged from a split in society between the conservative Jordanian
regime and Palestinian support of pan-Arab, pro-Nasser views. On an
individual level, however, some Palestinians worked with the Jordanian
regime: the head of Jordanian intelligence during Jordanian army clashes
with PLO in 1970 was Palestinian, while other Jordanians—most
famously, Naif Hawatmeh, Jordanian leader of the Democratic Front for
the Liberation of Palestine—worked alongside the Palestinians.
Camp
Identity
The
survival of the UNRWA camp system has played a major role in
protecting Palestinian identity in Jordan.
|
|
The
survival of the UNRWA camp system has played a major role in keeping
Palestinian identity alive in Jordan. Refugees at UNRWA schools studied,
under Palestinian teachers, a curriculum shaped by Palestinian national
aspirations. The camps have played a central role in protecting a
distinct Palestinian identity; although at no point in time have more
than 25 percent of the Palestinians in Jordan lived in refugee camps.
Camps
provide the focus and base for political activities, demonstrations
around contemporary events, or annual events such as Jerusalem Day. Even
though the majority of Palestinians no longer live in the camps, these
distinct geographic neighborhoods are the home of social and cultural
life focused on Palestine, such as the headquarters of village societies
and family leagues. The fact that in some camps today, over 15 percent
of residents are not Palestinians, but low-income foreign and guest
workers—Egyptian and South Asian workers, Iraqi immigrants, and local
gypsies—has not changed the political symbolism of the camps. The
camps remain a signifier of the Nakba and the ongoing injustice in
Palestine. While many Palestinians are settled as part of Jordanian
society and in practice would not move back west of the river, this does
not in any way dilute their determination to have their right to return
recognized.
Resources:
-
Al
Aza’r, Khaled, Arab Protection for the Palestinian Refugees:
Investigation of Practice and Foundations for Development, (Bethlehem: Badil, 2004) Paper produced for
Badil Resource Center
for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights Expert Forum, Cairo, 2004. Published on
Badil
Web site.
-
Badil
Resource Center
for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, Survey of
Palestinian Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons 2002, (Bethlehem:
Badil Resource Center, 2003).
-
Brand,
Laurie, “Palestinians and Jordanians: A Crisis of Identity,”
Journal of Palestine Studies, 24(4), 46-61.
-
Farah,
Randa, “Reconstruction of Palestinian Identities in al-Baq’a
Camp” in Bocco, Riccardo, Blandine Detremau & Jean Hannoyer
(eds.) Palestine, Palestiniens: Territoire National, Espaces
Communautaires, (Beirut: Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches sur
le Moyen-Orient Contemporain, 1997).
-
Al-Hamarneh,
Ala, “The Palestinian Refugee Camps in Jordan: Between National Identity and Socio-Economic Integration,”
Holy Land
Studies Vol 2, No. 2, March 2004.
-
Shlaim,
A, Collusion Across the Jordan: King Abdullah, The Zionist Movement and the Partition of
Jordan, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988).
External
links last accessed January 10, 2005.
1-
The
authorities at the time were not prepared to take accurate and
precise figures. Zionist propaganda has taken advantage of this
disorganization by consistently downplaying the number of refugees,
and suggesting it was in equal measure to those Arab Jews who became
refugees from Arab countries during the period.

|