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1948–1964
Hope in an
Arab Liberation of Palestine |
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The
Nakba
The
question of how Palestine was lost and the events of 1947–1949 have
tortured the minds of Palestinians ever since. The training,
organization, and military and financial resources of the Zionist forces
meant that they had no serious opposition. The groups of Arab fighters
and Arab government troops sent to join Palestinian fighters had no
chance of making any lasting military gains with old-fashioned weaponry
and lack of coordinated military command. Today, Palestinians will tell
of the feeling that they were let down by all sides, the false promises
of protection by British occupation forces and the Arab countries who
sent only halfhearted forces. (For more information see Bibliography.)
Beyond
1948
From
the Nakba throughout the 1950s and the rise of Arab nationalism through
the figurehead of Egyptian leader Gamal Abdul Nasser, Palestinians on
both sides of the border held on to the hope of an Arab liberation of
Palestine. Struggle was expressed through leftist and nationalist
movements of the countries in which they found exile, or in the case of
the Palestinians inside the 1948 borders, in the form of the Communist
Party, the only political party which remained for them.
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It
must not be forgotten that in the early years, the primary
struggle was literally for survival.
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However,
in the first years, it must not be forgotten that the primary struggle
for the Palestinian people was quite literally to survive. Whether
destitute in Beirut, Amman, East Jerusalem, or the villages of the
Galilee, the majority of people had lost everything. Even finding enough
to eat for the family was a struggle as land, and all the employment
that goes with it, had literally been torn out from under people (link
to Land Section 1948-1967). Whether living under Israeli rule in the
newly occupied land or living in refugee camps and cities under Arab
rule, Palestinians faced poverty, unemployment, and lack of security
from all sides. The struggle was a matter of staying alive.
A
former resident of Ma`lul, speaking on film (Ma`lul Celebrates its
Destruction, 1985, Belgium/Palestine) to director Michel Khleifi,
recalls the early days.
At
night, we’d creep back to retrieve what we could find. One night I
wanted to get some sugar from our stock. When I saw the ruins of the
house I went mad … I was terrified …. The livestock was starving.
We’d had the habit of keeping stocks of things … but the store was
empty: lentils, wheat, hay. We had really thought that we would be
back after the occupation and the end of the hostilities.
Returning
to the village to collect belongings was not always possible, and even
if technically so, the way was fraught with dangers. Those caught as
infiltrators could be shot or captured. A Nazareth doctor working with
refugees sheltering in the Galilee and Lebanon, reported that it was
“not uncommon for demolished houses to be mined, and a number of
people were killed while sneaking back to recover things they had left
behind” (Srouji 65).
Military
Law for Palestinians Remaining in the New Jewish State
Many
people ask why the Palestinians who remained inside Palestine did not
keep fighting—even a basic understanding of the dangers and
restrictions that they faced from the overwhelming power of the Israeli
state gives the answer. Military regulations covered every aspect of
life: travel, property, public speech, media, use of land, and so on.
Many depopulated villages were declared military zones under emergency
regulations so that no one could enter them. Arabs were divided into
three regions and military governors were appointed for the Galilee, the
Triangle, and the south, the Negev.
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“They
asked him where he was from and he would say ‘Bir’im’. If
he said he was from Jish they would give him a permit, but he
refused”
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The
communities lived under nightly curfew, and could not travel outside
their towns and villages without getting permits from the military
governor. Such a permit might be refused and at the least it took hours
to wait for. Under the military regime, 1948 Palestinians suffered under
similar mechanisms of control as the Palestinians in the West Bank and
Gaza face under the suppression of the current Intifada
(2000–present). Those who challenged authority could face
administrative detention, banishment, or house arrest. There was no
appeal; the Supreme Court would not interfere in matters defined as
“security.” The military government could even keep secret from the
accused themselves the reason or evidence of their crime if it were
deemed “security’ (Jiryis 20).
Nahida
Zahran, an internal refugee from Kafr Bir‘im, tells the story of her
father’s resistance to security police pressure.
My
father was persistently asked by the Shabak to work with them
but he refused. He needed to work outside in order to make money, but
he needed to have a permit to do this. They asked him where he was
from and he would say ‘I am from Bir‘im.’ They told him if he
said he was from Jish [shelter village] they would give him a
permit, but he refused.
Resistance
such as this formed the very essence of the struggle for the powerless
people remaining inside their conquered land.
Attempting
Legal Struggle
Some
Palestinian citizens of Israel tried to use their supposed status as
citizens to take their struggle through the Israeli courts. However,
this was largely unsuccessful, proving from the beginning that Israel is
a state for one people only. Groups of internal refugees tried to
present their case legally before the authorities. An appeal to the High
Court of Justice was made by 86 villagers with Israeli identity papers
stating Saffuriyya as their place of residence, but in November 1951,
the plea was rejected. The minister of defense and the military governor
of the northern district were required to state why the petitioners were
not allowed home. The High Court accepted the argument that Saffuriyya
was within a “closed military zone,” (despite the fact that the
Jewish settlement of Tzipori was established on village land in 1949).
It
is important to see that, at this stage, internal refugees were not
calling openly for the “right to return” for all refugees, both
internal and external. Fear and the shattering of community frameworks
by the Nakba made such action impossible, so the focus was on
individual villages.
Fear
and Israeli Control Preventing the Early Emergence of Struggle
Although
provided with certain limited basic food rations, many internally
displaced families were desperately poor and lacking in basic
necessities. Children were sent out to work and were unable to finish
their education. No one was sure what would happen next on a regional or
local scale, and there was no internal leadership to guide the
community. Palestinians remaining in the new Jewish state found
themselves going from a large majority in a British colony without
settlers, to a mere 11 percent of the population in a Jewish
settler-state (Ghanem 13). Most Palestinian leaders from the 1936–39
Palestinian revolt were in exile, and pre-Nakba leadership had
not been united. Educated elites, engaged with politics and protest, had
become external refugees under the Nakba. Those with financial
resources, which would include teachers, doctors, and lawyers started to
leave as soon as the Partition Plan was announced (Ghanem 16).
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Fear
of collaborators and informers successfully stifled political
activity.
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People
left behind were largely peasants and farmers with little experience of
political engagement. The climate of fear prevented development of
significant political movement under the military regime. “Anyone who
was just listening to the speeches of Abdul Nasser on the radio was
informed on. The Israelis would send for you.” Fear of collaborators
and informers successfully stifled secret political activity. “The
atmosphere was ‘Don’t talk about Saffuriyya, forget about
Saffuriyya, forget your demands,’ says Abu Arab, chair of both the
Saffuriyya Heritage Committee and ADRID, the committee today
representing all those internally displaced.
In
October 1956, on the eve of the Suez War, the army imposed a last-minute
nightfall curfew on the village of Kafr Qassem, close to the border with
the West Bank. As workers in the field returned late, unaware of the
curfew, 47 were shot and killed. While the government publicly claimed
this was an isolated event by renegade officers, Palestinians were
brutally reminded of their dispensable status in the eyes of the
government.
The
Suez War of 1956 underlined that the state of Israel would not be
dissolved in the short term. People had not lost hope in the return, but
many made more concrete plans to settle in the medium term. Like
the camps across the Arab world, many refugees settled as neighbors with
their neighbors from the village (Sayigh).
Many Saffuriyyans, for example, were living in the Nazareth district. In
the 1960s a piece of land overlooking Saffuriyya was bought and the
neighborhood of Saffafri established, largely peopled by those
internally displaced from Saffuriyya.
Suppression
of Palestinian Political Formation Under Israeli Rule
The
only political party that had survived the Nakba was the Communist
Party. Some Arab communist activists had remained and the existence of
Jewish Communists and links with the Soviet Union made it hard for the
Israelis to ban Arab activity within the party. Some protest did emerge,
such as widespread anger in the year following the killings of farm
workers breaking an unknown curfew in Kafr Qassem in 1956, but it was
sufficiently muted. On May Day 1958, for example, a decade after the
establishment of the state of Israel, Arab communists were refused the
timing for the parade that they were always permitted to hold in
Nazareth. Organizers decided to go ahead with the demonstration at the
time planned and large clashes with the police emerged. A few days
later, clashes with Israeli security forces also emerged in the town of
Umm Al-Fahem. Over the two incidents, hundreds of Arabs were injured and
many jailed for extensive periods.
During
the first two decades, a combination of fear and the brutal hand of the
military regime successfully prevented the emergence of any Arab
leadership of the minority remaining and only a few strikes and
demonstrations could be held. Arabs could not unite to act through Labor
organizations as initially they were banned from joining the pre-state
Jewish Union, which became the Israeli Histadrut. Palestinian unions had
been destroyed in the Nakba. Small parties or movements were initiated
but either collapsed or the meetings were declared illegal by the
authorities. During this time, the most noted group to develop was
called Al-Ard (The Land), but the Israelis used every law and violent
means to prevent its emergence into a widespread protest movement.
Israel,
thus, was in a position to prevent the Palestinian struggle developing
from inside its jurisdiction. Israeli government strategy has been a
classic case of “divide and rule,” dealing with clans, villages, and
religious groups as individual entities, enlisting loyalty through a
process of cooptation and coercion. Attempts to organize across these
boundaries would not be tolerated (Jiryis 57). Thus, for the
Palestinians inside Israel in the 1950s and 60s, the political hopes of
the community focused on the wider Arab nationalist movement.
Living
as Palestinians Under Arab Regimes
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Although
refugees were living in appalling conditions, made worse by Arab
regime neglect, many believed that the governments would still
fight for their return.
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By
far the largest numbers of Palestinians in the years following the Nakba
were living in the major cities or refugee camps of the neighboring Arab
states. Like the Palestinians remaining in the area conquered by Israel
listening to Nasser on their radios, initially, the hopes of liberation
lay with the Arab governments themselves. With the Egyptian revolution
of 1952 overthrowing the monarchy and the British influence, the coming
to power of Nasser seemed to promise much for the dispossessed
Palestinians. It is difficult to imagine now, after so many years of
prolonged conflict, but in the early 1950s, the extent of Israeli power
was not fully understood and many believed that an organized united Arab
force could defeat the newcomers and destroy a state build on the power
of European Zionists.
Although
refugees were living in appalling conditions, made worse by the laws and
discrimination found in host Arab countries, many believed that the
regimes would fight for their right to return. Thus Palestinians saw at
this time that the way to forward the struggle was through joining Arab
political movements, and this they did swelling the ranks of Arab left
and right, Marxist, internationalist, pan-Arabist and Nasserist forces.
At this time, it was politically expedient for all groups and regimes
from left to right to claim legitimacy through their pioneering of the
Palestinian cause.
Israel
continued to claim that there was no independent Palestinian identity
separate from an Arab identity, and that it was Arab politicians
cynically manipulating Palestinians to talk about the right of return.
However, a look at the actual situation demonstrates this as a lie.
Journalists and historians note to the contrary that immediately
following the Nakba, the Palestinians were leaderless, and it was
popular movements among people in the camps which clung so steadfastly
to the notion of return to their own land of Palestine. This belief that
the return was imminent was so adhered to, that in the first decade
people did not want to make any improvements to housing and camps in
case it sent signals to the world that they were prepared to settle
where they were.
Rise
of Fatah
However
much Palestinians had initially embraced pan-Arab movements such as
Nasserism, by the end of the 50s when liberation of their land by Arab
forces looked no closer to being realized, dissatisfaction began to
spread. In late 1959, a monthly magazine began to be produced from
Beirut called “Our Palestine: The Call to Life.” Addressed to “The
Children of the Catastrophe,” it included editorials, articles, poems,
and letters dedicated to Palestinian affairs (Hirst 396). Most
significant in terms of the struggle, were the monthly editorials,
officially anonymous, but written usually by Abu Jihad (Khalil
Al-Wazir), a founding member of Fatah.
Editorials
called for the people of Palestine to no longer place false hopes in the
Arab governments, but rise up and take the struggle for the liberation
of their lands into their own hands. In over a decade, countless
international resolutions calling for the return of refugees had
resulted in nothing, and now a voice from amongst the Palestinian people
was calling for the population to take its fate into its own hands.
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