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Mainstream
history books, media, and international political think-tanks rarely
present the fate of the area that was once Mandate Palestine as a
comprehensive whole. The issue of land is usually examined under
geographical categorization: each area, be it Gaza, Jerusalem, or the
Galilee, is studied separately. The implication of such methodology is
that there are unique issues in different areas with different
solutions. But to consider Zionist policy towards a specific district in
isolation from others is a grave error, hiding the true nature and
structure and root of the problems.
While
it is important to understand the unique circumstances and status of
land in each geographical area, this folder looks at long-term Israeli
land policy as a systematic whole, the same policy manifesting itself in
various ways in different areas. When looking at Israeli government land
policy towards the whole area that was British Mandate Palestine, (and
before that the Palestinian districts of the Ottoman Empire), it is
possible to identify an overarching scheme. Analysis reveals patterns,
trends, and similar strategies employed to achieve the same goal:
domination of the land for one ethnic group only. Israeli land policy in
each area fits into an all encompassing strategy to divide Palestinians
from their land. Labor
and the Allon Plan 1967 – 1977 Although
Israel celebrated what was perceived as a massive victory in 1967,
seizing an extensive area of new land ranging from the ancient city of
Gaza to the heights of the Golan, from the capital of Jerusalem to the
whole West Bank of the river Jordan, it did not succeed in transferring
the majority of Palestinians from their land. Not only did Israel occupy
a land peopled by the original inhabitants, but it could no longer avoid
taking some level of responsibility for large numbers of refugees who
had fled in 1948, now living in squalor in camps across the newly
occupied territory. In
the first decade following the 1967 occupation, the state remained in
Labor Party control, guided by the unofficial Allon Plan (named after
Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon). The goal was to achieve “maximum
land with minimum Arabs,” an objective which had not been successfully
accomplished in the 1967 attack. The Allon Plan aimed to annex around 40
percent of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to Israel, meaning that it
would be considered in Israeli eyes as fully part of Israel, rather than
land taken in war with as yet undetermined status. An integral part of
this plan was to devise numerous ways in which Palestinians would be
transferred off the land to be annexed, in order to render it suitable
for Israeli annexation. Annexation There
is often confusion over the terms occupation, annexation and
confiscation. In this text, the word occupation is used to mean the
taking of land by means of force, but many of the original inhabitants
may still live on the land. Annexation is the word that applies to the
Israeli laws passed in relation to East Jerusalem in 1980 and the Syrian
Golan in 1981 (although the land was “occupied” in 1967). The
Israelis applied civil rather than military law to these areas, and
attempted to enforce Israeli citizenship on residents. Although Israeli
citizenship would entitle Palestinians and Syrians in these areas to
greater rights under Israeli law, the large majority refused to accept
Israeli passports and citizenship. Accepting citizenship was seen as an
acceptance of Israel’s right to claim their land and would give them
even less chance in the future of reclaiming the land for themselves. Thus
those from annexed areas, East Jerusalemites and residents of the Golan,
do not usually have citizenship like Palestinians from areas occupied in
1948 such as the Galilee and the Negev; but they also have different ID
from West Bank and Gazan Palestinians. This means that currently an East
Jerusalemite is free to travel within Israeli borders, whereas a West
Banker would be arrested instantly if discovered visiting or working in
Tel Aviv or Haifa. Land
Confiscation Some
Palestinians living in occupied or annexed land are still able to farm
their land, but this number is decreasing every year, and farmers live
in the knowledge that their land is under constant threat, irrespective
of which side of the Green Line that they are living on.
“Confiscated” land is land that the Israeli government physically
prevents Palestinians from reaching. This could happen to Palestinians
wherever they live, and whatever their “status” in the eyes of
Israeli law. A Palestinian citizen of Israel in the Triangle area could
have farmland confiscated, just as a Bedouin citizen in the Negev or
Palestinian refugee in a Gazan refugee camp could have crops destroyed. Compensation In
1973 the government enacted legislation to try to persuade “internal
refugees” to accept offers of compensation. Internal refugees are
those who lost their homes and lands in 1948, but fled to other occupied
areas and were given citizenship in the new Israeli
state. Few accepted this compensation offered, which was not equal to
the value of the land and the loss of earnings incurred in the previous
25 years. Perhaps more significantly, signing for compensation meant a
signing away of any claim to their own land in the future. This was an
offer few were prepared to accept (Abu Hussein and McKay, 2003, p. 73).
Such a strategy has been employed throughout the history of dealings
over land confiscation. Similar offers have been made, a contemporary
example being offers to some West Bank farmers who have lost land for
the building of the new series of boundaries and walls in the West Bank.
Accepting compensation automatically signs away any claims to land in
future negotiations. Another
case study inside the 1948 Green Line concerns those farmers in the
Triangle area who lost land to build the Trans-Israel Highway. This new
road, seizing a large amount of the very little farmland left to the
Palestinian citizens of Israel, follows roughly the line of the 1967
West Bank border, just to the west side (as the Wall does to the east).
Farmers complained that the land offered to them in compensation was not
equal in size or did not have access to essential water resources. Many
received several smaller pieces of land in lieu of a larger piece; yet,
of course, this rendered much farming impractical. Others found that the
land allocated was divided by electricity pylons or even slated for road
development in the not-too-distant future. Land
Day In
1975 Palestinians inside Israel’s 1948 borders established the Land
Defence Committee to campaign against ongoing land confiscation. On
March 30, 1976, the political activity of the Palestinians in the 1948
areas, which had previously been muted by a harsh policy of Israeli
control, finally received the attention of the rest of the Arab world
owing to Israel’s bloody response to organized demonstrations. As
Palestinians across the Galilee gathered in the area of Sakhnin village
to protest increasing land expropriation, the Israeli government chose
to make a swift crackdown. Six Palestinians were killed and the day has
since been memorialized as Land Day on the national Palestinian
calendar. This event contributed to an increase in awareness of
Palestinians living within the Israeli state by the wider Palestinian
community. Jewish
Settlement: Strategy for Control of the Land Religious
Jewish groups initially opposed the idea of establishing the promised
land of Israel through military force. The kingdom of Israel was to be
established by God alone. The early Israeli settlers in the Ottoman and
Mandate periods, and then in the early decades of the state, were
largely driven by secular ideology. However, in the wake of the capture
of Jerusalem in its entirety, and the West Bank of the Jordan, which is
considered to be the ancient Jewish kingdoms of Judea and Samaria, the
majority of religious Jews began to embrace the Zionist project with a
drive and fervor unseen till then. Support
from the religious establishment was essential for the Israeli
government expansion project and brought with it vital support from
abroad, particularly from the United States. Religious communities were
prepared to lead the way in pioneering settlement in the newly captured
areas, to maintain often dangerous positions in places such as Hebron
and Gaza. The residence of settlers was essential to the maintenance of
military positions and the expropriation of Palestinian water and
resources, policies that it was hoped would make life so difficult for
Palestinians that they would eventually choose to leave. In the West
Bank, just as in the Galilee, settlements were usually built on high
positions, giving the army a perfect vantage point to maintain control
of the Palestinian population. The
settlement project launched in earnest in the 1970s in the West Bank and
Gaza was in form the same as the methods that were employed to seize
control of the land following the 1948 Nakba (see 1948 –
1967). Land
was confiscated in order to build
The
necessity for the building of the above has been used, and continues to
be used, as justification to increase the stranglehold on the land and
to devastate Palestinian lives and economy. The methods by which this
end is achieved are applied on both sides of the Green Line:
The
Oslo Years: Activity on the Ground Increases Many
accounts of the Oslo period would describe in detail the different ways
in which land was classified and used, and accords implemented.
Technically, for example, the West Bank and Gaza were divided into areas
A, B, and C. Area A was to be land fully under control of Palestinian
Authority (Gaza Strip and major West Bank cities such as Jenin, Nablus,
and Ramallah). In Area B Palestinians were responsible for civil affairs
but Israelis responsible for security. Area C was under full Israeli
control. Yet in practice, with no control over borders or the economy,
and no contiguous territory, it is hard to describe even Area A as ever
having been “independent” Palestinian territory. In
the Oslo years, settlement building and land confiscation were
supposedly to end, and an “interim period” was established to build
up confidence between the two “sides” before “final status”
negotiations were completed. More is written about this in the section
entitled “The Struggle,” but suffice to say at this point, that the
majority of those that did have confidence in the Oslo process at the
beginning (and many did not) had pretty much lost this hope before the
second Intifada started. A
common media myth perpetuated is that if Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak
Rabin had not been assassinated, a just solution to the conflict over
land would have been reach. Close look at policy under Rabin in the Oslo
years suggests otherwise. In spring 1995 under the Rabin government,
nostalgically considered by Israeli “doves” as the golden years, it
was decided that 8,000 new housing units would be built in Ma’ale
Adumim. This Israeli settlement is located at the center of the West
Bank, halfway between Jerusalem and Jericho, and thus can be quite
clearly seen as part of the plan to divide the West Bank and annex the
area of “Greater Jerusalem” to what is internationally recognized as
Israel. During
Oslo, not only did settlements expand, but land confiscation continued
apace. In the decade following Oslo, settlements doubled and numbers of
settlers soared. Facts on the ground continued to be established. Ehud
Barak, considered as Rabin’s heir, built more settlements in East
Jerusalem than his Likud predecessor Netanyahu. The practice on the
ground, not the rhetoric on the international stage, led Palestinians to
conclude that any words of reassurance from Israel were empty rhetoric. Land
Policy into the 21st Century: Creating Facts on the Ground The
brutal land policy employed during the Intifada—the destruction and
confiscation of land on which people live and work—must be seen in a
very different context than simply “a response to the Palestinian
escalation in violence,” the light in which Israel is so keen to
portray it. This can be seen in any number of issues; just a few are
highlighted below:
Summary The
system of dominance and control is not a conspiracy theory; documents
and information related to specific areas are discussed publicly by
Israelis themselves. Look to the bibliographic and Internet references
provided on this site, and go beyond to find out for yourself. At times
Palestinians and international advocates have succeeded in preventing
certain specific steps by the Israelis—for example, changes in the
direction of walls and compensation deals—but as a whole system, no
tangible mechanism is in force internationally which will stop the
ongoing process of domination of the land. Until the whole system is
addressed, land will continue to be pulled further from the reach of the
Palestinian people. |
