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During World War I (1914–1918), Arab notable Sharif Hussein ibn Ali of Makkah forged an alliance with the British. Hussein hoped that he could become leader of an Arab kingdom independent of the Allies if he encouraged the Arabs to help crush the Ottoman Empire. Palestinian Arabs largely supported Hussein’s bid, hoping that this would lead to their own independence. The Western allies saw Hussein as a suitable candidate to garner Arab support, and thus what proved eventually to be a treacherous liaison was sealed. In 1915, correspondence between Hussein and the British High Commissioner in Cairo, Sir Henry McMahon, promised the Arabs independence “in all the regions demanded by the Sharif” in return for Arab support in the Allied attempts to overthrow the Ottomans. However,
unknown to Arab leaders, in 1916 the British and French imperial powers
signed the Sykes-Picot agreement. This overruled the terms laid out in
the Hussein-McMahon correspondence and laid the groundwork for dividing
the Ottoman Empire among the Allies.
In
regard to Palestine, Sykes-Picot stated that power was to be shared
among the Allies (excluding the Arabs), but in the final event the
British seized all power from the French. By December 1917, southern
Palestine and Jerusalem were in British hands. To compound the disaster
for the Arabs, just a month before, the infamous Balfour Declaration was
made. This oft-cited letter by British Prime Minister Arthur Balfour
promised the Zionist leadership a Jewish national home in Palestine, a
promise which would lead the colonial power into trouble initially with
the Arabs, but later with the Zionists, too. The
establishment of a “Jewish national home” was written into Article
IV of the mandate. Chaim Weizmann, a leading figure in the Zionist
movement in London, had personal influence in the very highest levels of
British government, owing to his position as leading scientific
researcher. Herbert Samuel, a Jewish British diplomat and openly a
Zionist, was appointed as first British High Commissioner. While
Zionists complained that he did not do all he could to ensure the
immediate establishment of a Jewish homeland, from the Palestinian
perspective this was a clear symbol of the level of collusion between
British and Zionist leaders.
By
1920, British control of Palestine, along with Trans-Jordan and
Mesopotamia (Iraq), had been recognized by the League of Nations, and
the military government in Palestine was replaced by a civilian
administration. It became clear to the Palestinians that a very real
threat was emerging beyond Western imperial colonialism, in the form of
Zionist settler colonialism. Both Palestinians and Zionists stepped up
their lobbying of those in power, with numerous delegations to the
British in Palestine and London. Between 1919 and 1922, three
Palestinian National Congresses were held, electing a Palestinian
Executive Committee. 1922
British White Paper
In
1922 the British issued a white paper (statement of policy) trying to
pacify growing Arab concern. It was emphasized that a Jewish homeland
would be within Palestine, not that the whole of the country was
destined to become Jewish, but Palestinians were not convinced by
British assertions. Mass immigration of Zionists continued to increase
the fears of the indigenous Arab peoples. Between 1919 and 1928, around
60 new Zionist settlements were established. In 1929, the Jewish Agency
was officially established. Tensions
continued to rise under the British Mandate. In August 1925 violent
clashes erupted at the Haram Ash-Sharif (Noble Sanctuary) in the Old
City of Jerusalem, following a protest by right-wing militant Zionist
secularists. This was perceived by the Palestinians as a direct threat
on the holy places, and the demonstration was met with violent protests
in which 133 Jews were killed and more wounded. The
British colonial response only served to aggravate the situation. The
British continued to promise both sides a place in the Palestine of the
future, but neither was reassured. A series of commissions and official
statements of policy always seemed to contradict and change what had
previously been said, to the anger of either Palestinians or Zionists,
who both believed the British were supporting the other. In
1933, Hajj Amin Al-Husseini was appointed mufti of Jerusalem and came
under increasing pressure from Palestinians to stand up to the Zionist
agenda. In the 1930s, Zionist-inspired Jewish immigration to Palestine
soared. Owing to the deterioration of living standards and dangers for
Jews in Europe, and the fact that the United Kingdom and United States
did not want to take responsibility in the West, immigration was, at
this stage, allowed to continue.
In the early 1930s, five new Palestinian political parties were formed, and it became increasingly accepted by the population that only an armed rebellion could succeed in bringing a true independence for the indigenous people in Palestine. In 1935 the first celebrated Palestinian guerilla operation was carried out, led by a Haifa-based Muslim preacher (of Syrian origin), Izz Ad-Din Al-Qassem. On his death in action he became an instant national martyr and hero. The Arab Revolt 1936–1939 In
April 1936 all five Palestinian political parties united under
Al-Husseini to become the Arab Higher Committee. National committees
were formed in towns and larger villages. By early May, the Palestinians
were in open armed rebellion, launching calls for all to partake in
civil disobedience and a general strike to protest British pro-Zionist
policies. For
a brief summary of the action of the history of the Arab revolt, it is
helpful to refer to Khalidi’s three phases (Khalidi, 1984): 1.
First Phase: May 1936–July 1937 In
this period the strike was strictly observed and there was an economic
shutdown of the whole Palestinian economy. Villagers took up arms in
rural areas and engaged in guerilla warfare. The Arab revolt was almost
entirely conducted by Palestinians, not by Arabs from outside. The
British rushed in reinforcements in response and used military force to
try and quell rebellion. On the political and diplomatic level, the Peel
Commission was launched to “establish the causes” of the rebellion. 2.
Second Phase: July 1937–Autumn 1938 In
July 1937, the Peel Commission report was published, unsurprisingly
concluding that the disturbances were a result of Palestinian desire for
independence and fear of the establishment of a Jewish national home.
Peel recommended partition, establishing a Jewish state and a
Palestinian state to be incorporated into Trans-Jordan (with a few areas
to remain under Mandate control).
The
Palestinians opposed the idea of partition and would not accept any
Zionist territorial claims in Palestine. It is important to note for
those not familiar with the history, that this was not opposition to
Jews living in Palestine as they always had done, but opposition to
Zionist control of the land. Under the Peel suggestion of partition, key
agriculturally fertile areas such as the Galilee and a large part of the
coastal plain would go to the Zionist state. Hundreds of Palestinian
villages would fall within the Jewish state. Palestinians feared land
confiscation, just as has occurred for Palestinian citizens of Israel
today. Another point of anger regarding Peel was the suggestion that the
Palestinian state would be incorporated into Jordan.
And
so the Palestinian resistance escalated. During this period fighters
even succeeded in assuming control of the Old City of Jerusalem. In an
effort to keep control, the British banned the Arab Higher Committee and
the individual Palestinian political parties. Palestinians deemed
responsible for the revolt were sent into exile or kept in detention
camps. In 1938 at least 1,000 Palestinians were killed by the British,
and 54 were executed by hanging. Some 2,500 were detained in camps. The
British air force, tanks, and heavy artillery were used not only against
the militants themselves, but also for collective punishment such as
housing demolition and curfews. The collective punishment enacted by
Israel in the 1967 territories today has a historical precedent in
British action to quell the Arab revolt. At
the same time as squashing the resistance, the British were building up
the Zionist military arsenal, cooperating with the Jewish Agency’s
secret army, the Haganah, to provide special training for a Jewish
Settlement Police (JSP). By early 1939 the JSP was 14,000-strong,
working in cooperation on secret operations with the British (Khalidi,
1984, p.190). Also during this second phase of the rebellion, the
Zionist militia, the Irgun Zvai Leumi (National Military Organization)
of the right-wing Zionist Revisionist Party, began a campaign of bombing
crowded market places. 3.
Third Phase: Autumn 1938–Summer 1939 The
British launched the Woodhead inquiry with the general conclusion that
partition was not practical. Alongside the commission, efforts to halt
the Arab revolt intensified. In February and March 1938, the British
sponsored a Zionist-Palestinian conference in London but refused to
allow outlawed Palestinian parties to participate. Unsurprisingly, no
agreement was reached. 1939
White Paper In
1939 a new British white paper was published. With yet another twist in
policy, the British announced that they believed that their obligations
to the Zionists were now fulfilled. Limits would be put on mass
immigration and land purchase, a plan to reassure Palestinians. Palestinians
obviously welcomed the idea of a unitary state, but the changes in
British policy in the past led to a cautionary air. The situation
between the British and Arabs calmed somewhat from previous years.
Zionists, on the other hand, were deeply angered by the white paper, and
it marked a formal end to the Anglo-Zionist unofficial pact that had
lasted for over two decades since the Balfour Declaration of 1917. Zionist
opposition, however, was muted during World War II (1939–1945), as
concern was focused on maintaining Allied support for defeating the
Nazis. Thousands of Palestinian Jews fought in the British army during
this war, and only the dissident Stern Gang continued Zionist militant
operations against the British Mandate authorities. But
the white paper inevitably brought tensions over immigration, escalating
in the years at the end of the war. Realizing that the British would not
bring all that they sought, the Zionists turned to America to cultivate
support. After the war the Zionist campaign escalated on diplomatic,
militaristic, and propaganda fronts (Khalidi, 1984, p. 236).
On
the military front, the Haganah was careful not to provoke the British
into a full-scale military response, as had been faced by Palestinian
rebels in the ’30s. However, they supported the militia attacks of the
Irgun and Stern Gang on British personnel and installations. On the
British side, it was not as easy to react harshly against the European
Zionists as it had been against non-European Arab resistance, especially
as the Americans were now interested in the Zionist cause. On
the propaganda front, the Zionists used images of thousands of destitute
refugees as a propaganda tool, posing Palestine as the only place of
refuge and a just solution for these people. The fact of European and US
responsibility for refugees in the West was ignored. The Zionists
continued to campaign for partition wherever there was a sympathetic
ear. In
1947, a meeting of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine
(UNSCOP) produced a report endorsing partition. On October 29, 1947, the
British announced that they would leave Palestine within six months if
no settlement was reached. On November 29 the UN General Assembly
recommended partition, with an international regime for Jerusalem. It is
important to note that only two African or Asian states—Liberia and
the Philippines—voted in favor of partition. |
