The second big winners were the Kurds, represented by the Kurdistan Alliance—comprised primarily of the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. The Kurdistan Alliance took second place with 25.6 percent of the votes; they have 75 seats in the National Assembly.

The Iraqi List, the party that catered to secularism, was headed by US-backed interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi. This party, which pursues policies mostly in line with US interests, came in a disappointing third, receiving only 13.7 percent of the vote and 40 seats in the parliament, despite a major media campaign.

The final party was The Iraqis, the Sunni Arab party led by present interim President Ghazi Al-Yawar. The Iraqis won just 1.8 percent of the votes, which gives it six seats in the National Assembly.

The first task for the National Assembly will be to appoint a presidential council, which consists of a president and two vice presidents and will be decided by a two-thirds vote. These individuals will then choose a prime minister and a cabinet; the appointees must then survive a confidence vote by a simple majority of the assembly. The Shiite bloc, with their 140 seats, makes up such a majority. Because of this, it is expected that the United Iraqi Alliance will have one of their own win the most powerful position, the prime minister.

The most important task of the parliament will be to write a new constitution. The goal is to have a draft prepared by mid-August that will be put in front of the population for a nationwide vote on October 15.

The large turnout for the United Iraqi Alliance secures that Iraq’s Shiite population will be the best represented bloc in post-election Iraq. Their position of power will give them much control in the government and in drafting the country’s new constitution. The Alliance will probably also get to appoint a prime minister, the most powerful position in Iraq’s system of government.

Nevertheless, the Shiite will not be able to completely dominate Iraq. Decisions on who will be appointed to influential posts, in addition to modifications to the constitution, will require a two-thirds majority of the National Assembly. This arrangement makes necessary the formation of coalitions within the Assembly, meaning that the Shiites will need to compromise with other parties within the Assembly to push through major changes.

Indeed, Sayyed Abdel Aziz Al-Hakim, the head of SCIRI, alluded to a potential coalition with the Kurds. Al-Hakim recently said, “A coalition between the Shiites and Kurd is good, because we don’t bump up against each other. The Shiites are in the south and the Kurds in the north. The Sunnis are between us, so we will never fight.”

If the Shiites and the Kurds were to form a coalition, they would control over 70 percent of the National Assembly, enough to secure a two-thirds majority. Nevertheless, the Kurds and the Shiites are bound to clash on many issues, making such a coalition far from certain.

Moreover, a Shiite-Kurdish coalition still needs Sunnis’ participation in the National Assembly’s main task—writing a draft for the permanent constitution for Iraq, which shall be presented to the Iraqi people for approval in a general referendum. If Sunnis get two-thirds of the voters in three or more governorates to reject the draft constitution, the National Assembly will be dissolved and new elections will be held.

This “veto” power can also be potentially used by the Kurds if two-thirds of the people of three predominantly-Kurdish governorates choose to vote no to the draft constitution. This, again, highlights the necessity for dialogue and the formation of coalitions between different Iraqi factions.

Senior Shiite clerics have stressed that the new constitution must embody Islamic law. Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Ishaq Al-Fayad, one of the four top Shiite authorities in Iraq, stated, “All of the ulema (scholars) and marjaiyas (religious authorities), and the majority of the Iraqi people, want the National Assembly to make Islam the source of legislation in the permanent constitution and to reject any law that is contrary to Islam.”

In the words of Adel Abdul Mehdi, the current finance minister and an influential member of SCIRI, “Eighty percent of Iraqis don’t have a problem with Islamic law.”

Yet, some Shiite leaders have stated that they will not press for Islamic law to be established throughout the country. Additionally, these same leaders, including aides from Al-Sistani, have said that they are uninterested in pursuing a theocratic form of government similar to Iran, where religious leaders hold a major stake in the federal power balance

Furthermore, most of Iraq’s Kurds are generally opposed to Islamic law, creating a situation where any attempt to impose such rule by the Shiites would be met with political resistance, and, potentially, violent struggle.

Faraj Haidari, a spokesman for the Kurdistan Democratic Party, asserted, “We are going to have civil law no matter what. If other cities want to have their own systems, let them do it.”

Due to this conflict of interests, one potential result will be an elaborate division of Iraq into different legal zones, allowing for Islamic law to be instituted in the areas where it has support from the population.

Shiites in general have been persecuted in several historical periods. Iraqi Shiites, for example, were largely oppressed during Saddam’s reign. The neighboring state of Iran is a Shiite-led power. Because of this connection, an Iraq led by a Shiite majority will see better relations with its neighbor to the east.

Further, many members of the Alliance spent years of exile in Iran during the rule of Saddam Hussein and the Baath Party; many members of the various Shiite militias were trained and supplied by Iran. The religious head of Iraq’s Shiites, Al-Sistani, is himself Iranian. And the head of SCIRI, Al-Hakim, holds Iran in high praises, which makes sense considering the fact that he lived in exile in the country for nearly 20 years; moreover, he received major funding from Tehran in the past. Interviewed by United Press International on January 27, Al-Hakim had this to say about Iran: “Iran has helped the whole Iraqi nation for two decades. We believe that with regard to the historical, cultural, religious, and political commonalities that exist between the two nations, the relations between Iran and Iraq will be based on friendship, mutual respect, and noninterference in each other’s affairs.”

Therefore, it can be expected that the new Iraqi government will seek closer ties with Iran. While it is unlikely that a Shiite-led Iraq will ally or agree with Iran on every issue, it can be expected that Baghdad will now join Tehran on many occasions, varying from the United States’ role in the Middle East to decisions on oil prices.

It is clear that the United States was hoping for the Iraqi List to win a larger role in the power sharing arrangement. The Iraqi List, led by Allawi, is very close to the United States and shares many of Washington’s interests. However, it may have been this exact relationship that led to the faction’s poor showing in the elections.

The United States is generally not a popular force in Iraq, and the fact that Allawi and his Iraqi List party were seen so close to US policy tainted them in the eyes of many Iraqis. So close to the United States, Allawi was even given the honor of addressing a joint session of Congress in September 2004. He was also responsible for the decision to launch assaults on Shiite forces in the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala, in addition to the Sunni Arab villages of Fallujah and Samarra. These attacks, which were launched in conjunction with actions by the US military, were not popular throughout Iraq, and led to much of the popular anger that is now directed toward US forces.

Had the Iraqi List won a larger stake in the government, it would have been easier for US troops to stay in Iraq. But the huge win of the United Iraqi Alliance party makes the continued extension of US influence in the country unpopular. As stated by Al-Hakim of SCIRI, “No dignified person is willing to see foreign troops in their country, and the Iraqi people are no exception. We hope, upon the formation, at the earliest, of strong and efficient military, police, and security organizations, that foreign troops leave the country.”

Al-Hakim’s statement appears to reflect the general mood of Iraq’s Shiites. While they are not ready to see a complete withdrawal of US troops—for such a withdrawal could result in civil warfare—the Shiites plan on waiting until they have enough control in the country so that the withdrawal of US troops would not result in the loss of their power.

The fallout from the national elections is not complete. In the following weeks, the nature of the power sharing arrangement between the different parliamentary contenders will become clear. One of the key developments will be with whom the Shiites look to form a coalition. It will also be relevant to note how Sunni Arabs react to the elections and whether the insurgency continues unabated. The worst potential outcome for Sunni Arabs will be that they become an oppressed faction within the country that once gave them preferential treatment for over eight decades.