Iraqis
have lived under the Baath party for over 30 years—and for
most of that time, under Saddam’s version of the Baath. Even
when Iraqis want to forget this past, old patterns, although not
etched in stone, have dug deep grooves into their psyche that
will continue to affect their society for years to come. So the
question of how to create a civil society based on principals of
democracy and the rule of law in a post-Saddam Iraq should
receive a great deal of public debate and discussion.
Unfortunately
the US is simply imposing its view of what such a society should
look like. But when put into practice, this view is running into
the brick wall of traditional and accepted Iraqi norms.
Many
believe that Iraq can only be ruled by a strong man. |
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The
following article was written after spending five and a half
months in Iraq (February-July 2004), and interacting with a
variety of Iraqi individuals, ministry staff and NGO
representatives. It is one view, among many, of the current
status of civil society in Iraq and it is offered in the hopes
that it may create more dialogue on this subject.
Only
a Strong Man
“Allawi,”
said a Shia cleric in Baghdad, speaking of the interim Prime
Minister, “he’s a little Saddam. He’ll be good for
Iraq.” While there are many Iraqis calling for an open,
democratic government, if you scratch the surface, even a
little, you are likely to get to a deeply held belief that Iraq
can only be ruled by a strong man. There are a number of sources
for this belief. One pragmatic reason for this idea is the fact
that the relatively stable (if oppressive) government of Saddam
and the Baath has given way to the crime and chaos of
Occupation. But the deeper roots of this may go back to the
painful collective memory of how Iraq was created, its borders
drawn by another occupier, the British. This difficult birth of
a nation included an imposed monarchy, revolution and one coup
after another until Saddam came along and exchanged the
bloodbath of nation-building for the equally bloody, but
remarkably resilient rule of a street thug. And Saddam, the
archetypal strongman, was to be venerated and praised for more
than 20 years, his picture on every wall, street corner, and
Iraqi Dinar.
In
the face of this history, is a healthy civil society likely to
arise from these ashes? Have Iraqis lived so long under a
tyrannical regime that they literally cannot imagine any other
type of government? It’s worthwhile to look at the Iraqi NGOs
that have arisen since the official end of the war to get an
idea of how the New Iraq is forming.
The
NGOs
Iraqi
NGOs are cut off from the outside world. |
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NGOs
(Non-Governmental Organizations) in Iraq are very different from
the types of civil organizations that Westerners are familiar
with. Iraqi NGOs, not surprisingly, reflect the male-dominated,
hierarchical society in which they are grounded. They are
generally academically-oriented institutions, and they are
disconnected from their counter-parts both inside and outside
the country. They tend to be suspicious of one another and
unwilling to network with natural allies.
They
have little understanding or experience in how to run an
organization independently from the government that is
accountable to both their membership and funders. They have at
times become a desperate means through which out-of-work,
professionally-trained Iraqis attempt to generate
self-employment opportunities.
Academics
vs. Activism
Iraqi
NGOs tend to have a more academic focus rather than an activist
one, and their membership is weighted towards older, male
academics. This is not surprising since academics, for the most
part, are non-threatening. If there is a problem, study it—but
one must be very careful never to go out and actually take
action to solve the problem. Tackling a problem academically can
take years and those in power are not likely to be troubled in
the least by such activities. Under Saddam, the problems arose
when someone started proposing solutions.
Networking
& Trust
Iraqi
NGOs have very limited knowledge of how (or willingness) to
network and coordinate activities with one another. This
primarily comes down to an issue of trust. Information under
Saddam could be a dangerous thing. One researcher in Iraq
recently told me that it is safer not to share information.
“Perhaps they will steal your information and pretend that it
is theirs,” he said. “Or they will use that information
against you in some way.” This problem with trust extends all
the way from professional to family interactions. In the Iraq of
Saddam, where even the innocent words of your children could get
you into trouble with the government, you had to be careful who
you let into your confidence.
Some
researchers in Iraq believe it is safer not to share
information. |
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International
Support
Iraqi
NGOs are cut off from the outside world and from international
organizations. Due to language and cultural differences, or just
a basic lack of information, most Iraqi NGOs are out of touch
with the work of their counterparts outside the country. And for
the most part, International NGOs are not doing nearly enough to
support and encourage Iraqi NGOs. When I was in Iraq, I spent a
great deal of time trying to make connections between Iraqi NGOs
and potential partners I knew of in the West, but I got very
little interest or response from many of these organizations.
Experience
Iraqi
NGOs are struggling to run organizations without any real
training or experience in budgeting, fundraising, or
organizational management. Running an independent organization
that is responsible for its own finances and activities, and
accountable to its members, was virtually impossible in
Saddam-era Iraq. Any quasi-civil society organization that did
exist (Student Unions, Women’s Association) was heavily
reliant on and controlled by the government.
Many
of the new Iraqi NGOs expect a similar close relationship with
the new Iraqi government. I attended two NGO meetings hosted by
the Ministry of Environment, where there were complaints that
the Ministry wasn’t providing funding for NGO projects. And I
heard the heads of NGOs gripe about that fact that the new Iraqi
government has not provided them with free office space. Such
things would rarely be heard of from NGOs in the West, who know
that government support is rare and often a double-edged sword
that is to be avoided.
Feeding
at a Non-Existent Public Trough
Only
a subset of the groups are truly dedicated to working on issues
central to their mission statements; some saw it as a potential
niche through which they would be able to find a way to
financially support themselves, their family, or friends.
Unemployment is rampant in Iraq. Many professional, highly
educated people are out of work and desperate for something,
anything, that will help them survive.
When
the Americans first came into Iraq, there was a great deal of
rhetoric about building a strong civil society. Many groups
started up to feed at this new, potentially lucrative, public
trough. Unfortunately, the US Agency for International
Development and related partner programs weren’t really
interested in funding Iraqi organizations. Iraqi organizations
didn’t know them. They couldn’t really speak to them, and
for goodness’ sake, they couldn’t even put together a
descent proposal in English!
There
never really was any opportunity to separate the wheat from the
chaff in terms of functional and non-functional Iraqi
NGOs—neither one were likely to get any funding from any of
the US aid groups.
A
Purely Iraqi Civil Society
These
are all disturbing trends when viewed through Western eyes, but
they should be expected given the history of Iraq and its
present circumstances. A strong and healthy civil society—just
like the establishment of democracy itself—is not something
that happens overnight. And an Iraqi civil society as the US
government may be envisioning it may take years to form. It is
also entirely likely that the US was never really interested in
what form a new Iraqi society would take as long as its
government and civic structure gave some lip service to
democracy and the rule of law—anything that would be
serviceable for US election campaigning. In the end, Iraqis will
most likely reject many aspects of the kind of civil society
that the US government at least verbally espouses.
In
the short run, the old patterns ingrained by years under Saddam
will continue to dominate, but even these will fade with time.
And as negative as some of these trends appear to be, the
proliferation of Iraqi NGOs is creating both a chaotic and
transformative experience for Iraqis. Eventually the country
will ford its own path to the creation of a vibrant, purely
Iraqi civil society.