|
|
|
A Shi’te demonstration
|
Progress
was made in Iraq on October 8 when the Iraqi Governing Council
(IGC) signed an interim constitution. The constitution is to
remain in effect until late 2005, when a permanent one will be
voted upon. The road to this day was fraught with obstacles, as
Iraq’s three main ethnic groups struggled to agree on a common
political framework; the initial date to sign the agreement,
October 5, passed without agreement as most of the leading
Shi’ite members of the IGC walked out in protest, heeding the
warning of Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani who had grave
reservations about certain clauses in the new constitution.
Despite
Monday’s success, the signing of the interim constitution has
only delayed the inevitable power clash that will eventually
occur unless Iraq’s Shi’ite population secures a majority
influence over political decisions in the turbulent country.
Click
here
to read the full text of Iraq’s interim constitution. |
|
Immediately
after the signing of the interim constitution, Al-Sistani
released a decree warning that, “This law places obstacles in
the path of reaching a permanent constitution for the country
that maintains its unity, the rights of sons of all sects and
ethnic backgrounds.” Ibrahim Jafari, a Shi’ite member of the
IGC, asserted that the signing of the interim constitution did
not mean that the provisions entailed were final, stating that
the thirteen Shi’ite members of the IGC would work to alter
certain clauses within the document before the June 30 handover
of power from the United States to the IGC. Jafar said, “We
say here, our decision to sign the document is pegged to
reservations.”
A
principal clause in the interim constitution that is not
considered acceptable by the Shi’ite population is Article 61,
Clause C. It states, “The general referendum will be
successful and the draft constitution ratified if a majority of
the voters in Iraq approve and if two-thirds of the voters in
three or more governorates do not rejected it.” This provision
theoretically gives Kurds and Sunni Arabs a veto over the
drafting of a permanent constitution when it is voted on in late
2005. The contested clause states that the constitution will be
rejected if two-thirds of the population of three provinces
votes against it, even if it wins the majority vote nationwide.
This clause was a direct attempt by the United States to prevent
Shiites (the ethnic group that constitutes some 60 percent of
the Iraqi population) from dominating Iraq under the new
constitution.
Washington
fears that Shi’ites’ control of Iraq would work counter to
US interests in the country and, possibly, in the region as a
whole. For one, Shi’ite majority rule would not be accepted by
Iraqi minority groups, especially the Kurds and Sunni Arabs. The
Kurds already have governed over a fairly autonomous region in
the north of the country and have experimented with years of
self-rule due to US and British-enforced “no fly zones”
initiated shortly after the cessation of the Gulf War.
In
that time period, the United States protected the Kurds
militarily from Saddam Hussein’s rule and politically from
Turkey’s historical attempts to quell Kurdish aspirations for
autonomy. Because of this political experience, ceding authority
to a government in Baghdad controlled by Shi’ite leaders would
work directly opposite to Kurdish interests and would push them
more in the direction toward yearning for independent statehood.
Sunni
Arabs were the traditional power brokers in Iraq under
Saddam’s Ba’athist establishment and are, therefore, very
politically organized. They will react harshly to Shi’ite
majority rule; the United States has already blamed Sunni Arab
groups for perpetuating much of the guerrilla conflict plaguing
US-led coalition troops today, especially in the region that the
Bush administration dubs the “Sunni Triangle.”
These
political realities mean that an Iraq governed by Shi’ite
majority would likely breed instability in the country and
possibly in the region. For example, there is the persistent
fear in Washington and other capitals that, if Baghdad were run
by Shi’ite leaders, the country would greatly increase its
ties with neighboring Iran, another country that is a haven for
Shi’ite Muslims. If this were to occur, the two countries
could create an extremely powerful alliance in the region and
usurp the power of any other regional state. This alteration in
the balance of power would weaken the power leverage that the
United States and certain other Western powers have in the
Middle East and Central Asia.
These
reasons explain why Washington is carefully working on forging
some sort of a compromise in Iraq in which the country’s
Shi’ite population would accept a government structure that
does not place them in sole control. But since Iraq’s
Shi’ite population is so close to gaining a level of power it
has never experienced before, it will be difficult to sway them
away peacefully from this objective.
Erich
Marquardt is an analyst with the Power and Interest News
Report (PINR), located on the web at http://www.pinr.com
|
