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Members
of the Iraqi Governing Council meet in Baghdad
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The
Iraqi Governing Council’s (IGC) composition is already a
recipe for disaster, say critics of the US-appointed
government-in-the-making, because it has been divided, often
unevenly, along sectarian lines.
“Politicizing
the sectarian differences in this way in the post-Saddam era
will not work. The US thinks it can put together a government by
giving political power to everyone who is not a Sunni Arab to
make up for Saddam’s Sunni-dominated government. Tension is
already rising because of how the council was put together,”
said Abdel Samad Al-Anbari, an Iraqi living in Montreal.
The
composition of the governing council is indicative of the
various religions and ethnicities that make up the modern nation
of Iraq. Comprised of 25 members, it includes 13 Shiites, five
Sunnis, five Kurds, one Christian and one Turkoman; three of the
25 are women.
“Barely
a week after the IGC appointments, many of Iraq’s political
and religious groups are questioning its legitimacy as a
representative of all Iraqis. Iraqi observers and politicians
expressed growing fears that the council, with its current
constellation, might set the stage for the establishment of
sectarian bases of political power and undermine solidarity
between Iraq’s two major Muslim communities,” said an
editorial in Egypt’s Al-Ahram Weekly.
Although
most Iraqis agree that the sectarian composition of the council
is a recipe for Iraqi civil war and dissolution, the challenges
facing the council go beyond sectarian loyalties. Nearly most of
the 25 members are unknown to both Iraqis inside the country and
dissidents in self-imposed exile elsewhere, while those whose
names have continued to resurface in North American media are
citizens of other nations.
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Click here for Ahmed Chalabi’s
profile. |
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A
thorough study of the members of the council reveals that many
of the most luminous are not even Iraqi citizens. Ahmed
Chablabi, a rich financier who fled Iraq as a child in the
1950s, and current leader of the London-based group, the Iraqi
National Congress, had never returned to Iraq until April of
this year. A British citizen, Chalabi was convicted in absentia
of fraudulent banking activities in Jordan in 1989 and sentenced
to 20 years in prison.
Chalabi’s
statements before and during the war hint at the notorious
politician’s leanings in post-war Iraq. On April 6, Chalabi
alarmed Iraqi opposition forces in and outside Iraq when he told
MSNBC that he believed the US Army should remain longer than
proscribed and continue to maintain a strong military presence
in Iraqi cities.
Many
in Iraq who do know of him view him as a lackluster puppet of
the Bush administration. One of Chalabi’s first announcements
upon entering Iraq was that he would immediately reverse
Iraq’s oil nationalization policies and mete out all contracts
to US and UK firms.
The
two statements have worried many in the Iraqi community who
believe that Chalabi is lying about not seeking an official
position and will operate as a de facto proxy “middle-man”
for US and UK strategic oil interests.
With
powerful oil conglomerates vying for lucrative black goldmines
in Iraq, powerful oil interests entrenched in the White House,
and Chalabi’s alleged role as a middle-man for the
aforementioned, Iraqis and some CIA officials are beginning to
feel that the new government in Iraq will be run by non-Iraqis
-- Iraqis who have not been in Iraq in decades and are out of
touch with the Iraqi populace. Chalabi himself has not been to
Iraq proper in 45 years.
Chalabi’s
INC has received a $97 million aid package from Washington and
maintains strong commercial ties with US Vice-President Dick
Cheney, US Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, and other
power-brokers, including the powerful oil lobby.
Of
particular note is that Cheney was former CEO of Halliburton,
which is thought to be positioning itself (or through
third-party affiliates) to rebuild Iraq’s ailing oil
infrastructure. In August, oil industry giants Bechtel and
Schlumberger pulled out of what they said was a biased contract
bidding atmosphere; they accused the US military of heavily
favoring Halliburton, already in Iraq, of hoarding the
opportunities a “free” Iraq offers.
US
National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice also maintains strong
ties with the Texas-based Chevron oil company, which has named a
super tanker, The Condoleezza, in her honor.
There
have also been allegations that the INC is supported by the
AIPAC, a dominant pro-Israeli lobby in Washington. According to Ha’aretz
writer Nathan Guttman, “[Head of the Washington office of the
Iraqi National Congress] Intifad Qanbar’s invitation to the
conference reflects a first attempt to disclose the links
between the American Jewish community and the Iraqi opposition,
after years in which the two sides have taken pains to conceal
them.”
Chalabi
is one of the 13 Shiites on the council.
Abdel
Aziz Al-Hakim, brother of the leader of the Supreme Council for
the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) is probably the next most
powerful Shiite on the council. Prior to the war, SCIRI sold
itself as the sole representative of the Shiite majority in Iraq
while pledging allegiance to its Iranian backers.
In
Iran since 1982, Al-Hakim was provided thorough logistical and
financial support to build an army, which eventually came to be
called the Badr Brigade, a 10,000-strong corps consisting of
infantry, armored, artillery, anti-aircraft and commando units.
The Badr Brigade has been committed to the formation of an
Islamic Iraq.
Baqir
Al-Hakim, leader of SCIRI returned to Iraq in early May in what
many analysts saw as reminiscent of Khomeini’s return to Iran
in 1979. In southern Iraq, the SCIRI leader said “Iraq must
base its laws on Islamic strictures and prohibit the kind of
behavior that may be acceptable in the West but is forbidden in
Islam.” How this aspiration will play out within the political
wrangling of the IGC remains to be seen.
Jalal
Talabani and Massoud Barazani, both Sunni Kurds of the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)
respectively, also sit on the council but have rarely seen
eye to eye. During the 1990s both engaged in wars of attrition
against one another and maintained close ties in one form or
another with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Both men lead
strong armies of peshmerga fighters, feared in northern Iraq
because of their ruthlessness and barbarity.
During
the period 1970-2003, Kurdish peshmerga routinely attacked Arab
civilians in Iraq, raided Arab villages, and in minor cases
murdered civilians. They blamed Arabs for keeping Saddam’s
Baath government in power and sought revenge for the ethnic
cleansing campaigns launched by Saddam’s henchmen.
When
Kurdish fighters entered the cities of Mosul and Kirkuk, as well
as other Arab villages in the vicinity, they proceeded to
forcibly remove Arab families from homes they claimed as their
own. Any who resisted were immediately shot. In the first few
days after the fall of Baghdad, Kurdish forced defied a US ban
and quickly moved to capture as much territory in northern Iraq
as possible. Arabs, dismayed at the change in the balance of
power, quickly allied themselves with local tribesmen and a
mini-war, undeclared and mostly unknown to the west, broke out
in northern Iraq.
Writing
for The Independent from northern Iraq, reporter Patrick
Cockburn said, “The Kurds have gained so much territory in
northern Iraq, that it will be difficult for any future Iraqi
government to accept this. Kurdish advances have frightened the
Arabs across northern Iraq.” He cited the number of Arabs and
Kurds killed while fighting one another from village to village.
Many
local Iraq experts believe the rush to consolidate a hold on
northern Iraq is a Kurdish ploy to strengthen their claims for
autonomy and eventual independence.
The
motives of the two Kurdish leaders come in to question. In 1999,
Talabani told Kurdish media that “whatever that US says is not
bad and the United States of America is a big government in the
world. We are not American and we are Kurd and the Kurdish
interests have priority over other issues, but we have friendly
relations with the US and we also have some different
opinions.”
This
leaves open the question: Do Kurdish interests have priority
over those of a unified Iraq?
“The
very members of the IGC show us just what the United States
intends to do,” said a former member of Iraq’s government
from Kingston, Canada. Refusing to be identified, he went on to
say that the Kurds have never been in a stronger position to
call for secession and the creation of an independent Kurdistan.
He claimed that in-fighting will eventually tear the council
apart, with each faction withdrawing to the protections of its
armed militias.
“Those
with foreign passports like Chalabi and [Iyad] Allawi will run
as soon as the situation worsens,” he said.
Power,
Legitimacy and Recognition
The final
say on the Iraqi policy remains Bremer’s. |
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While
Iraq’s US Civil Administrator Paul Bremer continues to laud
the progress made by the council and its speedy pursuit of
self-rule, it remains to be seen just how much power the members
actually retain.
To
satisfy the political and religious whims and, in particular the
squabbling that threatened to tear the council apart in its
first few days, Bremer suggested a rotating president every
month, giving nine “elected” council members a chance at the
top spot.
The
first president of the IGC, Ibrahim Al-Jaafari, trained in
medicine at Mosul University, does not consider Iraq to be his
home. In an interview with the Associated Press last weekend,
Al-Jaafari admitted that he considered London, England to be his
home. A member of the formerly outlawed Al Da`awa party,
Al-Jaafari had not been to Iraq in 23 years.
But
what power does Al-Jaafari really have? None, say critics,
because by the end of August he will be replaced. No one in
Baghdad has heard of Al-Jaafari; much less cares for him.
“His
family live in the comforts of their London home, how could we
consider him one of us,” said Bazan Al-Na`imi, an Iraqi
student stranded in Canada.
The
IGC’s power is rather limited, according to a document
released by the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority:
“It
will exercise specific powers in addition to representing the
interests of the Iraqi people to the Coalition Provisional
Authority and the international community.”
The
above effectively appoints the council members as middlemen
between the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the Iraqi
people. While the council can appoint interim ministers, it
cannot effect major policy changes unless specifically
coordinated with the CPA.
“Together
with the Coalition the council shall name Iraqi nationals to
serve as representatives to international organizations and
conferences… The council, with the Coalition and with the
involvement of the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and
the United Nations Development Program, will play a full part in
drawing up the 2004 national budget,” the document says.
Evidently,
the council has very little independence; Bremer has the power
to veto (sources indicate the council members accepted his
supreme power over them) any council decision - the final say on
Iraqi policy remains his.
The
Iraqi police force, which was briefly trained and allowed to arm
by US military forces, answers to the CPA and not the IGC. The
New Iraqi army is being recruited and selected by Iraqi tribes,
but does not owe its allegiance to the IGC.
Iraqi
courts have no jurisdiction over any Coalition personnel in
relation to civil and criminal matters and also do not answer to
the IGC.
An
Amnesty International report also highlights the shortcomings of
the council: “The organization has investigated a number of
cases of unlawful detention. These result from the failure of to
implement promptly release orders issued by Iraqi examining
magistrates, before the approval of a senior military
official.”
Not
surprisingly, the IGC was met with disdain and outright
rejection by many Iraqis.
Muqtada
Al-Sadr, son of Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq Al-Sadr, who was
assassinated along with two of his sons in 1999, rejected the
IGC from the outset.
“We
condemn the Governing Council headed by the United States. An
Islamic army must be created and volunteers for this great army
must come forward,” the 30-year old cleric told his supporters
in the Shiite Holy City of Najaf. He called the 25 members of
the council “nonbelievers.”
In
the wake of the recent US Army’s fatal shooting of Shiite
demonstrators protesting an alleged attempt to tear down an
Islamic banner, Al-Sadr’s call for an Islamic army has been
strengthened.
According
to sources in Iraq, Sunnis embittered with the US presence are
beginning to rally to Al-Sadr’s site.
Christians
have also started to vent their anger at the council. The latest
political group, the Christian Democratic Party of Iraq,
rejected the new interim government and specifically pointed out
their rejection of Kurdish leader Massoud Barazani. The
Christian group said it would not recognize any government
unless directly voted in by the Iraqi people and legitimately
represented the aspirations of the people.
Neither
will Iraq’s Arab neighbors and regional powers. Iran welcomed
the IGC, but refused to endorse or recognize it. The Arab League
rejected outright opening any channels for official recognition
of the council.
“The
Council is a start but it should pave the way for a legitimate
government that can be recognized,” Arab League
Secretary-General Amr Moussa said.
Firas
Al-Atraqchi is a Canadian journalist of Iraqi heritage.
Holding an MA in Journalism and Mass Communication, he has
eleven years of experience covering Middle East issues, oil and
gas markets, and the telecom industry. You can reach him at firas6544@rogers.com
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